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Conceiving Due Process
Cynthia R. Farinat
"No answer is what the wrong question begets.
We seem unable to make peace with procedural due process.2
To be sure, in the twenty years since Goldberg v. Kelly3 the Supreme
Court has come to speak in the clear, strong tones of doctrinal certainty. It
now deals deftly with claims that people have been mishandled by their
government, first culling out those who can point to no "entitlement" and then
weighing up, for those who remain, just how much process the system can
afford. Once-sharp and fundamental debates on the Court about the nature,
scope, and purpose of procedural due process in the administrative state have
subsided into occasional squabbles among the justices about the margins of the
doctrine and sporadic disagreements over its specific application.
Do not, however, mistake this lessening conflict on the Court for some
emergent consensus that procedural due process has been brought, at last,
through the turbulent years of rapid growth to a stage of doctrinal maturity and
sophistication. Scratch the smooth, plausible skin of the doctrine and there lies
turmoil, contradiction, and instability, a pathological combination of ineffectu-
alness and destructiveness. For years, commentators have warned of this, in
terms ranging from dignified rebuke4 to near evangelical condemnation.'
Indeed, the doctrine's most remarkable quality may be its ability to transcend
traditional boundaries and unite, in thorough-going disapproval, those on the
political left and right, constitutional theorists and administrative law scholars,
academics and practitioners, Kantians, utilitarians, and Hegelians.6 Procedural
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1. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 103 (1962).
2. The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution provides: "No person shall .. .be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law. .. "The Fourteenth Amendment extends this prohibition
to the States.
3. 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (extending procedural protection to termination of welfare benefits).
4. E.g., Timothy Terrell, Liberty and Responsibility in the Land of "New Property : Exploring the
Limits of Procedural Due Process, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 351, 352 (1987) ("the Court's failure to identify
any consistent, meaningful, or comprehensive theory of the due process clause").
5. E.g., Edward Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1044, 1065 (1984)
("the current agony of procedural due process"); id. at 1083 ("a jurisprudential Armageddon").
6. Of course, the grounds of criticism and the proposed solutions vary dramatically. See Part II infra.
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due process is ringed by criticism, and the Court's increasingly single-minded
entrenchment in that doctrine seems the exhausted stubbornness of those who
must continue to function in the face of protracted siege.
I began this article as an exploration of the problems with contemporary
procedural due process jurisprudence. But, as I read the considerable literature
produced in the last two decades, I started to doubt my original undertaking.
Critiques of the doctrine abound. Yet one more seemed unlikely to make a
difference. However, as I continued, with almost morbid fascination, to read
one devastating attack after another, I realized something else. Several of the
most acute and imaginative minds in modern legal scholarship have pushed,
and probed, and worried over what's wrong with due process in the adminis-
trative state. Why, then, do we seem to make no progress towards getting
procedural due process right? That is the question I consider here.
I still begin by exploring the problems with procedural due process juris-
prudence: its schizophrenic dependence upon and rejection of the dictates of
the legislature, its simultaneous overprotection and underprotection of interac-
tions between people and their government, its contorted view of the value of
process. My purpose in this first half of the article is to chronicle how a
profoundly troubled doctrine has resisted twenty years of efforts to right it.
Just as every story embodies a point of view, so this chronicle is my own
synthesis and interpretation of those years. To that end, I have selected,
arranged, and connected, across time and political spectrum, so that the
doctrine and the criticism it has evoked can be seen as an integrated whole.
At the same time, however, I have sought to retain the voices of the courts
and commentators who made the jurisprudence, conveying and (at least for the
moment) sharing the aspirations and the anxieties they brought to the undertak-
ing. In other words, the synthesis and interpretation that occurs in this first
half deliberately takes place within the perspective of the prevailing discourse;
it is a gathering together of the ways we have been accustomed to think and
talk about procedural due process in the regulatory state.7
Having told the story of those years in its own terms, I then consider, in
the second half of the article, how we might tell a different story. I begin by
suggesting that both the problems within procedural due process doctrine and
our inability to solve those problems can be directly traced to the set of
assumptions-about human nature, the role of law, and the relations among
people and between people and their government-that have thus far engen-
dered our thinking in this area. Where we began has led us, ineluctably, to
where we have ended up. These assumptions, once uncovered, may not appear
novel or startling. Indeed, their very familiarity, the ease with which we take
7. Thus, the critiques (of doctrine and scholarly solutions) that I make in the first half accept the terms
in which the debate has thus far been cast. My choice to reserve challenges to those terms until the second




them on as the concepts that shape and order our thinking, blinds us to their
influence. They are assumptions which have been so embedded in our legal
culture as to seem inevitable. And yet, the only thing that is inevitable is that
we will be unable to solve the problems in procedural due process doctrine so
long as we begin with these assumptions.
And so, finally, I will pose a very different beginning: a set of understand-
ings, drawn from feminist theory, about what people are and need, what law
might accomplish, and how we should understand the relationship between the
citizenry and the state. And I will sketch (at least, preliminarily) the very
different procedural due process that might be brought forth from such origins:
a jurisprudence that pursues the connection between a people and their govern-
ment rather than the autonomy of isolated individuals; that seeks ever-improv-
ing solutions within the particularized, living context of actual programs rather
than timeless, universal answers from abstract, objective principles; and that
strives to create a culture in which public power will be used with care rather
than a set of weapons with which its misuse can be defended against. I hope
to convince you that these alternative understandings respond, in important
ways, to the experience of life in the modern regulatory state, and that they
therefore hold the promise of producing the truly humane procedural due
process which thus far has eluded us. I hope also to reassure you that, even
though these alternative starting points are radically different from where we
have been accustomed to beginning, the vision they generate would not be
radically disconnected from what we have been thinking, feeling, and attempt-
ing. Rather, the effect is that of reversing a damask: woven background
becomes foreground, what has been muted is made manifest, a new pattern
that has always existed is revealed. But even if you remain unpersuaded of
these things, consider the undertaking a heuristic exploration-helping us
understand that "the agony of procedural due process" is largely self-inflicted.
I. THE DOCTRINE
"A more misspent piece of marvellous ingenuity
I never read ... .
The current doctrinal analysis proceeds according to a by-now-well-settled
framework that tracks, quite formulaically, the language of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments: Has the claimant been "deprived" of "liberty" or
"property" without "due process of law"? The threshold question of whether
a "deprivation" has occurred is conceptually interesting, but of relatively
limited practical importance. 9 Far more critical is the next analytic step: Does
8. 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 17 (Mark Howe ed. 1941).
9. After initially holding that negligent official conduct was sufficient, see Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.
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the loss involve an interest characterizable as "property" or "liberty"? The
methodology for defining those interests effectively determines the scope of
procedural due process protection available to the individual confronting
administrative power.
The Constitution, the Court has insisted, does not itself create "proper-
ty."10 As explained in Board of Regents v. Roth,1 the presence of a property
interest depends upon the content of the sub-constitutional federal or state law
governing the particular regulatory program. Specifically, this law must contain
substantive standards that limit the discretion of the official decisionmaker.
Such discretion-constraining criteria create a "legitimate claim of entitlement,"
which constitutes the "property" due process protects.12
Originally, only property interests were identified through entitlement
analysis. The Roth Court conceptualized "liberty" very differently, adopting
Meyer v. Nebraska's broad vision of an open-ended set of fundamental rights
rooted deep in natural law:
Without doubt, [liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in
any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge,
to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized. . . as essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men. In a Constitution for a free people, there can
be no doubt that the meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed. 3
Hence, in the early stages of constructing the modern doctrinal framework,
"liberty" was understood to have an expansive, immanent substantive content,
even though "property" was viewed as completely derivative of other law.
The Court still acknowledges that liberty interests can be grounded directly
in the Constitution. Less certain, however, is its continued commitment to the
Meyer vision of liberty as including but not being limited to interests explicitly
protected in parts of the constitutional text outside the due process clauses
themselves. The first signs of ambivalence appeared in two cases decided four
527, 536-37 (1981), the Court now interprets "deprive" to require some intentional (or possibly reckless)
abuse of power. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-32 (1986). In the "typical" administrative
due process case, the harmful conduct-withdrawing benefits or employment, or imposing some penalty-is
unequivocally intentional, even though the complaint may be that the official decision resulted from careless
information-gathering or processing.
In the less frequent cases in which the harm is attributed to an official'sfailure to act, the mental state
requirement is further complicated by the Court's recent distinction between governmental action and
inaction. See Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services, 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989); David
Strauss, Due Process, Government Inaction, and Private Wrongs, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 53.
10. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
11. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
12. Id. at 577.
13. Id. at 572, quoting, in part, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
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years after Roth. Paul v. Davis repudiated a long line of precedent that had
recognized a Meyeresque liberty interest in reputation."' In Paul's revisionist
account, the constitutionally critical fact in the earlier cases was not that
government had stigmatized an individual but rather that some other, non-
reputational "right or status previously recognized by state law was distinctly
altered or extinguished." 5 This invocation of what sounded suspiciously like
entitlement reasoning was followed shortly by Meachum v. Fano. " Meachum
explicitly used entitlement reasoning to determine whether the transfer of state
prisoners to another penal institution implicated a liberty interest. 7 Meachum
may simply have intended to expand the possible range of "liberty" to include
entitlements created by sub-constitutional law. However, Paul loomed large,
and the dissenters read Meachum as reining in Meyer's naturalistic conception
with the positivist tethers of entitlement. '
Whatever the original intent of Meachum, once entitlement analysis became
available as a way to think about liberty as well as property interests, its power
as an analytic framework was almost irresistible. After all, a substantial part
of the constitutional content of liberty can be neatly accounted for in entitle-
ment terms: What is the Bill of Rights but a set of standards, of the highest
order, constraining the discretion of official decisionmakers? The fit is not so
comfortable, however, for interests not explicitly protected in the constitutional
text. Although it is not impossible to recast Meyer in entitlement
terms-"liberty" in the due process clauses would be seen as itself a source
of entitlement to marry, engage in the common occupations of life, acquire
useful knowledge, etc.-entitlement's emphasis on locating a checklist of
substantive standards limiting government action serves only to highlight the
indeterminacy of the natural law/fundamental rights vision. And the Court has
appeared increasingly uncomfortable invoking that vision. While it has not
openly disavowed the naturalistic conception of Meyer, it repeatedly and
conspicuously sidesteps opportunities to affirm, unambiguously, that "liberty"
has significant immanent content independent of interests recognized by other
law. 9
As the methods for identifying "property" and "liberty" converge into
entitlement analysis, the precise workings of that analysis have become critical,
for they effectively determine the nature and scope of the due process guaran-
14. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). Roth itself had acknowledged reputation as a protected interest; it had even
collected cases demonstrating it as such. See 408 U.S. at 573.
15. 424 U.S. at 711 (emphasis added).
16. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
17. See id. at 226-29.
18. Id. at 229-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
19. Even in the core area of interference with physical integrity, the Court now tends to link "liberty"
to the terms of subconstitutional positive law. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488-93 (1980)
(transfer of prisoner to mental hospital); Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1036-37 (1990)
(nonconsensual administration of psychotropic drugs to prisoner). In both cases, the Court first identifies
in detail a state law liberty entitlement, then adds a cursory assurance that due process itself also generates
a liberty interest.
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tee. Standards that constrain the discretion of the official decisionmaker-the
touchstone of entitlement-may be found in state or federal statutes, municipal
ordinances, or the terms of agency regulations and contracts. Whether they
can be grounded in anything short of explicit, written official promulgations
is increasingly doubtful. Early on, a companion case to Roth held that entitle-
ment could be found in the "unwritten common law"2" of the agency, as
proved by "the existence of rules and understandings, promulgated and
fostered by state officials . "..."21 Later, however, Paul v. Davis refused to
recognize the common law of defamation as a source of entitlement to reputa-
tion.22 Then, Meachum v. Fano gave short shrift to a claim based on institu-
tional practice. Although the majority admitted that prison transfer decisions
typically hinge on official judgments about inmate conduct' (and conceded
that this had been so in Fano's case24), it found no entitlement because state
statutes did not explicitly limit the transfer power to occasions of inmate
misbehavior. 5 Subsequent institutional practice claims have fared similarly
poorly. As in Meachum, the reason does not appear to be judicial disbelief that
the plaintiffs accurately represented the reality of official practice, but rather
unwillingness to accord constitutional significance to a course of agency
conduct not formally codified in positive law.
26
The constriction of the institutional practice branch of entitlement analysis
has been matched by increasing restrictions on even those claims grounded in
20. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972) (internal quotes omitted).
21. Id. at 602 (emphasis added) (remanded to determine whether standard met).
22. 424 U.S. at 708-10. Although agency common law and judicial common law are different, they
share a defect crucial to the Court's analysis: Each lacks the affirmative imprimatur of the majoritarian
processes. See infra text accompanying notes 190-200.
23. 427 U.S. at 228.
24. Id. at 216-21 & nn.2-3. The plaintiffs had been transferred because of alleged participation in a
riot.
25. Id. at 228.
26. E.g., Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979) (per curiam); Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v.
Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 465 (1981); Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S.-, 104 L.
Ed.2d 506, 522 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
At one point, a 5-4 per curiam opinion introduced a peculiar twist by asserting that institutional
practice can be invoked to ground property but not liberty entitlements. See Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S.
14 (1981). This distinction, which the Court has not mentioned since, seems thoroughly unsound. In the
first place, the difference between "liberty" and "property" entitlements is often elusive. For example,
both employment and education have been labelled property interests, see Roth, 408 U.S. at 577; Goss
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-73 (1975), even though Meyer and other early substantive due process cases
regarded both as aspects of liberty. See Henry Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property", 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 405, 434-35 (1977). Even within the contemporary period, the Court has not been consistent, compare
Goss, 419 U.S. at 573 (describing "good time credits" as property) with Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225-26
(describing same as liberty), which suggests that the classification was never thought to matter. More
fundamentally, although it is superficially appealing to associate such contractual notions as implied
promises and estoppel with "property" rather than "liberty," the real question is what due process is
supposed to be protecting. If entitlement analysis tries to safeguard the citizen's reasonable expectations
about official behavior, see infra text accompanying note 189, there is no reason why institutional practice
should be relevant to defining property, but not liberty, interests. If (as now seems more likely) protection
of reasonable reliance is not the moving force behind entitlement, see infra text accompanying notes 190-95,
Jago is probably best understood as one step towards eliminating institutional practice claims across the
board.
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formal official promulgations. The issue here is the degree to which positive
law must constrain official discretion before an entitlement will be recognized.
Frequently, a regulatory statute will establish decisional criteria that are not
determinate and self-executing; rather, their application requires an exercise
of official judgment. In 1987, the Court explicitly considered whether such
statutes might give rise to an entitlement, and six justices agreed that they
could.27 Justice O'Connor vehemently dissented, insisting that entitlement
requires "particularized standards or criteria."2 Joined by Justice Scalia and
the Chief Justice, she argued that no protected interest exists unless "judicially
manageable standards are available for judging how and when an agency
should exercise its discretion."29 In 1989, the Court moved significantly
closer to this more restrictive view, announcing that entitlement requires
"explicitly mandatory language in connection with the establishment of specific
substantive predicates to limit discretion."3 Regulations that contained "sub-
stantive predicates undoubtedly ...intended to guide the [official's] discre-
tion" were held insufficient where "the regulations are not worded in such a
way that an inmate could reasonably expect to enforce them against prison
officials.""' Thus, the doctrine now apparently incorporates Justice O'Con-
nor's theory that a protected interest exists only where positive law provides
a basis for courts to compel the official to act or refrain from acting.32
The final significant aspect of entitlement analysis is its treatment of any
procedural terms contained in positive law. The rule, simple at least in theory,
is that such provisions are irrelevant. On the one hand, statutes or regulations
that impose procedural requirements on official action cannot, by themselves,
give rise to liberty or property interests.33 On the other hand, neither can
procedural provisions limit the dimensions of the entitlement. In other words,
the question of what process is due is entirely separated from the question of
whether process is due. The latter may (and in the case of property, must)
27. Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 375-81 (1987) (Discretion is inconsistent with
entitlement only where decisionmaker "is simply not bound by standards set by the authority in question,"
such that he is, in effect, authorized to decide as he sees fit.).
28. Id. at 382 (dissenting op.).
29. Id. (citations omitted).
30. Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S.-, 104 L.Ed.2d 506, 516 (1989) (citations
omitted).
31. Id. at 517-18.
32. On the critical question whether the terms of the particular statute or regulation represent
mandatory decisional standards, ultimate interpretive authority rests with the courts of the relevant
jurisdiction, see, e.g., Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249-50 & n.10 (1983) (deferring to Hawaii
Supreme Court's decision that state regulation does not operate substantively to constrain prison administrat-
or's transfer power). Accord Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 n.7 (1972). Thus, the state court
retains effective control over the fate of due process claims through its power to set the meaning of the
relevant positive law. Some have speculated that such rulings are subject to a requirement of "fair support."
See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 579 (3d ed. 1988)
[hereinafter HART & WECHLER]. However, the Court thus far has shown no inclination to probe the
reasonableness or predictability of the interpretation given state law, and has accepted constructions that
were, to say the least, imaginative readings of the pertinent language. E.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S.
341 (1976) (discussed infra notes 194-95).
33. E.g., Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. at 250; Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. at 345-47.
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depend entirely on sub-constitutional law; the former is purely a matter of
constitutional analysis. Chief Justice Rehnquist has been the most vigorous
opponent of this bifurcation, repeatedly urging the view that "where the grant
of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the limitations on the
procedures which are to be employed in determining that right, a litigant...
must take the bitter with the sweet. " 3' The Court eventually rejected this
position by an 8-1 margin,35 but the issue is not as moribund as the lopsided
vote implies. The justices have often disagreed on whether particular provi-
sions should be regarded as substantive (and so, constitutionally relevant) or
procedural (and so, constitutionally irrelevant),36 thus perpetuating the debate
under the guise of classification.
The final doctrinal question-what process is due?-is answered by employ-
ing a tripartite utilitarian balance set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge.3' The
private interest that will be affected by the official action and the risk of
erroneous deprivation of this interest through the procedures currently used
are offset against the government's interest in avoiding the burdens of affording
additional process (which include the cost of undeserved but unrecoupable
benefits paid while such process is being afforded). In theory, each procedure
sought (oral presentation, opportunity to present witnesses, cross-examination,
etc.) must be separately assessed. Timing questions (i.e., which elements of
process, if any, must precede the deprivation) also are resolved through the
balance.
Although framed in terms that invite quantitative analysis, the Mathews
balance is rarely conducted with empirical evidence. Indeed, the Court has
discouraged data such as agency reversal rates, opining that "[b]are statistics
rarely provide a satisfactory measure of the fairness of a decision-making
process." 3' Not surprisingly, the precise outcome of the balancing in any
given case is virtually impossible to predict, although some general trends have
emerged. The Court almost never accords a full adversary hearing prior to
termination. 39 Typically, the process due is notice of the grounds for decision
plus some sort of opportunity for response' prior to the deprivation, with
something approaching a full evidentiary hearing available after the depriva-
tion. All this process occurs at the administrative level. Although the Court
34. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1974) (plurality opinion).
35. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
36. Compare, for example, the various positions taken by Justices Powell, Blackmun and Stewart in
Amett with their respective positions in Goss.
37. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
38. Id. at 346. See also id. at 347.
39. Id. at 343 (announcing "the ordinary principle, established by our decisions, that something less
than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action").
40. The opportunity for response may be quite informal, will not necessarily include the opportunity
to offer corroboration, and may be written rather than oral.
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has, on occasion, refused to order any administrative process on grounds that
post-deprivation judicial process is available, those cases appear to be idiosyn-
cratic. 4
II. CRITIQUES AND CRITIQUES OF CRITIQUES
"It was a long time in the learning, that lesson:
You cannot curse a part without damning the whole. ,42
No aspect of contemporary due process doctrine has escaped criticism.
Without doubt, though, the lion's share of disapproval has been reserved for
entitlement analysis-and with good reason. Entitlement is the linchpin of
procedural due process, most immediately defining the range of protected
interests, but also indirectly shaping even such ostensibly separate inquiries
as what process is due. To appreciate the dilemmas of the doctrine, here is
where we must start.
The troubled history of entitlement analysis can best be understood as
comprising two distinct (though related) questions: where will we look for
protected interests? and what will we require those sources to contain? Part
A, The Positivist Trap, discusses the first; Part B, Inside the Positivist Trap,
tells of the second. Finally, to complete the story of contemporary due process
jurisprudence, Part C, Utilitarian Balancing, moves beyond entitlement to
recount the related discontent that is "what process is due?"
A. The Positivist Trap
COURT: "You don't expect us to just make these interests up,
do you?"43
When Goldberg v. Kelly afforded procedural due process protection to
41. Some are distinguishable from the typical benefit or sanction decision by the fact that the harmful
action was alleged to be negligent and hence not foreseeable by the agency. E.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451
U.S. 527 (1981). The subsequent holding that "deprivation" requires more than mere negligence, see supra
note 9, rendered these cases doctrinal anachronisms. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), holding post-
deprivation tort remedies sufficient where a state employee maliciously and unauthorizedly effected a
deprivation, is potentially more significant. However, the Court has recently explained Hudson as an
instance in which the state was unable "to provide predeprivation process because of the random and
unpredictable nature of the deprivation . . . . " Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S.Ct. 975, 987 (1990).
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), which refused to require any process before school officials
inflicted corporal punishment, is the other significant example of post hoc tort remedies constituting "due"
process. This case was complicated by the fact that state law afforded teachers a good-faith-mistake
privilege-although even a liberty interest in avoiding unreasonably mistaken corporal punishment would
seem to merit the minimum process of predeprivation notice of reasons and opportunity to respond. Perhaps
the best that can be said about Ingraham is that Court seems uncomfortable with it and has resisted
defendants' efforts to extend it to other cases. See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436
U.S. 1, 19-22 (1978).
42. ALICE WALKER, THE TEMPLE OF MY FAMILIAR 198 (1989).
43. JERRY MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 148 (1985).
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welfare benefits, it seemed the beginning of a brave new world. Due process,
Justice Brennan's opinion assured us, had at last escaped the right/privilege
distinction." That assurance carried great symbolic significance. The
right/privilege distinction had repeatedly thwarted the extension of due process
to benefits, licenses, jobs and other advantageous relations with government.
In its substantive aspect, it allowed legislatures to condition the establishment
or continuance of such relationships on individual behavior that government
otherwise could not compel. 5 In its procedural aspect, it permitted officials
to deny or withdraw these relationships on the basis of reasons that had been
ascertained through inadequate or unreliable process or, more extreme, to act
for no articulated reason at all." Catchphrase for a fairly intricate body of
law, "the right/privilege distinction" stood for a fairly simple idea: The
Constitution has nothing to say about how government conducts itself in
relationships it is under no obligation to establish, even if those relationships
are deeply important to the people involved. Unless the citizen can muster a
legal basis for demanding the benefit, status or opportunity (that is, can assert
a "right" to what the government offers), the only substantive or procedural
constraints on official action are those which the legislature has chosen to
impose.
The Goldberg world was new in unabashedly asserting that the Constitution
mediates the intercourse between government and its people even when
government is distributing the quintessential largess, welfare. It was brave in
thus opening to constitutional exploration the broad expanse of the contempo-
rary regulatory state. When, two years later, Roth emphatically stated that "the
Court has fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between 'rights'
and 'privileges ,'"' Goldberg's promise seemed confirmed. Due process had
transcended the 19th century vision of a world privately ordered within the
shelter of the common law, which government sporadically entered to jeopar-
dize vested rights or dispense gratuitous privileges. It had, at last, arrived at
a 20th century recognition that access to much of what people wanted or
needed was created or controlled, to some degree, at some level, by govern-
ment.
But Roth lied, or at least was profoundly self-deluded. Determined to
banish even the rhetoric of privilege, Goldberg had insisted that welfare
"benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive
44. 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
45. Or, at least could not compel without significant burden ofjustification. The best example remains
an opinion of Oliver Wendell Holmes, dismissing the claim of a police officer who had been fired for
engaging in off-the-job political comment: "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics,
but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass.
216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892).
46. E.g., Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided court, 341
U.S. 918 (1951) (government employee dismissed for disloyalty without opportunity to know or respond
to evidence against her).
47. 408 U.S. at 571.
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them." 4" Roth took this description, which had been intended to empower
citizens standing before their government, and transformed it into a burden
incumbent upon the individual who would claim due process. In so doing, Roth
turned the new doctrine irresistibly back towards right/privilege. Although the
vocabulary had changed-"It is a right?" became "Is it an entitlement? "-the
methodology remained constant in two crucial respects. First, the applicability
of constitutional protection depends upon a categorical assessment of the
interest, rather than on the fact or effect of government interaction with the
citizen. Second, this assessment hinges principally on the content of law
outside the due process clause.49
The commentary quickly pointed out that entitlement analysis recreates the
essence of the right/privilege distinction." The objection here goes deeper
than the Court's apparent unawareness that Roth marched us back down the
hill Goldberg had just marched us up. If the right/privilege distinction had
offered spotty and uncertain protection for citizens otherwise at the mercy of
how their government chose to treat them, entitlement analysis represented a
positivism that was alarming in its implications. Roth held, seemingly without
qualification, that property interests are not created by the Constitution;
"[r]ather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules
or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law
... "5 Henry Monaghan then posed a hypothetical that has since haunted
the commentary:
Suppose that a state motor vehicle statute invested automobiles with all
the attributes of property as that term is generally understood, but also
provided that no person who bought a car after the statute was passed
would be deemed to have a "right to continued" ownership as against
the state.52
Would an "owner" deprived of his automobile pursuant to this statute have an
interest in the vehicle sufficient to trigger due process scrutiny? An earlier
court, following the right/privilege distinction, surely would have thought
48. 397 U.S. at 262 (citations omitted).
49. The right-privilege distinction looked principally to the common law. See Todd Rakoff, Brock
v. Roadway Express, Inc., and the New Law of Regulatory Due Process, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 157, 170;
Rubin, supra note 5, at 1068-69. Entitlement's disinclination to resort to the common law, see supra text
accompanying notes 20-26, appears rooted in the Court's concern with constitutionalizing large portions
of state law. See infra text accompanying notes 190-200.
50. E.g., LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrruTioNAL LAW 697-98 (2d ed. 1988); Rubin, supra
note 5, at 1067; Rodney Smol la, The Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law:
The Price of Protesting Too Much, 35 STAN. L. REV. 69 (1982). That the Court has not gone the full
distance, to incorporate Chief Justice Rehnquist's "bitter with the sweet" reasoning, is roundly criticized
as internally inconsisteni. See infra text accompanying note 203.
51. 408 U.S. at 577.
52. Monaghan, supra note 26, at 440. Monaghan did not describe the hypothetical statute in any more
detail, but assume that it contains no substantive criteria formally constraining the confiscation decision.
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so." Right/privilege analysis had posed no threat to traditional forms of
wealth. Un-self-conscious in their methodology, earlier courts knew property
when they saw it. The shortcomings of right/privilege as the gate-keeper for
due process were felt when courts encountered interests-such as government
employment, licenses, or social welfare benefits-that possessed substantial
importance to individuals but had neither traditional common law status nor
statutory protection. Goldberg, in a great levelling, promised those newer
forms of wealth the same claim to constitutional protection as traditional forms
had always enjoyed. But where Goldberg would have levelled up, entitlement
analysis now threatened to level down. If Roth was serious in asserting that
the existence and dimensions of property interests depend upon the terms of
sub-constitutional law, then traditional as well as new property is no more than
whatever the legislature decides it should be.54 A contemporary court employ-
ing entitlement analysis would be hard-pressed to explain how automobile
"owners," under Monaghan's hypothetical statute, have any interest to which
due process protection could attach.
By rendering tenuous constitutional protection of interests whose protection
we had always taken for granted, the unabashed positivism of entitlement
analysis made manifest the worm that also lay (though perhaps better hidden)
at the core of the right/privilege distinction: Due process protects people from
being deprived, by their government, of only those things their government
has chosen to allow them to keep. The problem is not positivism per se;
neither is it, per se, the idea of a norm that binds the community only so far
as the community chooses to be bound. A constitution can constitute positive
law; a constitution can embody our choice to bind ourselves until we collec-
tively choose no longer to be bound. Indeed, both of these ideas are elemental
to our understanding of our Constitution. Rather, the problem is the form of
positivism that looks-exclusively in the case of property, and increasingly in
the case of liberty-to the provisions of sub-constitutional law. Precisely
because we understand the essence of the Bill of Rights and 14th Amendment
to be constraint on simple-majoritarian positive law, a doctrine that makes
constitutional protection contingent upon the terms of such law is deeply
disturbing if not actually, within our constitutional culture, incoherent.5 5
53. Note that the question is not whether the owner would win on the merits. Depending on how the
confiscation scheme was implemented, venerable doctrine involving "traditional" property could lead to
a conclusion that no individualized process was due. Compare Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board
of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) with Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908). But surely the
analysis would not have been truncated at the outset on grounds that no protected interest was implicated.
54. Since entitlement analysis does not privilege common law over statutory law-indeed, it apparently
gives common law less effect, see supra note 22 and accompanying text and infra note 191 and accompa-
nying text-there would seem no question that a statutory redefinition of the dimensions of the interest
would trump any common law understanding. Part of the elegance of the Monaghan hypothetical is that
it makes any reliance argument very difficult.
55. To be sure, we do not fully understand the "rather mysterious process" by which "the people both
constitutte] themselves as sovereign and, by that same self-constitutive act, self-impos[e] substantive limits
on the reach of their own sovereignty." Frank Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional
Idea of Properry, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1319, 1326-27 (1987). See, e.g., Jonathan Macey, Competing Economic
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Once the problem is thus identified, the remedy seems obvious. The phrase
"life, liberty, or property" must possess intrinsic meaning that is not dependent
on positive law.56 Entitlement analysis must be abandoned, as fundamentally
misguided, in favor of a doctrine that acknowledges a robust constitutional
content to those terms.
This solution is appealing, for it accords with our deepest intuitions not
only about our Constitution and its relation to normal politics in general, but
also about the particular concepts involved. The beauty of the Monaghan
automobile hypothetical is that it catches even us, a sophisticated audience of
legal professionals, unawares. In the moment before our 20th century intellec-
tual skepticism slips back into place to remind us that we know that property
is "simply a label for whatever 'bundle of sticks' the individual has been
granted,"" most of us have received a powerful instinctive signal that some-
thing is wrong. As C.B. MacPherson reminds us: "Property is not thought to
be a right because it is an enforceable claim: it is an enforceable claim because
it is thought to be a human right."58 Whether we ultimately deal with the
Monaghan hypothetical by attempting to clothe that first instinct with reason,
or by attempting to reason instinct away, few of us are prepared simply to
accept the statute as the definitive word on what the automobile owner
"owns. " " With respect to liberty, our instinctive resistance to positivism is
even greater. When Justice Stevens un-self-consciously speaks in the voice of
natural rights, many of us privately confess our sympathies: "[L]aw is essential
to the exercise and enjoyment of individual liberty in a complex society. But
it is not the source of liberty, and surely not the exclusive source."60
1. Looking to Grand Theory
However, the solution that appears so simple and sensible is revealed,
almost immediately, to be fraught with difficulty. What should we understand
to be the constitutional content of "property"? "[A]ny institution of property
Views of the Constitution, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50 (1987); Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures, 93
YALE L.J. 1013 (1984) (both hypothesizing dynamics that distinguish constitution-making from "normal
politics"). But, as with any article of faith, we know it to be so even if we cannot explain it.
56. I am using "positive law" in the sense in which the phrase is conventionally used in the procedural
due process commentary, that is, to refer to law other than the Constitution itself.
57. Rubin, supra note 5, at 1086.
58. C.B. MacPherson, The Meaning of Property, in PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL
PosrrIoNs 11 (C.B. MacPherson ed. 1978).
59. Discussions of the hypothetical include Peter Simon, Liberty and Property in the Supreme Court:
A Defense of Roth and Perry, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 146, 182-84 (1983); Timothy Terrell, "Property,' "Due
Process, 'and the Distinction Between Definition and Theory in Legal Analysis, 70 GEO. L.J. 861, 896-97
& n.201 (1982). Even Peter Simon, one of the very few commentators who applauds entitlement analysis,
does not accept pure positivism. See supra at 184 ("The Court might conceivably find private ownership
of automobiles so important that a statute like this, which does not treat the automobiles as property, is
unconstitutional . . .).
60. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 230 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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requires a justifying theory. "61 Yet, the spectrum of possible justifications
is vast, encompassing labor/natural rights theories,62 personality theories,63
and utility theories,64 theories in which property is constitutive of the political
order65 and theories in which property is extra- (even anti-) political,66 theo-
ries that embody an egalitarian presumption and theories that embody a
libertarian presumption.67 Even if choice among these multifarious theories
were unnecessary-if, for example, history demanded that the constitutional
meaning of property be derived from a labor/natural rights justification in the
Lockean tradition6 -the difficulties would only have begun, for theory must
then be applied to sort through the plethora of interests now seeking due
process protection. A Lockean labor theory might exclude from the category
of "property" most of the governmental largess of the modern regulatory state.
Or, as Edward Rubin has suggested, it might yield some surprising inclusions
and exclusions.69 Metamorphosed into Robert Nozick's "justice in holdings,"
Lockean theory appears to provide no purchase for dealing with the regulatory
state short of wholesale dismantling.70 But others, arguing from Locke, have
found basis for fairly robust claims to that portion of the common wealth
required to satisfy important needs.7 1
There is little cause for optimism that any of the other "grand theories"
of property would prove more tractable in identifying which of the multitude
of advantageous relations with modern government are comprised in the
"property" of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. And,' despite our first
flush of natural law conviction that "liberty" will be easier, it is not. Once we
get beyond the familiar terrain of the Bill of Rights, the way is largely unchart-
ed. Immediately, there looms the great divide between "negative liberty" and
61. MacPherson, supra note 58, at 11.
62. E.g., JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT paras. 25-51; ROBERT
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 149-160 (1974).
63. E.g., G.F.W. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT secs. 41-71 (T. Knox trans. 1976); Margaret Jane
Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
64. E.g., DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 484-516 (L. Selbey-Bigge ed. 2d ed. 1978);
JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION, 1-2, 68-120 (Bombay 1975); RICHARD POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW ch. 3 (2d ed. 1977).
65. E.g., James Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana, in THE POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES
HARRINGTON 157-58, 163-65 (J. Pocock ed. 1977); James Harrington, The Prerogative of Popular
Government, in id. at 394, 404-12, 458-73. See DREw McCoY, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC: POLITICAL
ECONOMY IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA 60-62, 67-69, 126-27 (1980); Michelman, supra note 55, at 1329.
66. E.g., R. NOZICK, supra note 62, ch. 7 passim, esp. 167-74.
67. See Thomas Grey, Property and Need: The Welfare State and Theories of Distributive Justice,
28 STAN. L. REV. 877, 877-78 (1976).
68. Of course, there is no way to avoid choice. Even if the historical triumph of Lockean thought were
conclusively established-which (even putting aside the 100 year gap between the adoption of the two due
process clauses) it is not, see STEVEN WAITS, THE REPUBLIC REBORN (1987); D. MCCOY, supra note
65-the proposition that history should play the dominant role in constitutional interpretation is hardly
uncontroverted.
69. Rubin, supra note 5, at 1090 n.239 (explaining that AFDC benefits might be "property" while
business license granted to owner of capital might not be).
70. R. NOZICK, supra note 62, at Preface, 149-53.
71. E.g., JAMES TULLY, A DISCOURSE ON PROPERTY (1980); G.A. Cohen, Self-Ownership, World
Ownership and Equality, in JUSTICE AND EQUALITY HERE AND Now (F. Lucash ed. 1986).
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"positive liberty. "72 The choice here may not appear so difficult. In our legal
tradition, negative liberty seems reassuringly familiar; indeed, in this region
lie well-known landmarks: "the right of the individual to contract, to engage
in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, to establish a home and bring up children . . . . 7 Yet it takes little
imagination to realize that, today, the ability to enjoy even these archetypical
freedoms is not assured by merely "the right, as against the Government, to
be let alone."' The licenses required to marry and to enter many occupa-
tions, the permits and certificates needed to build a home, the policies and
procedures constituting the public education system are but the superficial
indicia of government involvement. There is, more fundamentally, the matrix
of health, safety, consumer protection, environmental, and other social welfare
regulations in which our personal and professional transactions are embedded,
the economic programs which enable us to acquire a home or an education,
the financial and social services that support our efforts to bear and raise
healthy, knowledgeable, well-rounded children-all bearing witness that the
liberty "generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential
to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men"75 now depends upon govern-
ment's active cooperation and assistance. To live, with any appreciable degree
of awareness, in our complex regulatory society is to be wary of a purely
negative conception of liberty. And even this wariness would take into account
only the privileged position of the healthy, able-bodied, pre-retirement age,
two-parent, white family able to generate an income comfortably exceeding
the poverty level. For the significant portion of our population who are poor,
elderly, children, persons of color, physically or mentally challenged, or
otherwise living under conditions of disadvantage and oppression, the high
plain of negative liberty is not merely bleak and inhospitable, it is openly
hostile and even life-threatening.
By contrast, positive liberty is a fertile land, laden with promise. From
simple seeds spring richly-branched conceptions, such as Laurence Tribe's
articulation of the interests entailed in freedom of speech: "One must be able
to express oneself to protest the violation of other rights, but to express oneself
one needs at least a decent level of nourishment, shelter, clothing, medical
care, and education. To have these things, one needs either employment or
income support."7 But the very generosity of the positive theory of liberty
is the genesis of problems. In a society that has evolved a plentiful standard
of living through the coordination and assistance of government, positive
liberty has no readily discernible stopping point.
72. See generally ISAIAH BERLIN, FouR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY xxxvii-lxii, 122-72 (1969).
73. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
74. The phrase originally comes from Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
478 (1928).
75. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
76. L. TRIBE, supra note 50, at 778.
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The effort to give meaningful intrinsic content to "liberty" is thus caught
in the same dilemma as the attempt to unsubstantiate "property": The available
theories yield a collection of interests that is either inadequate or indetermi-
nate.77 That both undertakings should end in a common quandary is not
surprising. A powerful element of our political philosophical tradition has been
that liberty and property are interdependent. 78 At least for us, to identify the
one may be, inescapably, to reveal the other. A sense of this interdependence
may have inspired the alternative to entitlement theory proposed by Henry
Monaghan and John Hart Ely. "Life, liberty, or property," they argue, should
not be parsed as discrete categories, to one of which any contending interest
must conform. Rather, the phrase should be understood as a unit that embraces
"every interest valued by sensible persons."" This unitary "importance
theory" has the virtue of pretermitting the exercise of classifying interests in
favor of a direct focus on the meaning of the interchange with government to
the individual situated in a particular cultural context.8" But this formula-
tion-however promising as a new starting point-will not, without more,
significantly advance the inquiry. The recognition of "value" or "importance"
can take place only within some larger account of human nature and the human
community, the appropriate relationship between a people and their govern-
ment, and the role of law in defining and facilitating these things-in sum, the
same sort of account that is central to a justification of property or a theory
of liberty. The unitary "importance theory" puts us more immediately in touch
with these questions, but it cannot obviate the need to make choices about how
we will resolve them.
To be sure, deliberating upon and reaching a resolution of these issues
would seem to be one of the most compelling tasks for a people to undertake.
Whether the occasion be crafting a grand theory of "property" or "liberty,"
or establishing the criteria by which we will assess the "importance" of
interests, it is a task of defining and realizing our society's identity. The
sticking point comes when a judiciary attempts to undertake this task in the
context of constitutional interpretation. As Colin Diver puts it, "the utterance
77. Even negative liberty is not so definitive as to make up for in determinateness what it lacks in
reach. Consider the problems in defining the scope of legitimately-initiated custodial relationships with
government, such as the questions of inter-prison transfers in Meachum or Olim, solitary confinement in
Jago, transfer to a psychiatric facility in Vitek, or nonconsensual drug treatment in Harper. Surely
conviction cannot extinguish all rights to physical and psychiatric autonomy.
78. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134
U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1986); Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771-74 (1964).
79. The formulation is Monaghan's. See Henry Monaghan, The Burger Court and "Our Federalism",
43 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 39, 49 (Summer 1980). See also Monaghan, supra note 26, at 406-09 (inter
alia, "every individual 'interest' worth talking about"). Ely's version is that "the government [can't]
seriously hurt you without due process of law." JOHN ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 19 (1980). To
the extent that Goldberg can be said to embody a theory of protected interests, this appears to be it. See
397 U.S. at 262-263.
80. I am assuming here that "importance theory" is meant as something more than a vehicle for
screening out potential plaintiffs with no personal stake. Although the question may be closer for Ely, as
I read Monaghan, "importance" is not proposed merely as a variant standing requirement.
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of two words-Lochner and Wade-is usually enough to stop this idea in its
tracks." 8' The Lochner objection has two distinct, though related, compo-
nents.
The first challenges the legitimacy of a process in which fundamental
decisions about who we are and what we value would be made by persons not
elected by and unanswerable to the people. The flight from entitlement analy-
sis-a journey begun so that the individual might not be at the mercy of the
majoritarian process-is, by common reckoning, a grotesque failure if it ends
in putting the majoritarian process at the mercy of the judiciary.2 Our anxiety
that this might indeed be the outcome of attempting a robust substantive
conception of "liberty" or "property" or "importance" is heightened by the
disturbing propensity of those who advocate such an approach to apply their
particular conception to generate results that are highly debatable. 3 This
anxiety in turn produces valiant attempts to cabin the judicial role without
abandoning due process to the whim of positive law-such as Mark Tushnet's
proposal that the Court give content to liberty and property by looking to the
well-settled opinions of respected professional organizations. 4 But we have
no real or abiding faith that such attempts can succeed. Cut loose from any
mooring in positive law, we suspect that due process adjudication would "be
adrift in a stormy sea of 'natural' or 'fundamental' rights claims with no
navigational aids beyond the imagination of the justices." 5 And "[i]n a
system which treats politically unaccountable power as presumptively illegiti-
mate unless constrained by binding principle," 6 that prospect is so disturbing
that entitlement analysis begins to appear a sheep in wolf's clothing. Perhaps,
what seemed judicial abdication of constitutional responsibility is actually a
seemly judicial modesty; perhaps, what appeared to be a Court acquiescing
in the tyranny of the majority is really a Court properly apprehending the will
81. Colin Diver, The Wrath of Roth, 94 YALE L.J. 1529, 1542 (1985). Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905), invalidated a law prescribing maximum hours for bakery workers as an illegitimate
interference with freedom of contract. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), invalidated restrictive abortion
statutes as unduly trenching on a right of privacy, which included decisions about whether to terminate
pregnancy.
82. See, e.g., Stephen Williams, Liberty and Property: The Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 16 (1983) ("the effort to stuff liberty full of every good thing, like a Christmas stocking,
is little more than a counsel to the courts to assume the role of a Council of Revision").
83. For example, after proposing that "liberty ... should be read to embrace ... any governmental
conduct which so invades a decent respect for a person's personal integrity that, if not fairly justified, the
result would outrage public sensibility," Henry Monaghan applies this standard to suggest that the plaintiff
in Paul v. Davis (which has been the object of general criticism for its refusal to find any protected interest)
.arguably did not state a prima facie case .... [A] case can be made for the proposition that it does not
violate fundamental traditions of our law for the police to notify businesses during the Christmas season
that a person is suspected of being an active shoplifter." Monaghan, supra note 26, at 433-34 (citations
omitted, emphasis supplied).
84. Mark Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestion for the Revival of Substantive Due Process, 1975
Sup. CT. REV. 261, 279-80.
85. Jerry Mashaw, Dignitary Process: A Political Psychology of Liberal Democratic Citizenship, 39
U. FLA. L. REV. 433, 438 (1987).
86. Laurence Tribe, StructuralDue Process, 10 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 292 (1975) (citations
omitted).
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of the people expressed through their representatives.
The second component of the Lochner objection represents a dilemma of
comparable magnitude. One of the most troubling aspects of entitlement
doctrine is its implications for takings analysis and substantive due process.
Deprivation of "property" appears to be the constitutional trigger not only for
government's responsibility to afford procedure but also for its duties to pay
just compensation and to provide at least a rational justification for its actions.
If property is purely the creature of positive law, Monaghan's hypothetical
statute would appear to truncate not only claims for process but also these
other, substantive, claims as well. 7 Entitlement analysis thus threatens to be
even more grossly underprotective of individual interests than the focus on
process first suggests. And yet, giving constitutional content to liberty and
property in the service of procedural due process threatens to be grossly
overprotective. Lochner casts long shadows. No matter how often we are
reassured by highly respected voices that it need not be so,"s we perceive
behind attempts to secure property and liberty the dim outlines of a straight-
jacket on progressive social change. 9 In few areas of constitutional law do
we confront as clearly the difficulty of reconciling the capacity for growth and
change implicit in our commitment to self-government with the stasis entailed
in our commitment to self-restraint.
2. Looking to History-And History Modified
Still, one might insist, this act of reconciliation is an inescapable part of
the Bill of Rights as we understand it, and the most resonant component of the
Lochner objection appears to be the fear that the precise content of "liberty"
and "property" would be defined by the preferences of five non-elected
justices.90 One way to minimize the danger of constitutionalizing "the judges'
own notions of justice"9' without abandoning due process to positivism is to
cleave to history: The due process clauses embody not a grand theory of
liberty or property but rather a discrete, historically recoverable set of interests
expressed by the framers through those terms.92 "Property" would include
87. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 26, at 421.
88. E.g., id. at 432-33; Tushnet, supra note 84, at 277-79.
89. Indeed, the Reich article that encouraged Goldberg to extend procedural due process to the area
of government benefits, see infra text accompanying note 103, was prompted by the failure of a substantive
due process and takings attack on a Social Security Act amendment which prospectively altered the old-age
benefits payable to a particular class of recipients. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
Since we tend to associate Lochner with an obsession with private property, it is worth recalling that
much of the substantive due process expansion in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century occurred
under the rubric of "liberty" not "property." See Monaghan, supra note 26, at 411-13.
90. Ely traces this fear to "our ordinary notion of how law works: if your job is to enforce the
Constitution then the Constitution is what you should be enforcing, not whatever may happen to strike you
as a good idea at the time." 1. ELY, supra note 79, at 12.
91. Frank Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SuP. CT. REv. 85, 91.
92. See, e.g., id.; Williams, supra note 82, at 19-21.
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"estates in fee and . . . a motley collection of additional interests (leases,
estates) that made up the bulk of private wealth," 93 as well, presumably, as
tangible personalty, to make up a group denominated "traditional" or "ordi-
nary" or "classical" property.94 As these adjectives suggest, the constitutional
category would track the comfortably familiar: It would legally vindicate the
intuition that automobiles are property no matter what Monaghan's hypothetical
statute says. Indeed, the promise of securing what we "know" to be property
and liberty is felt as one of the great rewards of following in the footsteps of
the framers. Proponents of a strict historical approach point out that Goldberg's
attempt to enfold new interests in the same mantle which protected traditional
ones so strained the constitutional fabric that all interests were left with only
the threadbare protection of entitlement. Better to afford real protection to only
certain, core interests than pseudo-protection to all. 95
But the protection afforded by history also proves to be thin. "Traditional
property" might encompass my automobile, but what about the inspection and
registration certificates and the driver's license without which I may not travel
on the public highways? To resolve these questions, I might turn hopefully to
"liberty," but what lies within traditional liberty is an unpleasant surprise. The
original understanding appears to have encompassed merely the freedom from
physical restraint.96 So meager does this notion of liberty appear to inhabitants
of the contemporary regulatory state that only the most stout-hearted origina-
lists can abide by it. 97
As an alternative, Stephen Williams has proposed that "liberty" be under-
stood to include "the interests entitled to due process protection as of 1925. ""
Liberty thus would encompass a collection of interests recognized by the Court
beginning in 1897, 99 such as occupational liberty, the freedom of parents to
control their children's education and, of course, freedom of contract. This
expansion of classical liberty is justified, Williams argues, because "[tihe
family resemblance between these interests and freedom from incarceration
seems clear enough . . .. ..." Without doubt, the pressure to expand liberty
beyond the classic freedom from physical restraint is great-but so is the price
of surrender. The high ground of legitimacy claimed by originalism affords
but little compass. To leave the sacred precinct of what the framers understood
and consented to is to join the ranks of the fallen angels. By stepping off the
narrow path of historically determinate meaning and judicial restraint, Wil-
93. Easterbrook, supra note 91, at 97.
94. E.g., Williams, supra note 82, at 11-12.
95. See, e.g., id. at 13.
96. See Easterbrook, supra note 91, at 97; Williams, supra note 82, at 20; Monaghan, supra note
26, at 411.
97. Frank Easterbrook is the most notable example. His originalism in this area goes to lengths that
virtually no one else is prepared to contemplate. See Easterbrook, supra note 91 (Except in limited cases,
"due" process should be whatever legislature says it is.).
98. Williams, supra note 82, at 21.
99. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 588-90.
100. Williams, supra note 82, at 20.
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liams' solution forfeited all claim to whatever justificatory power strict inter-
pretivism possesses.
3. Looking to Analogy
Of course, this observation need not mean that no justification of Williams'
proposal is possible. Indeed, his argument that restraints on the ability to
contract, to pursue an occupation, and to educate one's children are sufficiently
like restraints on one's person to be included within "liberty" represents
another familiar method of determining constitutional meaning-a method that
might be called analogical interpretivism."'0 In this approach, "the job of the
person interpreting the provision . . . is to identify the sorts of evils against
which the provision was directed and to move against their contemporary
counterparts. "102 As a methodology for giving constitutional content to
"liberty" and "property," analogical interpretivism occupies a pragmatic
middle ground between the generality of grand theory and the particularity of
a historically closed set of interests. It begins with the historical set, but eludes
the grasp of the dead hand by distilling from those interests some essential or
common elements that can be seen to transcend the limits of history. This
process of distillation must include reference to the kind of normative consider-
ations that constitute theoretical systems, but demonstrates an appealing
humility by disavowing the comprehensiveness and abstract self-sufficiency
of full-blown theory.
Analogical interpretivism is no stranger to due process. It undergirds
Charles Reich's early and influential article, "The New Property."'"0 Proper-
ty, Reich argued, has always been the secure base from which Americans
assert their individuality and claim their freedom; it draws the magic circle
between public and private, maintaining independence, dignity and pluralism
by creating a "small but sovereign island""° within the bounds of which the
majority has to yield to the individual. In this way, "property" constitutes the
indispensable condition of "liberty."105 Liberty is the preservation of the
individual from the tyranny of the collective, the freedom of each to exist as
an autonomous being, uncoerced (except as necessary for the maintenance of
societal order) by the majority's sentiments of appropriate or reasonable
behavior. 6 Thus, taking the first critical step of analogical interpretivism-
distilling that element or quality of the historical collection of interests that can
then be carried forward to assess contemporary interests-Reich broadly
identified "property" with individual security and "liberty" with individual
101. 1 am indebted to my colleague David Williams for this descriptive phrase.
102. J. ELY, supra note 79, at 13.
103. Reich, supra note 78.
104. Id. at 774.
105. Id. at 771-74.
106. Id. at 771.
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independence. While this reading was not uncontroverted, t°7 it was thorough-
ly familiar and widely accepted."10 Where later analogical interpretivists such
as Williams sharply part company with Reich is in the next step: applying this
reading to classify interests that today claim due process protection.
Reich observed that, for many citizens, government benefits, services, jobs,
contracts, and licenses have come to take the place of traditional forms of
wealth. Security, independence, and individuality itself could be preserved,
he argued, only by affording these beneficial relations with government the
same legal protections that traditional property and liberty receive." But this
reasoning, Williams pointed out, is at best hopelessly romantic and at worst
positively illogical. 110 Those who have become dependent upon government
cannot be saved through the very instrument of their dependency.1 1 The only
hope of preserving a vital individualism in the welfare state is to concentrate
constitutional protection on those who retain some base for meaningful inde-
pendence from government-that is, those who hold traditional property and
thus fruitfully can exercise liberty. That due process thus fortifies only those
already possessed of strength should come as no surprise: "Protection of
property seems inescapably more likely to protect the propertied than the non-
propertied; protection of liberty. . . is likely to advantage primarily those with
the personal capacity to use their liberty."12
Cast in such raw, uncompromising terms, Williams' response to Reich is
easy to dismiss as a particularly offensive version of laissez-faire libertarian-
ism. But beneath the Malthusian rhetoric lies a subtly powerful point. To call
upon the state's legal regime to protect the individual from the state itself is
always a delicate and chancy undertaking. Due process might accomplish this
difficult feat with respect to traditional property and liberty because, although
we recognize the role of law in defining and protecting these interests, we
resist, on some very fundamental level, the idea that law literally creates them.
The distance we perceive between these interests and government is what
enables us to regard traditional property and liberty as bastions of individual-
ism; it is the space on which we stand to make a credible demand that govern-
ment, through its courts, protect us from itself. By contrast, many of the
valuables dispensed by the regulatory state do seem to be the creature of
107. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 26, at 414-16 (historical criticism of this broad conception of
"liberty").
108. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 82, at 11. Cf. Terrell, supra note 59, at 903 n.215 (sharing with
Reich "a common concern with individual autonomy"); Robert Rabin, Job Security and Due Process:
Monitoring Administrative Discretion Through a Reasons Requirement, 44 U. Ci. L. REV. 60, 78 (1976)
(discussing "the respect for individual autonomy that is at the foundation of procedural due process").
109. Reich, supra note 78, at 733, 778-87. Reich specifically discussed procedural due process, id.
at 783-85, but it played only a minor part in his sweeping proposal.
110. Williams, supra note 82, at 11-13.
111. See id. at 16 (Due process protection "could not transform government dependents into bulwarks
against it . . . . IJ]udicial creation of procedural niceties could not secure genuine independence for
individuals who were substantively dependent upon government.").
112. Id. at 27 n.86.
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government, made available to individual citizens purely because the collective
will of the citizenry, expressed through its representatives, would have it so.
Coincidental with the positive law that creates them, these interests offer little
moral or political purchase for the sort of self-disciplining exercise due process
entails, in which government responds to the individual's demands for distance
between himself and the collective. A political system that recognizes simulta-
neously the essentialness and the unlikeliness of such demands being honored
might well allow them to be made in only the strongest of cases. What first
seems benighted social Darwinism may be in fact prudent constitutional
economy.
Thus, Williams' analogical interpretivist theory-in which the group of
protected interests extends as far as, but no further than, the freedoms of
family ordering, occupation, and contract which (with traditional property and
liberty) represent spheres of individual autonomy-begins to seem an astute
compromise between the anachronistic spartanism of literal historical meaning
and the unworkable prodigality of Reich's vision. But at this point, Williams
himself encounters two major difficulties. The first can be seen by returning
to the ubiquitous automobile hypothetical. Traditional property protects my car,
but even extending "liberty" to encompass the classic negative liberties will
not reach the certificates and licenses I require to make meaningful use of it.
Unless my access to those items is protected from government arbitrariness,
any independence and security that arises from owning my car is chimeri-
cal.113 Williams meets this first, and most immediate, difficulty by proposing
a sort of penumbra around the core protected interests: In addition to policing
direct deprivations of traditional property and negative liberty, due process will
intervene whenever "denial of the government benefit burdens traditional
property or negative liberty."114 On the "burden" theory, at least vehicle
registration and inspection certificates, and possibly even my driver's license,
would be recognized as constitutionally-protected interests.
This seemingly modest, common-sensical extension of "liberty" and
"property" proves, however, to possess a surprising, kudzu-like vigor. Its
power springs from the elementary fact that most benefits government offers
citizens are simply reincarnations of burdens on citizens' liberty and property.
The point here is not a Nozickian attack on the legitimacy of those burdens
in the first instance. Rather, the point is one of identity: The people who seek
licenses, benefits, jobs, and other' valuables from government are the same
people who pay for those things by giving up substantial portions of their
property and liberty." 5 To take account of this, Williams reasoned, due
113. This, of course, is the same problem that grand theory encounters in choosing between a negative
and a positive conception of liberty. See supra text accompanying notes 72-77.
114. Williams, supra note 82, at 22 (emphasis added).
115. As Williams points out, "Everyone pays taxes. Even a person who at any given moment derives
his entire income from government transfers is likely either to have paid taxes out of nontransfer income
in the past or to do so in the future." Id. at 24-25.
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process must also protect both (1) those benefits for which, if the individual
tried to use a private substitute to escape government arbitrariness, he would
have to, in effect, pay twice; and (2) those benefits for which there is effec-
tively no private substitute because citizen-subsidized public intervention has
substantially foreclosed private alternatives.' 16
Here, then, is Williams' second difficulty. Despite his careful historical
and analogical reasoning, the whole of the welfare state seems to be slipping
into liberty and property through the back door of "burden." He attempts to
stem this infiltration by narrowly applying his own pay-twice and private-
preclusion tests." 7 But the damage is done. Having begun with the meticu-
lously pedigreed concepts of "liberty" as those interests which constitute
individual independence from the collective, and "property" as those which
represent individual security from government, he has arrived at two defini-
tional standards-pay twice and private preclusion-that have only the most
attenuated conceptual connection to the original categories. Consequently, the
specific interests that pass even Williams' own stringent application of those
tests-public education," 8 social security benefits" 9 and welfare' 2°-bear
little resemblance to the traditional property and liberty family. Indeed, they
have a suspiciously Reichian, positive liberty cast. This internal instability is
most clearly revealed when welfare-the epitome of individual dependence on
government, the antithesis of the right to be let alone-can emerge from
Williams' analysis wearing the name "property."
4. Looking to Function
It thus appears that neither grand theory, nor history, nor history-embraced-
yet-transcended-through-analogy can meet all the necessary conditions of a
successful attempt to give content to "property" and "liberty": a content that
is rich enough (comprehending the new promises and perils of the regulatory
state), but not too rich (constitutionalizing all of administrative government and
resurrecting Lochner), attained through a methodology sufficiently principled
116. Id. at 22.
117. For example, he would limit pay twice reasoning to benefits, such as education, financed through
an earmarked tax. Id. at 23-27. But this limitation ultimately proves unsatisfying. Attempts actually to trace
tax contributions are fraught with difficulty. Even the quintessential federal earmarked-tax program-social
security retirement benefits-is a quid-pro-quo system in only the loosest sense. See William Simon, Rights
and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1431, 1444-45, 1458-59 (1986). More
fundamentally, focusing on earmarking loses substance in a meaningless pursuit of form. The reality that
Williams' "burden analysis" attempts to capture is not that individuals "earn" due process protection when
their traditional property is perceptibly transmuted into a particular benefit on a dollar-for-dollar basis, but
rather that the valuables government dispenses do not materialize out of thin air. The link between a benefit
such as public education and "the concomitant impact upon property or well-recognized liberties,"
Williams, supra note 82, at 22, is no more or less real if the program is funded out of general revenues
than if it is financed through an earmarked tax.
118. Williams, supra note 82, at 21-27 (on both pay twice and private preclusion theories).
119. Id. at 37-38 (on pay twice theory).
120. Id. at 36-37 (on private preclusion theory).
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and determinate to be regarded as a legitimate judicial exercise in constitutional
interpretation. Yet the pressure to free due process from the jaws of entitle-
ment is so strong that it impels still another strategy for escaping the positivist
trap, a strategy that might broadly be called the functionalist approach.
Functionalism's central methodological metaphor is stepping back several
paces, so as to see the forest rather than the trees. It encompasses a number
of proposals that differ, sometimes radically, in their elements but that share
a common determination to discover not the constitutional meaning of "proper-
ty" or "liberty," but rather the constitutional function of due process.
One of the earliest proponents of functionalism was William Van Alstyne.
We don't really, he observed, regard government jobs or benefits as "proper-
ty. "12 When we invoke the term in these cases, "we are almost surely say-
ing it only instrumentally, ...because we see no other constitutional handle
on the problem."' 22 What really bothers us is that the individual was not
treated fairly by government. "And surely there must be a way to carry
forward the simplicity of that concern by more direct means, without vindicat-
ing property in all its meanness, as was done in Lochner."23 Van Alstyne's
initial solution was as simple and direct as one could imagine: Due process is
a self-actuating right to be free of arbitrary government action, a right that
"comes in from the outside to build in the assurance provided by fair proce-
dures" that government decisions are in fact supportable.' 24
If this straightforward solution looked too good to be true, it was. Van
Alstyne himself soon acknowledged a seemingly insurmountable textual
objection. His interpretation in effect rewrote the Fourteenth Amendment to
read: "No State shall ...deprive any person of life, liberty, property, or of
due process of law, without due process of law."" So he proposed a varia-
tion, in which "liberty" includes the "substantive element" of freedom from
arbitrary adjudicative procedures: "[T]he ideas of liberty and of substantive
due process may easily accommodate a view that government may not adjudi-
cate the claims of individuals by unreliable means."' 26 He had not, however,
evaded the textualist critique. The revision presented the same problem in a
slightly different package: "Nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty (including the freedom from arbitrary adjudicative procedures), or
property without due process of law."' 27 Indeed, the attempt to locate the
right to fair process within "liberty" was an even greater textual failure, for
121. William Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property': Adjudicative Due Process in the Adminis-
trative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 483-84 (1977).
122. Id. at 484.
123. Id.
124. William Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81
HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1452 (1968).
125. Van Alstyne, supra note 121, at 451 (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 487.
127. See Smolla, supra note 50, at 98 n.108 (emphasis added). Accord Williams, supra note 82, at
18 & n.54; Simon, supra note 59, at 185 n.121.
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it not only produced circularity but also rendered "life" and "property"
glaringly redundant.
The textualist rout of Van Alstyne's early attempts was temporarily dis-
tracting but could not, ultimately, be devastating. The animating spirit of
functionalism is precisely that the textualist point misses the point. To become
fixated on the words "liberty" or "property," the functionalist warns, is useless
and even perverse. No matter how ingenious the manipulation, terms used by
18th century natural lawyers cannot be made meaningfully to comprehend the
contemporary regulatory state and, in the effort, we will lose sight of the
fundamentally important idea towards which the entire constitutional phrase
is reaching. That idea is to safeguard the individual from government power
that strikes arbitrarily and unfairly, to secure from collective domination the
citizen's capacity for self-determination and his integrity as a moral and
political being. Thus, whereas textualists like Reich and Williams conceptual-
ized due process as designed to protect the property that is individual security
from dependence upon government and the liberty that is individual freedom
from collective tyranny, functionalism insists that due process is designed to
protect, directly and immediately, individual security and individual free-
dom. 12
8
Once the object of concern is seen to be the individual and the preservation
of his capacity as autonomous moral and political agent (rather than categories
of interests the protection of which is merely instrumental to this end), the
question of what triggers due process protection becomes far less important.
"[D]eprived of life, liberty, or property" is simply a synecdoche for the range
of government actions that could endanger "what it means politically to be an
individual or to act as an individual."129 To invoke due process scrutiny, all
that would seem necessary is some non-trivial harm perpetrated or threatened
against the individual by a government actor.13 The truly significant constitu-
tional inquiry becomes: What exactly does protecting the individual from
arbitrary government power entail?
Government could be said to act arbitrarily or unfairly when it harms the
individual on the basis of a careless or unsound assessment of the facts of his
case, or when it treats him less favorably than it treats similarly situated
persons. But functionalist interpretations of due process, while not denigrating
the importance of accuracy and equality, have not centered around either of
these qualities-perhaps because entitlement analysis (whatever its other faults)
is explicitly concerned with the correct application of decisional standards to
128. See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 85, at 439; Richard Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values:
Toward a More Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 148 (1978).
129. See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 85, at 439.
130. Hence, in a functionalist conception of due process, some formulation like the Monaghan/Ely
"every interest valued by sensible persons," see supra note 79, could indeed serve simply as a standing
requirement.
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the individual case, 1 3 and equal protection analysis is the most direct vehicle
for addressing disparate treatment. The principal contribution of functional
approaches has been to insist that the fair, non-arbitrary exercise of govern-
ment power requires more than simply correct outcomes and equal treatment.
It also requires a process of interchange between government and the individual
that acknowledges his existence and value, that respects and affirms his
dignity.
A decisional process consonant with individual dignity implies, at a mini-
mum, rights of what Frank Michelman, Edmund Pincoffs, Richard Saphire and
others have called "revelation" and "participation." As Pincoffs explains,
"Decency generally requires that a man seriously and adversely affected by
an official's decision be told why the decision was made as it was, and that
he be allowed to contest the reasoning that supposedly justifies the deci-
sion."132 These rights contribute to substantive fairness, but at least as
significant is their importance to the human mind and spirit. Laurence Tribe
explains, "Both the right to be heard from and the right to be told why, are
analytically distinct from the right to secure a different outcome; these rights
to interchange express the elementary idea that to be a person, rather than a
thing, is at least to be consulted about what is done with one." 133 Consonant
with our deepest intuitions about how the government of a free people ought
to treat its citizens, the identification of an essential dignitary dimension seems
finally to get at "what really bothers us" in the due process cases: Government
should deal fairly and humanely with people, especially when it contemplates
harming them, and it should not require something in positive law to trigger
this obligation.
The intuitive appeal of a dignitary conception of due process can be
analytically supported by tenets of moral and political theory, as well as by
observations about the formation of individual and societal identity. Pincoffs
locates the moral grounding of the rights to be told why, and to respond, in
the Kantian injunction that each man be treated as an end in himself and not
merely as a means. 34 To wreak harm on the individual without meaningfully
consulting him because it is cheaper, or quicker, or simply less bother not to
involve him, is to reduce him to an instrument in the service of efficiency or
inertia. 35 This moral imperative parallels a political imperative. Mashaw
explains, "This tradition has at its core the notion that individuals are the basic
units of moral and political value."' 36 "The protection of the due process
clauses is the protection of individual liberty-a condition of liberal citizenship
131. See infra text accompanying notes 180-81, 184, 217.
132. Edmund Pincoffs, Due Process, Fraternity, anda Kantian Injunction, 172, 172 in NOMOS: DUE
PROCESS (J. Roland Pennock & John Chapman eds. 1977).
133. L. TRIE, supra note 50, at 666 (emphasis in original).
134. Pincoffs, supra note 132.
135. Id. at 176-79.
136. J. MASHAW, supra note 43, at 182.
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in which the significance of individual interests is individually deter-
mined."137 In such a political order, government must treat each citizen as
an end in himself and not merely as a means for the attainment of collective
ends. And, as Michelman points out, revelation and participation may be
integral to the individual's sense of self and to the citizen's conception of his
society. For the individual, learning why a government official is treating him
unfavorably may "fill[ ] a potentially destructive gap in the individual's
conception of himself.""'3 If the harm descends in silence, he is left with the
anxiety of uncertainty, never sure whether and in what respect he was found
lacking; with knowledge may come pain, but also the opportunity for further
self-awareness and growth. Similarly, to be able to respond to the decision-
maker, "to have played a part in, to have made one's apt contribution to,
decisions which are about oneself may be counted important even though the
decision, as it turns out, is the most unfavorable one imaginable and one's
efforts have not proved influential."139 For the citizen, a rule securing this
sort of process may be central to his normative vision of social and political
arrangements, "expressing revulsion against the thought of life in a society that
accepts it as normal for agents representing the society to make and act upon
decisions about other members without full and frank interchange with those
other members, a kind of accountability to them . ... 
Finally, gathering together all these threads, Saphire shows how the
dignitary dimension of due process "constitute[s] a necessary element of the
consent which is essential to the continuing viability of a just and morally
supportable constitutional government":.41
[An individual's willingness ultimately to be subjected to deprivatory
governmental action may be directly related to the extent to which the
decisionmaking process generates "the feeling, so important to a
popular government, that justice has been done" . . . . According the
individual the opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process-
to face the decisionmaker, to receive explanation and revelation, and
to react orally-preserves and enhances her sense of personal dignity
and individual autonomy, and thereby strengthens the prospects for
future obligation and consent. 142
And so the dignitary conception of due process is revealed, not as some flimsy
tissue of "feel good" constitutional interpretation, but as the fundamental
137. Mashaw, supra note 85, at 439.
138. Frank Michelman, Fornal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in NOMOS: DUE
PROCESS, supra note 132, at 127.
139. Id. at 127-28.
140. Id. at 128.
141. Saphire, supra note 128, at 189.
142. Id. at 190-91, quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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pattern of our moral and political fabric, the strong warp and woof of our
sense of our selves and our society. And, at this point, the dignitary conception
unravels.
The fateful loose thread is consent. Consent, the manifestation of choice,
is critically important to the picture of the individual as autonomous moral and
political actor. The dignitary conception of due process is founded upon the
proposition that a fair, moral society must safeguard the capacity for individual
self-determination. Its proposed rights of revelation and participation are part
of a larger emphasis on ensuring a system of social ordering that is comprehen-
sible and responsive to those who dwell within it: a system in which the
individual is not at the mercy of capricious, unknowable, uncontrollable forces
but rather is able to engage in the deliberate ordering of his life, to contemplate
competing visions of what is good and desirable, and purposefully to direct
his actions towards the goal he has selected. But the foundational proposition
has an equally basic corollary: A freely chosen fate is not an unfair fate. If
individual dignity necessarily requires the opportunity to act and not simply
to be acted upon, to determine one's own life and not simply to have one's life
determined, it necessarily implies accepting responsibility for the actions one
has taken, the decisions one has made. And, in many cases, one of those
decisions is voluntarily to seek benefits, statuses or other relationships from
government in spite of the fact that no procedural protections are offered.
Attempts to modify dignitary theory to take account of the significance and
consequences of individual choice yielded a variant functional approach called
monopoly theory. Monopoly theory begins at the familiar starting point: Due
process aims to protect citizens from arbitrariness and unfairness in their
interactions with government. It goes on, however, to add an important caveat:
when there is no other effective check on governmental power in the precise
situation involved. '43 One of the principal checks on government repression
is extra-legal-the market. "Where government competes with private entities
or other governments for some item, such as labor, then the individual has the
weapon of choice available . . .... ' If government will enter into a benefi-
cial relationship only on terms that appear arbitrary or overreaching, but the
individual nevertheless goes ahead to deal with it rather than seeking alternate
providers, on what basis could government's position be condemned as unfair
or illegitimate? '45
Hence, what follows from understanding the function of due process as the
preservation of individual autonomy and self-determination is not ubiquitous
rights to participation and revelation, but rather procedural protection tailored
to those situations in which government's monopoly position forecloses the
143. Timothy Terrell, Causes of Action as Property: Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. and the
"Government-As-Monopolist" Theory of the Due Process Clause, 31 EMORY L.J. 491, 499 (1982).
144. Id. at 500 (emphasis in original).
145. See, e.g., Smolla, supra note 50, at 111; Terrell, supra note 4, at 371-73.
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opportunity for choice. For due process to interpose a set of (inevitably costly)
procedures beyond these situations would be not only grossly inefficient-
"government should be as free to structure its employment contracts and other
contracts as would any other member of the relevant market""'-but also
deeply paternalistic, denying the individual the responsibility and capacity to
order his relationships in a way that reflects the value he places on proce-
dure. '47
Monopoly theory thus arrives, though by a different conceptual route, at
a standard for triggering due process protection very similar to Stephen
Williams' pay-twice and private-preclusion tests. In fact, monopoly theorists
reach many of the same conclusions in specific cases. Welfare benefits and
public education require due process protection because individuals have no
choice but to deal with government to obtain these things. 4 ' Occupational
licenses would be protected on the same theory.' 9 By contrast, virtually no
government employment relationships would be covered by due process; even
in such classic public sector jobs as police officer, the individual has not only
private analogues (e.g., security guard) but also choice among levels and
locations of governmental employers. 5 ° Social security retirement payments
and unemployment compensation would be protected because the individual
has no choice about participating in these programs.'-"
Although its aggressive market rhetoric jars ears attuned to dignitary
reasoning, anyone who sees in due process a societal commitment to individual
moral and political autonomy must take seriously monopoly theory's explora-
tion of the conditions of individual choice. However, rigorously pursuing the
concept of "choice" is a notoriously difficult undertaking-as illustrated by the
loose application of the word by monopoly theorists themselves. Except in rare
cases, it is not literally true (as the economist would be the first to insist) that
the individual has "no choice" but to rely on government to educate his
children or provide for his retirement, disability or unemployment.'52 Per-
146. Terrell, supra note 59, at 904. See Smnolla, supra note 50, at 115; Terrell, supra note 143, at
500. See also Terrell, supra note 4, at 385 n.127 (rejecting argument that government has "moral
leadership" obligation to be "better" than others in market; "'better' in this situation necessarily means
'inefficient' and 'more expensive'").
147. As Thomas Grey reminds us, the commitment to the morally and politically autonomous
individual is commonly understood as entailing the belief that "[clompetent adults . . . should be free to
enter into transactions even on terms which by prevailing sentiment are regarded as unreasonable." Grey,
supra note 67, at 893. Cf Reich, supra note 78, at 774 ("Liberty is the right to defy the majority, and
do what is unreasonable.").
148. Terrell, supra note 59, at 904; Smolla, supra note 50, at 116.
149. Terrell, supra note 59, at 904.
150. Id. at 904, 908.
151. Id. at 905.
152. If he regards the conditions under which he can obtain these public benefits as sufficiently
dispreferential, he will avoid or minimize the undesirable aspects by purchasing private supplements or
alternatives. True, he is required to underwrite these public undertakings, through the payment of taxes,
whether or not he participates as a beneficiary. But if monopoly theory uses "no choice" to refer to
compulsory contribution, it just restates Williams' "pay twice" test, and will encounter the same problems
of line-drawing in a world where most individuals have no option but to pay for government activities.
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haps, then, we are to understand the designation "no choice" as a capitulation
to the average person's mulish tendency to perceive decisions which would
require sacrifice of other valued possessions, activities or conditions as "not
really choices," rather than as the purposeful implementation of preference
ranking. But if "choice" is to be treated as a psychological phenomenon, how
could employment be categorically distinguished? In many (perhaps most)
cases, people do not experience jobs as fungible given appropriate adjustments
for changes in working conditions, geographical location, etc. And jobs that
are sufficiently common in most communities that they might be experienced
by their holders in this way-for example, the pink collar and blue collar jobs
that monopoly theory summarily excludes from due process protection"'-
tend to present a different complication. If, as is often true with such jobs,
private-sector alternatives do not include any procedural protection, in what
sense could the individual's choice of position be said to evince the value he
places on procedure? Disciples of the market might assure us that, in such
cases, the market has accurately implemented the preference of this class of
employees generally for wages and other substantive benefits over procedures.
But if "choice" is merely acquiescence in some pre-existing collectively struck
balance of substance and procedure, as signalled by the individual's decision
to enter or remain in a particular labor pool, then the constitutional status of
occupational licenses must to be reconsidered. 154 And, having focused on the
degree to which the individual should be held to have consented to the conse-
quences that predictably follow from the way he chooses to order his life, can
we automatically accept that recipients of welfare and other need-based benefits
had "no choice" about dealing with government?
Thus, the difficulty with monopoly theory's effort to refine the dignitary
conception to account for the significance of individual choice is that no
coherent concept of choice emerges. In part, this comes from attempting to
superimpose the idea of monopoly, a slippery enough notion in the private
sector, onto the individual's interactions with government. More fundamental-
ly, any serious inquiry into the extent of individual responsibility eventually
recapitulates the debate between free will and determinism-a debate that
becomes, if possible, even more vexed when directed at the condition of the
individual situated in the economic, social and political reality of the contempo-
rary regulatory state. It would seem that dignitary theory must, as its monopoly
See supra text accompanying note 115.
153. See Terrell, supra note 59, at 906. Cf. Williams, supra note 82, at 28 (excluding from protection
"the common garden variety of government worker").
154. Those who decide to become lawyers or doctors know that access to the considerable financial
and social rewards of those professions depends upon government approval. To be logically rigorous, must
we not assume that the choice to enter law or medical school signals an individual's deliberate assessment
that any uncertainty inhering in the licensing process is compensated for by the rewards awaiting those who
successfully negotiate it? Unlike monopoly theorists, Stephen Williams acknowledged this as a "nagging"
problem. See Williams, supra note 82, at 30-31. Perhaps this is why he treats occupational licenses as a
direct burden on liberty rather than under a preclusion-of-choice analysis. See id. at 22, 31.
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cousin insists, stake out some middle ground between the two extremes. It
must establish some position in which the possibility of real autonomy and self-
determination can be reconciled with the power and ubiquity of the welfare
state, and in which vigilance in protecting the conditions of meaningful individ-
ual choice is accompanied by acknowledgement that the individual is responsi-
ble for what he has chosen. So far, however, dignitary theory has not been
able to do so.
The problems posed by consent extend further still. Rights to revelation
and participation can not exist in the abstract; they must be addressed to (more
accurately, directed against) some identifiable person, the decisionmaker. They
represent the power to bend another's will to one's own, to compel access to
the reasoning processes-processes closest to the core of personhood of a
rational being-of another individual who is, by hypothesis, unconsenting. As
Michelman forthrightly concedes, "A due process entitlement is a concession
to its holder of control over-one might as well say ownership of-bits of the
behavior of the relevant officials."15 The dignity of the individual seeking
government benefits can be rescued only, it seems, at the high cost of objecti-
fying the individual allocating them. 56 Moreover, even if it were possible
theoretically to resolve this dilemma, the quest for dignitary process may
prove, as a practical matter, hopelessly quixotic. Again, Michelman is painful-
ly honest:
[I]t can be argued that a due process entitlement . . . cannot convey
the nonformal, the interpersonal meanings of revelation and participa-
tion . . . because an official whose explanations and interchanges have
been requisitioned by someone who assertedly owns those elements of
his behavior just will not be engaging in the kinds of acts which carry
the interpersonal meanings that (possibly) we yearn for." 7
Mashaw is even blunter: "To rethink participatory process rights in terms that
make them meaningful at the level of self-definition or in terms of the desire
for community may be, necessarily, to make them nonjusticiable. "158
As dignitary theorists looked deeper into the implications of judicial
enforcement of dignitary rights, the problems became graver yet. In its politi-
155. Michelman, supra note 138, at 149.
156. See J. MASHAW, supra note 43, at 192:
[W]hat is to be said of Roth's colleagues who object to spending their time pursuing Roth's
purposes? Are they not being used as mere means? May they not wield the categorical imperative
to demand privacy from Roth's incessant pursuit of participatory governance? Where is the
principle of limitation that would adjust competing claims or ends.
157. Id. at 149 (emphasis in original). This 1977 article has become the classic exposition of the
dignitary conception. Michelman's more recent work outside the area of procedural due process suggests
that he would not approach these issues in quite the same way today. See, e.g., Law's Republic, 97 YALE
L.J. 1493 (1988); Takings, 1987, 88 COLuM. L. REV. 1621 (1988); Possession vs. Distribution in the
Constitutional Idea of Property, supra note 55.
158. J. MASHAW, supra note 43, at 180. Accord id. at 200, 216-18.
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cal dimension, the commitment to individual self-determination is a commit-
ment to equal voice."5 9 Majority rule is the collective expression of respect
for each individual as autonomous political actor. Mashaw explains that
equality is one of the core dignitary values in our particular constitutional
culture: "Any judicial decision that imposes procedures contrary to those
arrived at in the majoritarian political process accordingly carries some anti-
egalitarian stigma, even if that intervention is itself premised on egalitarian
concerns. "160 It is the problem of consent, writ large. How can the judiciary
discern when the ordering of positive law must be rejected so that self-determi-
nation can flourish? Mashaw's answer, ultimately, is that it cannot. Due
process embodies our commitment to individual moral and political autonomy
and yet, at the same time, "developing, pursuing, and maintaining individual
interests must be preserved through, as well as in defiance of, collective
action."161 No dependably determinate criteria exist for knowing when to
displace the process choices that emerge from the majoritarian process.
Therefore, as a general matter, the Court must defer to the legislature's
specification of decisionmaking structures, insisting only that the process
choice be reasonably coherent.'62
And so, ironically, the dignitary approach comes, in the end, to "explain[
our concern to respect the positive law." 163 Mashaw professes to be "not
dismayed" that the quest to secure individual dignity and autonomy should end
at the legislature not at the court."6 "I believe," he argues, "that we should
give ourselves laws primarily through nonjudicial institutions of private and
public ordering, and that the compromised character of public life necessarily
limits the degree of constitutionalization that will accommodate our constantly
shifting needs to mediate the clash of individual and group interests." 16 But
others-those who have less faith, or had greater hopes-see a darker meaning
in where dignitary theory found itself. Colin Diver captures it best: "Mashaw's
pilgrimage through the wilderness of due process yields a message and a
lesson. Due process must save the individual from being engulfed by the
bureaucratic state, reads the message. But the lesson answers: There is no
escape from the positivist trap. "166
159. See, e.g., J. MASHAW, supra note 43, at 173, 199-200. See also Mashaw, supra note 85, at 439-
40.
160. J. MASHAW, supra note 43, at 173-74. Jerry Mashaw's work is particularly illuminating for he,
more than any other commentator, has persistently engaged the dilemmas of procedural due process
jurisprudence. His book, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE, is the culmination of years of
effort "to come to terms with our liberal, individualist aspirations in the context of a collectivized,
bureaucratic public life." Id. at 41.
161. Mashaw, supra note 85, at 439.
162. J. MASHAW, supra note 43, at 242. See id. at 172-73,212-53; Mashaw, supra note 85, at 439-43.
163. J. MASHAW, supra note 43, at 219.
164. Id. at 218.
165. Id.
166. Diver, supra note 81, at 1530.
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B. Inside the Positivist Trap
"Immodesty is not avoided, but only concealed. "167
Accepting (albeit reluctantly) that the existence of "property" must always,
and "liberty" must often, turn on the content of positive law does not end the
matter of entitlement. Indeed, it simply introduces another set of questions.
What attributes of positive law will constitute a protected interest? Who decides
whether they are present? Is it relevant whether the individual reasonably
believed they were present? The answers to these questions are not determined
simply by the choice of a positive law trigger for due process. We would,
however, expect the answers to be guided by, and consistent with, the princi-
ples and concerns which led to that choice.
Our expectations will be disappointed. In essence, a federal court enforcing
current due process doctrine says to the national political branches and to the
states:
We will prevent you from depriving an individual, without due process,
of those interests which you have chosen to define in a certain fash-
ion-that is, through use of specific, mandatory, substantive standards
that meaningfully constrain the discretion of the official decisionmaker.
Rest assured, you really are in control here. We have nothing to say
about how, or even whether, you define interests in the first instance;
we have nothing to say about interests you choose to define in some
other fashion. Indeed, we are primarily concerned about what you
really meant to do, not what the individual might have thought you did.
And our standard for standards, if you will, has gotten pretty high, just
as we've become very hesitant to hold you to anything that you haven't
expressly and formally undertaken. But keep this also in mind. As to
interests which you have defined in the critical fashion, your views
about the process appropriate to implement those interests are not
controlling on us.
This is doctrine so patently absurd that criticizing it seems about as challenging
as shooting fish in a barrel. Only by disassembling it, and understanding how
each piece came to be present, can we appreciate that the alternatives threat-
ened to make of due process either the warrant for boundless judicial interven-
tion in administrative government, or the meaningless rubber stamp of whatev-
er process the legislature decides is due.
167. Pincoffs, supra note 132, at 172.
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1. The Significance of Discretion
"In Hell there will be nothing but law,
and due process will be meticulously observed. "168
Why identify the constitutionally-critical component of positive law to be
specific, substantive standards that limit the discretion of the official decision-
maker? As commentators have pointed out, 169 the presence of explicit, man-
datory decisional criteria is no gauge of the importance to the individual of the
benefit or status at stake. Because of the standards requirement, due process
might intervene when an official gives you a $5 parking ticket, but not when
he terminates your employment; when he publicly labels you a drunkard, but
not when he tells local merchants you are a shoplifter. All turns on the fortuity
of how the legislature framed the pertinent statute or regulation.170
If the standards requirement operates capriciously with respect to the
importance of the underlying substantive interest at stake, it appears an abso-
lute disaster with respect to the importance of procedural protection. No
regime would seem more threatening of the citizen's autonomy, security and
dignity than being at the mercy of a bureaucrat whose behavior is unchannelled
by fixed, substantive rules. No circumstance would seem to cry louder for the
interposition of the constitution between the individual and government power.
And yet, the more discretion positive law confers on officials-the closer the
legal regime comes to the nightmare vision we call Kafkaesque"-the more
certain it is that due process will not intervene. The Court, it seems, has
created a doctrine that is "impotent where official power is most in need of
procedural monitoring . . . ."2
Why, then, does the Court not only cling to the requirement of discretion-
constraining standards, but actually seem to be ever more rigorous in the
specificity and mandatoriness demanded? With respect to importance of the
interest, substantively, to the individual, the explanation is straightforward
(even if unpleasant). It is immaterial that the standards requirement is a poor
proxy for importance because importance cannot be the constitutional trigger;
importance cannot be the trigger because there are no justifiable, sufficiently
determinate criteria by which it could be measured (at least by a national
168. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGEs OF AMERICAN LAW 111 (1977).
169. E.g., Williams, supra note 82, at 13; Mashaw, supra note 85, at 436-37.
170. Indeed, not only does specificity of decisional standards have no logical relation to importance
of the interest, it may actually be inversely correlated. Although some decisions of signal importance to
individuals are heavily standard-bound (e.g., welfare), it is often the case that important issues are too
complex to be resolved through a fixed set of rules specified in advance (e.g., parole). To make such rules
the indispensable predicate of due process may skew constitutional protection towards more mundane
interests susceptible to resolution through a pre-set decisional code.
171. Kafka's work, particularly The Trial, has been a powerfully recurring symbol in this area. E.g.,
J. MASHAW, supra note 43, at 175-76; Rabin, supra note 108, at 78 n.66; Easterbrook, supra note 91,
at 116; Tribe, supra note 86, at 277.
172. Mashaw, supra note 85, at 438. Accord L. TRIBE, supra note 50, at 676.
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judiciary proposing to second-guess the judgments of state and federal legisla-
tors and administrators) for the many forms of largess distributed by the
contemporary regulatory state.173 If such criteria existed, we would not be
stuck here in the positivist trap.
With respect to the importance to the individual of procedural protection
in his interaction with government officials, the reason why the Court cleaves
to the standards requirement is more complicated. The Court justifies the
requirement on purely utilitarian grounds: When official judgment is not bound
by mandatory decisional standards, process is not needed. 74 Since the com-
mon reaction is exactly the opposite-the standards requirement denies process
precisely where it is most needed-the justification must go beyond a bald
assertion of utility. We need to understand what criteria of "need" are being
applied in this debate.
The critics' insistence that process is most "needed" where decisions are
discretionary comprises four strands. The first is the familiar concern with
human dignity: "[I]ndividual participation is most required in such subjective
situations precisely to avoid an individual's feeling that her life and liberty
173. See generally Richard Stewart & Cass Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 1195, 1257-58 (1982). Peter Simon has argued that the standards requirement is essential to
implement constitutional provision that protects "property" because property is "an interest one can insist
upon, rather than one which turns upon the good will of another." Simon, supra note 59, at 171. Simon's
argument draws apparent support from Gregory Alexander's earlier observation that neither legal nor
popular usage recognizes as property "those interests which are subject to a power, held by another person
or entity from whom the interest derives, to extinguish unilaterally all opportunity for the claimant to obtain
future enjoyment of the asset." The Concept of Property in Private and Constitutional Law: The Ideology
of the Scientific Turn in Legal Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1545, 1561 (1982). When summoned to the
defense of entitlement analysis, however, this insight proves much too much. Surely, the state and federal
legislatures which create government jobs, licenses, social welfare benefits, etc., have the power to
extinguish, unilaterally and prospectively, most (if not all) of these advantageous relationships.
We might avoid the conclusion that no interest created by regulatory statutes could be "propertyish"
(because legislatures always have the power to change their minds) by insisting on a distinction between
the legislature and the executive. The officials who administer regulatory programs usually do not possess
.a legally recognized power of termination" exercisable in their "unrestricted discretion." Id. at 1571.
Where this is most evidently true is, indeed, where the law establishing the program expressly sets forth
standards to govern the behavior of the officials who run it. However, if we thus modify the Alexander
formula, the rigor of the present standards requirement can not be defended. Alexander uses two hypothet-
icals to illustrate the difference between property and non-property. In the first, Alpha, the owner of a bottle
of rare wine, says to Beta, "I will deliver the wine to you next week unless I need it tomorrow night at
a dinner party." In the second, Alpha says "The wine is now yours and I will deliver it next week unless
in the meantime I decide to keep it or give it to someone else." In the first, Beta obtains a property interest
in the wine; in the second he does not. Id. at 1563-64. The difference, of course, is the extent to which
Alpha retains discretion. Note, however, that the standard contained in the first hypothetical does not
completely withdraw discretion from Alpha. Although there may be extreme circumstances in which the
condition "unless I need it at my dinner party" will have one, obvious, indisputable application to the facts,
in the "normal" range of cases Alpha will exercise judgment about whether the wine is "needed."
If Alexander is correct, then, "propertyish-ness" can co-exist with discretion so long as there is enough
substantive guidance in the initial commitment to allow us to think meaningfully about reasonable, good-
faith judgment in contrast to bad-faith caprice. And if this is so, the standards requirement-at least in its
present, highly restricted form-is grossly underinclusive in identifying "propertyish" interests created by
regulatory statutes. How often does a legislature which empowers an official to distribute bottles of wine
(or grant parole, or transfer prisoners, or renew teaching contracts, or employ policemen) mean to give
the official carte blanche to deliver it to the Betas of the world "unless you decide to keep it or give it to
someone else?"
174. See, e.g., Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543 n.8; Olim, 461 U.S. at 250; Meachum, 427 U.S. at 228.
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have been dealt serious affliction without reason or explanation."175 The
second is a related concern with the felt legitimacy of government action:
[Ilt is especially important to give process values their due in those
circumstances, often frequent, in which the standards for evaluating
process results are not clear or are not agreed upon, or the facts re-
quired for applying agreed-upon standards are not ascertainable. In
these circumstances, the entire "process-result" aggregate can be
judged only in terms of the quality of the process itself .... 176
These two strands are drawn from the conception of due process as intended
to preserve the individual's status as autonomous moral and political actor. The
remaining two strands take a utilitarian view of the function of process that
is more expansive than the Court's. One strand (thoroughly familiar to admin-
istrative lawyers) argues that a process in which the decisionmaker makes
known his views and seeks comments from interested persons yields better
decisions, particularly in situations where complex policy or factual judgments
require considerable agency discretion.177 The other strand, taking a systemic
remedial perspective, observes that cases in which positive law sets mandatory
decisional standards are the very cases in which there typically exist subconstit-
utional causes of action for challenging agency behavior; to confine due
process intervention to these situations "has the odd consequence of protecting
those and only those who do not need protection."'"7
Although the Court has never systematically responded to critics of the
standards requirement, its reply to each strand of their attack is not too difficult
to reconstruct. With respect to the first, dignitary, strand of criticism, Dixon
v. Love'79 provides a starting point. Love's driver's license had been revoked
summarily, pursuant to statute, because official records showed that his license
had been suspended three times within a ten-year period. Rejecting his plea
for some opportunity to be heard prior to revocation, the Court reasoned:
Such an appearance might make the licensee feel that he has received
more personal attention, but it would not serve to protect any substan-
tive rights. We conclude that requiring additional procedures would be
175. L. TRIBE, supra note 50, at 676. Even Frank Easterbrook agrees that "[tihe argument for
'dialogue' with decisionmakers as a basis of dignity is strongest when the rules are most uncertain."
Easterbrook, supra note 91, at 116.
176. Robert Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes-A Plea for "Process Values," 60
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 (1974).
177. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Procedural Due Process of Law, Civil, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1465, 1468 (Leonard Levy, Kenneth Karst & Dennis Mahoney eds. 1986);
Williams, supra note 82, at 21 n.72; Rubin, supra note 5, at 1133-34.
178. Patricia Smith, Commentary on Terrell: Definition and Metaphor in Legal Analysis, 39 U. FLA.
L. REV. 387, 395 (1987). Accord Mashaw, supra note 85, at 437. Todd Rakoff aptly dubs this the "double-
or-nothing aspect" of the doctrine. Rakoff, supra note 49, at 174.
179. 431 U.S. 105 (1977).
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unlikely to have significant value in reducing the number of erroneous
deprivations." 0
There is, in other words, no "substantive right" to be dealt with in a manner
that acknowledges one's existence and affirms one's worth. 8 ' The function
of process is to reduce errors-period. Dixon does not elaborate upon why the
preservation of individual dignity can not claim substantive protection but,
then, we already know the problems with locating such a right in the due
process clauses. They are the problems that prevented the dignitary conception,
appealing as it is, from freeing the doctrine from the positivist trap in the first
place. As Michelman reminds us, "If we see due process as concerned with
the quality of interaction between government and citizen . . . . then any state-
inflicted grievous loss will seem to bring into play the constitutional standards
.". 12 The Court would find itself second-guessing the dignitary adequacy
of the host of state and federal regulatory activities and programs, struggling
with the meaning of individual consent and the significance of an apparent
majoritarian consensus-and all to arrive at the morally problematic and
practically futile point of attempting to coerce one individual to talk and listen,
respectfully and openmindedly, to another individual. And, as the dignitary
strand falls, so falls the related strand which argued that process is needed to
legitimate the exercise of agency discretion. Indeed, the federal judiciary might
well experience even greater doubt about its institutional competence in, and
constitutional warrant for, defining-in the teeth of state and national majori-
tarian processes-what decisional structures will best inspire confidence in the
citizenry that important decisions are being made regularly and thoughtful-
ly. 18
3
This leaves the two critiques of the standards requirement that are explicitly
utilitarian. At first blush, it seems that these strands of the commentary ought
to be more telling attacks on the doctrine, for they meet the Court on its own
terms and make, in effect, the following argument. Even if the only workable
conception of the function of due process is producing better outcomes, the
standards requirement makes no sense, for process can also serve this function
when officials exercise discretion. Meachum is the perfect illustration. If (as
no one disputed) the plaintiffs were in fact transferred to a higher-security
prison because officials believed they had misbehaved, the utility of a hearing
to forestall erroneous transfers exists quite apart from whether some rule of
180. Id. at 114.
181. One could, of course, acknowledge such a right and then go on to conclude that it was not
infringed significantly (or unjustifiably) on the facts of Dixon.
182. Michelman, supra note 177, at 1469 (emphasis added).
183. The Court has curbed lower federal courts who attempted this task in the context of subconstitu-
tional adjudication involving federal agencies. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). If you add the constitutional context and the federalism
implications of telling state agencies how to proceed, the prospect is almost unthinkable.
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law predicates transfer on misbehavior. The capacity of process to facilitate
sound decisions rests not on the existence of mandatory substantive criteria
formally constraining government action, but rather on the elementary facts
that (1) agency officials, like the rest of us, usually have reasons for what they
decide, and (2) those reasons usually involve beliefs about the existence of
facts and the appropriate application of policies and principles to them. Inter-
change with affected individuals can provide relevant, helpful information in
both of these areas. The nature and extent of discretion might affect the type
of process afforded, but the presence of discretion would. not signal whether
process is useful at all. Surely the Court ought to realize this.
Surely the Court does realize this. When it responds to the Meachum
plaintiffs' argument that a hearing might have prevented a wrong decision by
reiterating that "no legal interest or right of these respondents under Massachu-
setts law would have been violated by their transfer whether or not their
misconduct had been proved,"'" it is not missing the point. It is making a
point. The goal of due process is not good administrative decisionmaking, it
is accurate administrative decisionmaking. Moreover, the accuracy due process
seeks is accuracy of a very special and limited nature: the reliable ascertain-
ment of whether, on the basis of determinable facts, legally sufficient justifica-
tion exists for official action. This may be a crabbed, legalistic (in the very
worst sense of the word) notion of protecting the individual from erroneous
deprivation by government officials, but what are the alternatives? What could
be more indeterminate and intrusive into regulatory processes than a constitu-
tional quest for procedures that produce "better" decisions? By what criteria
would you have an unelected, generalist, national judiciary measure "good"
prison transfer decisions if not by the criteria specified in positive law? And
if there are no criteria sufficiently specific that a court could reliably determine
whether they are satisfied and sufficiently mandatory that it could then compel
official action, where would a more expansive view of "erroneous deprivation"
lead? Suppose the Meachum plaintiffs are given a hearing in which they
establish that, contrary to official belief, they did not misbehave. What is to
prevent officials from then saying, "We are going to transfer you anyway"?
As Easterbrook bluntly puts it, in the absence of legal constraints on adminis-
trative discretion, "there is no need for a hearing, because the state's officer
need not pay attention to the claimant's demands; the state may do what it
pleases. "185 If such constraints are not to be found in positive law, they
would have to be found in the due process clause. And if we had an acceptable
theory for identifying such constraints in the due process clause, we wouldn't
be stuck in the positivist trap.
In sum, for the Court to accept the plea for due process protection in the
absence of explicit, mandatory, positive law standards would be to "place the
184. 427 U.S. at 228.
185. Easterbrook, supra note 91, at 87-88.
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Clause astride the day-to-day functioning of [agencies] and involve the judicia-
ry in issues and discretionary decisions that are not the business of federal
judges."" 6 Few commentators-even those highly critical of the present
doctrinal approach-have taken issue with that assessment. The standards
requirement might yield a straitened doctrine, ungenerous in its protection, but
at least it represents a judicial stance that is appropriately modest in a represen-
tative democracy. Within its shelter, the courts are simply applying rules that
emanate from the legislative sovereign."8 7 And so the Court might respond
to the fourth and final strand of criticism-the standards requirement provides
protection only for those who are already protected-by quoting Hippocrates
"First, do no harm."
2. Promises and Procedures
"Great nations, like great men,
should keep their word. "8
Perhaps it unfairly denigrates the present doctrinal conception-in which
due process functions essentially to secure rule obedience-to imply that its
principal justification is the defensive claim, "At least it can't do much dam-
age." Promise-keeping may not be a sufficient condition of legitimate govern-
ment, but it would seem to be a necessary condition. A due process doctrine
which insists that government abide by the assurances it has given its citizens
about how largess will be distributed or sanctions imposed would go a long
way towards enhancing individual autonomy and security. That the doctrine
does not go further-to force the giving of assurances or to police their con-
tent-might be accepted as a regrettable but inevitable accommodation in a
world in which the proliferation of administrative government has rendered
the judicial task of constitutional enforcement simultaneously most necessary
and most problematic.
To the extent that the Court has articulated any theory undergirding its
entitlement reasoning, that theory does seem to be the protection of individual
expectations. Roth explained: "It is a purpose of the ancient institution of
property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives,
reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined. It is a purpose of the constitu-
tional right to a hearing to provide an opportunity for a person to vindicate
those claims.""89 Unfortunately, after all the competing pressures have oper-
ated upon the doctrine, the result is not a sensible compromise between the
need of the people for security in expectation and the need of the judiciary to
186. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 228-29. See also cases cited infra note 196.
187. See Michelman, supra note 138, at 129-30; Michelman, supra note 176, at 1467.
188. FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting).
189. 408 U.S. at 577.
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respect political and administrative judgments, but rather a deeply compro-
mised muddle that makes no sense from any perspective.
In the first place, the doctrine refuses to acknowledge many sources from
which individuals naturally and justifiably develop expectations about how
government will dispense benefits and burdens. Institutional practice is an
obvious example. Particularly in the case of a close, ongoing relationship
between the agency and the individual-as in Meachum-patterns of conduct
observed and experienced over time are often more influential than formal,
-written rules in shaping the individual's beliefs about how officials will behave.
When the Meachum court dismisses "[w] hatever expectation the prisoner may
have in remaining at a particular prison so long as he behaves himself" as "too
ephemeral and insubstantial to trigger procedural due process protections, " 90
it implies a view of "expectation" that seems to have little to do with psycho-
logical reality. In addition, the doctrine ignores even some formally expressed
constraints on behavior. Paul v. Davis rejects defamation law as a source of
entitlement to reputation, and yet what is that law but a collection of rules
defining the bounds within which individuals can feel secure in the enjoyment
of their good name? When the Paul Court asserts that "Kentucky law does not
extend to respondent any legal guarantee of present enjoyment of reputation
which has been altered" when officials circulate his name as an active shoplift-
er,191 it implies a view of "expectation" that seems to have little to do with
legal reality. Most broadly, the doctrine is wilfully blind to the background
understanding-shared by citizens, legislators and administrators alike-that
regulatory programs have comprehensible, identifiable objectives and that
government officials are given power that they might pursue those objectives,
not that they might indulge their personal predilection or caprice.1 92 When
the Meachum Court insists that, in the absence of explicit statutory constraints,
"prison officials have discretion to transfer [a prisoner] for whatever reason
or for no reason at all,"'93 it implies a view of "expectation" that seems to
have little to do with political reality.
In the end, as Bishop v. Wood made clear, the current doctrine is not in
fact concerned with protecting the individual's expectations about how govern-
ment will behave. Faced with an ordinance that distinguished "permanent"
employees, such as Bishop, from probationers and appeared to grant them
tenure-even conceding that "[o]n its face the ordinance on which petitioner
relies may fairly be read as conferring such a guarantee"-the Court neverthe-
less refused to disturb an interpretation that all employees held their posts "at
190. 427 U.S. at 228.
191. 424 U.S. at 711-12.
192. This is not to say that regulatory goals are always (or even usually) determinate, consistent or
accomplishable. But acknowledging that the mandate of many administrative programs is open-ended,
conflicted, and/or unrealistic is a very different thing from asserting that power is delegated to administra-
tors with neither object nor constraints on its use. See supra note 173.
193. 427 U.S. at 228.
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the will and pleasure of the city."' 94 Only Justices Brennan and Marshall
would have framed the inquiry as "whether it was objectively reasonable for
the employee to believe he could rely on continued employment. ,
195
How does a Court that set out, in Roth, to prevent the arbitrary undermin-
ing of those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives end up so
defiantly indifferent to what citizens reasonably understand to be the "The
Rules" governing their government's behavior? Perhaps it came to recognize
that, in a society which clings to a normative vision of government power as
limited in scope, answerable to the people, and justified only as an instrument
of the public good, a doctrine truly concerned with protecting legitimate
expectations about official behavior will eventually find itself squarely in the
middle of almost every interaction between the citizen and his government.
Surely it is no coincidence that Meachum, Paul, and Bishop (which collectively
sound the death knell for any true expectation-based theory of due process)
were decided within a four-month span. Nor is it coincidence that each per-
ceives-and emphatically condemns-the plaintiff's claim as opening large
sectors of state and federal governmental operations to the constitutional
scrutiny of the national courts. 96 If, in Michelman's words, "[e]ntitlement's
antithesis can be conceived as a legally valid rule saying that treatment is to
be accorded or not, according to the actor's effectively irrefutable judgment
or preference," 97 then virtually every government action seriously affecting
a citizen should be understood to implicate an entitlement for, in our legal,
political and psychological understanding, public officials undertaking public
business could virtually never legitimately claim this sort of power. 99 As
Van Alstyne asks, "[I]s it plausible that persons contemplating the structuring
of a social organization to be subsequently binding upon them . . . . would
agree upon a government vested with power to proceed" in such a way? 9
But the task of discerning and ensuring the implementation of the criteria
which a citizen of a democratic, limited government could legitimately expect
to constrain official behavior in the conduct of regulatory activities is precisely
the indeterminate, intrusive, institutionally inapt role from which entitlement
analysis was to deliver the Court.2°
194. 426 U.S. at 345 (citations omitted).
195. Id. at 353 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
196. In addition to the language already quoted, supra text accompanying note 186, see Meachum,
427 U.S. at 229, Bishop, 426 U.S. at 349, and Paul, 424 U.S. at 701.
197. Michelman, supra note 138, at 132.
198. See supra note 173.
199. Van Alstyne, supra note 124, at 487-88.
200. The complications that might follow from seriously attempting to vindicate individual expectations
can be imagined in Bishop, where the case for reliance was quite strong. If the Court held that Bishop had
a protected interest in his job based on a reasonable reading of the ordinance, it would presumably require
the City Manager to afford him some process prior to terminating him. But the constitutional effect could
not end with procedural restructuring. What Bishop thought the ordinance gave him was job security in
the absence of "cause" for dismissal. To protect that expectation, the due process clause would have to
convert what local law had attempted to set up as at-will employment into tenured employment. Would
the same conversion then take place for Bishop's fellow, similarly-situated officers?
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Viewed from one perspective, then, a real concern with protecting individu-
al expectations about official behavior leads to an explosion of due process.
Viewed from another perspective, however, an expectation-based theory leads
to the diametrically opposite but equally unthinkable point, the extinction of
due process.
Recall that among the things deliberately ignored by the highly selective
vision of the present doctrine are procedural terms in positive law. What
justifies looking to only part of the law to define the entitlement? A thoroughly
plausible account of individual expectation would insist that anyone dealing
with government could not reasonably expect officials to afford any more or
different process, in the course of dispensing largess or imposing sanctions,
than positive law provides. An economist would point out that the extent of
procedure afforded is simply another way of setting the value of the bene-
fit.2"' "The substantive rule itself is best seen as a promised benefit coupled
with a promised rate of mistake."202 We might object that the average per-
son-the person not trained in economics-does not understand a law that
promises a benefit of $X allocated according to a procedure that has an error
rate of Y% as "really" only promising a benefit of X discounted by Y. Still,
so long as the process terms of the law are as clear and accessible as the
substantive terms, we are hard pressed to explain why the individual's expecta-
tions would be shaped by only the "sweet" substance without reference to the
"bitter" procedures. 203
As we push deeper into the question of what expectations ought to be
regarded (and protected) as "reasonable" expectations, we stumble, once again,
into the quagmire of consent. Even the firmest constitutional commitment to
individual autonomy and self-determination would not require, in order to
protect reliance, that the regulatory relationship be adjusted post hoc to include
terms more favorable than those of which the individual was aware when he
entered into the relationship. Thomas Grey suggests that people may not read
"the fine print" of procedural terms, assuming instead a "normal" or "reason-
able" level of accuracy in implementation. 24 Even if this is so, the law tradi-
201. Easterbrook, supra note 91, at 112-13. Accord Diver, supra note 81, at 1543.
202. Easterbrook, supra note 91, at 113. Accord Thomas Grey, Procedural Fairness and Substantive
Rights, in NoMos: DUE PROCESS, supra note 132, at 194-5.
203. Commentators who have pointed out the internal inconsistency of the Court's refusal to allow
procedural terms in positive law to affect the dimensions of the entitlement include-in addition to
Easterbrook-L. TRIBE, supra note 50, at 671, 710-12; J. MASHAW, supra note 43, at 145-51; Lawrence
Alexander, The Relationship Between Procedural Due Process and Substantive Constitutional Rights, 39
U. FLA. L. REV. 323, 325-29, 341 (1987); Diver, supra note 81, at 1542-43; Grey, supra note 202, at
190-95; Rubin, supra note 5, at 1070; Terrell, supra note 4, at 373-74; Tushnet, supra note 84, at 270-71;
Van Alstyne, supra note 121, 462-65; Williams, supra note 82, at 6-9. Henry Monaghan finds Rehnquist's
"bitter with the sweet" position unwise and at odds with our tradition of distinguishing substance from
procedure, but admits that it is "not inherently illogical." Monaghan, supra note 26, at 438-39.
204. Grey, supra note 202, at 195. Grey himself finds this an unpersuasive defense of current doctrine,
concluding that no criteria exist for discerning a "normal" degree of accuracy in most regulatory programs.
Whenever government has the power to withdraw the program entirely, "the only procedure that could
reasonably be expected would be that procedure actually specified in the statute." Id. at 196.
[Vol. 3: 189
Conceiving Due Process
tionally has little sympathy for the expectations of people who don't read
what's right in front of them. Perhaps more accurately, it will relieve them
of unpleasant parts of an undertaking only when it perceives fraud, overreach-
ing or some other barrier to informed consent, or when the interest involved
is regarded as so important, on some value scale, that it will be deemed
inalienable. None of these notions will be easy to invoke in this context. The
terms of these deals are set by the majoritarian processes. Any attempt to set
them aside as underhanded or unconscionable implicates consent writ large.
We may dismiss, as patently pollyannaish fiction, Frank Easterbrook's picture
of the legislative process: "The contents of the legislation are the best available
evidence about the value the affected people place on hearings. "205 We may
share Laurence Tribe's agnosticism: "In a society whose legislative and
administrative processes of value-formation and conflict-resolution seem to
resemble less the ancient ideal of the polis than the contemporary notion of
pluralist compromise, any suggestion that bartered rules are necessarily
expressions of true substantive consensus seems difficult to maintain."106
Still, the belief that the legislative process expresses the will of the people is
so venerable an article of our constitutional creed that abandoning it seems to
imperil our constitutional identity. Absolute faith might be impossible, but so
long as atheism appears unthinkable, we seem committed to the possibility of
divining in positive law the course of our collective self-determination."0 7
So, it really is not surprising that, despite Roth's talk about securing "those
claims upon which people rely in their daily lives," the doctrine is not now
constructed to identify and safeguard individual expectations. However, if the
goal is not to secure citizens' expectations about how government officials will
wield power, it is no longer clear just what the doctrine is attempting to
accomplish. Ensuring rule obedience (that is, administrative compliance with
formally-prescribed criteria of decision) has the ring of an unimpeachable
objective, but it is not in fact an end in itself. The most obvious reason to care
about government's following the rules is the importance of promise-keeping
to the rational individual's sense of security, order and predictability in his
daily life. 0 ' A less obvious, though probably related, reason is the impor-
tance of promise-keeping to the citizen's sense of his government as an institu-
tion with integrity. But to address either of those concerns, the doctrine would
have to ask what the rational citizen-individual thought his government had
promised about how power would be exercised.
A different sort of reason for caring about rule obedience is to safeguard
the product of the majoritarian process from bureaucratic subversion. The
205. Easterbrook, supra note 91, at 118.
206. Tribe, supra note 86, at 315 (emphasis in original, citations omitted).
207. See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 85, at 439-440 (One of the three "essential elements of due
process in a liberal democratic regime" is that "the exercise of democratic decisionmaking must affirm,
through majority rule, the equality of citizens as political agents.").
208. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 5, at 1105.
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legislature delegates power to an administrative agency in order to accomplish
a set of policy objectives; that purpose is foiled if the agency fails to employ
procedures capable of accurately implementing the legislative program; when
the legislative program is frustrated, the will of the people is frustrated. At
first glance this reason is quite promising, for it ties the concern with accurate
application of explicit statutory standards back into the larger institutional
concerns that led the doctrine to positive law for the meaning of "property"
and "liberty." But it withstands no more than a first glance.
Displacing the legislature's own set of procedures with a set constructed
by the Court looks a lot less like seemly judicial facilitation of the legislative
will than like the most impertinent sort of intermeddling. Altering the process
of regulatory decisionmaking inevitably introduces costs and sometimes alters
the substantive bases on which officials act, both of which belie judicial
deference to choices about resource allocation and value definition made in the
majoritarian arena. Specifying the set of procedures that will most appropriate-
ly minimize administrative errors hardly seems consistent with a judiciary that
abjures, on both philosophical and practical grounds, responsibility for super-
vising the operations of state and federal agencies. In sum, the pursuit of rule
obedience has become an exercise in judicial double-speak. Given the right
substantive provisions in a state personnel statute, the same Court that assured
us that "the Fourteenth Amendment is not a guarantee against incorrect or ill-
advised personnel decisions"2" will independently assess a state agency's
dismissal processes to see if they permit too many mistaken terminations.2 10
Given the right substantive provisions in agency regulations, the same Court
that insisted that "[t]he federal courts do not sit to supervise state prisons, the
administration of which is of acute interest to the States," 21" ' will reform the
procedures of a state parole board.2"2
Indeed, taken to its logical end, the present doctrine threatens to constitutio-
nalize a broad range of claims that agencies have incorrectly applied their
governing statutes or regulations. Specifying a procedure to minimize adminis-
trative errors in rule application would be an empty exercise if agency officials
remain free to perform the procedural ritual and then decide in a way that
ignores the information adduced or employs different substantive criteria.
Guaranteeing the integrity of the mandated process implies some residual
constitutional concern with how that process is actually implemented.2"3 And
209. Bishop, 426 U.S. at 350.
210. E.g., Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542-47.
211. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 229.
212. E.g., Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal
& Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979) (in dicta).
213. See, e.g., Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985) (Disciplinary board's proceedings
must contain "some evidence" that plaintiffs had in fact engaged in the conduct for which they were
deprived of good time credits: "a governmental decision resulting in the loss of an important liberty interest
violates due process if the decision is not supported by any evidence."). Cf Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307 (1979); Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960) (establishing due process review of sufficiency
of evidence in criminal context). See generally Gerald Neuman, The Constitutional Requirement of "Some
[Vol. 3: 189
Conceiving Due Process
so, after nearly a century of fending off ingenious attempts to challenge official
violations of state law through the Fourteenth Amendment,2 14 the Court itself
may have created the most effective argument for why a state administrator's
misapplication of state law presents a federal constitutional question.
In sum, in building a theory of due process around a positive law core, the
Court has constructed a doctrine that lacks a coherent purposive focus and
stands in tension with the principles and concerns which led it to positive law
in the first place. The elements chosen (explicit, specific, mandatory substan-
tive standards) and the elements rejected (institutional practice, common law,
background understandings, explicit procedural terms) cannot be rationalized
by reference to the importance of either substance or process to the individual,
or to his expectations about how official power will be exercised. Even if we
ignore the perspective of the individual-a strange thing to do in interpreting
the Bill of Rights2"'-the doctrine looks no better from the perspective of
government institutions. For the Court to assert complete control over the
process by which certain interests are dispensed, and yet simultaneously to
forswear both power over how interests are defined and concern with any other
sorts of interest, establishes a truly bizarre relationship between the national
judiciary and the state and federal political branches. It is as if the Court has
drawn a line in the dirt and said, "You don't have to step over this, but if you
do, don't complain about what happens next." One might appreciate this
strategy as a particularly elegant invocation by the Court of the power, and
responsibility, of consent-except that there is no good explanation for either
the location of the line or what happens after the legislature crosses it. More-
over, "a line in the dirt" isn't the right metaphor, for it implies more precision
and certainty than current doctrine affords. When judicial intervention turns
upon the specificity of substantive standards and, more fundamentally, the
distinction between substance and procedure, the image might better be a line
drawn in shifting sand. And yet, how can the Court be blamed? At each
decision point-the relevance of importance, the function of process, the
meaning of accuracy, the significance of individual expectations, the role of
statutory procedural terms-the alternative answers appeared no better.
Evidence," 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 631 (1988).
214. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 32, at 1225-1229.
215. Cf. Tracey Maclin, Constructing Fourth Amendment Principlesfrom the Government Perspective:
Whose Amendment Is It Anyway? 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 669 (1988) (Fourth Amendment should be viewed
from perspective of individual, not government.).
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C. Utilitarian Balancing
"No man's liberty or property [is] safe
when the court simply asks case by case
what procedures seem worthwhile and not too costly. "216
By the time we reach the final step, determining exactly what process is
due, much has been ordained by earlier doctrinal choices. The espoused
objective-assuring that (certain) rules governing official conduct are correctly
implemented-leads to an analytic focus on identifying and minimizing sources
of error. Hence, the Mathews formula asks whether the increased accuracy to
be anticipated from additional procedures, considered in light of the individual
interest at stake, will outweigh the anticipated burden to government of provid-
ing the procedures. The adoption of an entitlement framework-a model
concerned with "vindication of the private claims of individuals to have what
belongs to them under the law"'217-encourages as the procedural paradigm
the formal adversary process in which competing claims of right are tradition-
ally resolved. Thus, the set of potentially invocable procedures assessed
through the Mathews balance are the familiar components of civil trials.
Not surprisingly, this approach breeds theoretical and practical difficulties
that reflect by-now familiar, unresolved, and apparently unresolvable normative
dilemmas within the doctrine as a whole.
As a theoretical starting point, a utilitarian balance is deeply troubling. If
due process is to mark out and defend a sphere in which the individual is
reliably preserved from the demands of the collective, how can the extent of
the protection the individual receives turn on some calculus explicitly designed
to maximize aggregate welfare?" 8 When the claim of the individual is pitted
against "the sheer magnitude of the collective interests at stake,"219 how
often will the collective good not predominate? The unnaturalness of using a
social welfare balance to set the content of due process protection becomes
apparent, critics point out, if we imagine employing the Mathews approach to
decide what process is due parties in traditional civil adjudication. 2 ' And
yet, the Court's tacit recognition that due process in the regulatory context
must, somehow, be differently understood is grounded in an inescapable
reality: Providing mass justice is a staggering task. Although entitlement
analysis denies due process protection in many circumstances in which protec-
tion seems important, it nonetheless imposes procedural obligations on state
and federal administrative programs which process numbers of claims that
216. Rakoff, supra note 49, at 162 (hypothesizing reaction of "typical American lawyer").
217. Michelman, supra note 138, at 127.
218. See, e.g., J. MASHAW, supra note 43, at 47; Rakoff, supra note 49, at 162-63; Saphire, supra
note 128, at 155.
219. Saphire, supra note 128, at 155.
220. E.g., Rubin, supra note 5, at 1138.
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dwarf judicial caseloads.221 As Jerry Mashaw points out, "We surely are not
prepared to devote the whole of the national budget to the assurance of the
accuracy of all social welfare decisions. The appropriate implementation of
positive law is important, but it does not exhaust our demand for a good
life."222 If the Court is to avoid dictating a massive reordering of state and
federal fiscal priorities, it must, it seems, weigh individual claims to process
against the systemic costs of proceduralization.
To venture into social welfare accounting is, however, to crack the lid of
Pandora's box. Once the Court openly acknowledges that process implicates
resource allocation, and that different levels of procedural protection could be
justified according to the balance of individual and governmental interests at
stake, it lets loose the swarm of criticism (both conceptual and practical) over
ignoring the procedural provisions of positive law. What is the judiciary doing
second-guessing the political branches' judgment on how much should be spent
to implement a given regulatory program? "If the greatest good for the greatest
number is the test for constitutionality under the due process clause, then it
is hard to escape the notion that the best evidence of social welfare will always
be the judgment of the legislature or its delegate. "22l To engage, at this stage
of the analysis, in an inevitably ad hoc and standardless assessment of the
importance of the individual interest, and to use that assessment as the basis
for restructuring administrative behavior, is precisely the undisciplined judicial
interference in local and national governance that the Court embraced entitle-
ment analysis to avoid.
Even if there were conceptual justification for the Mathews balance, the
practical problems of conducting it are insuperable. Jerry Mashaw has exten-
sively demonstrated the shortcomings of the Court's application of the calculus
in Mathews itself.224 His work is illuminating, but that level of detail is not
necessary to appreciate the impossibility of the task Mathews sets. How can
the Court predict the number of errors that would be avoided by, for example,
permitting the individual to present oral testimony? Or the cost to the govern-
ment that would be entailed? Although in theory quantifiable, these factors
cannot, realistically, be quantified. 22 Moreover, the analysis shares with all
cost/benefit assessments the tendency to overlook, or at least underrate, "soft"
variables. 226 The government's interest, for example, is reduced to conserva-
221. "In 1984, the Social Security Administration made 337,459 dispositions. In 1984, federal trial
judges disposed of 243,000 civil cases and 44,501 'defendant dispositions' [i.e. criminal cases]." Judith
Resnick, Due Process:A Public Dimension, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 405, 427 n.110 (1987) (citations omitted).
222. J. MASHAW, supra note 43, at 106.
223. Id. at 152. Accord Easterbrook, supra note 91, at 110.
224. See J. MASHAW, supra note 43, at 115-40; Jerry Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process
Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of
Value, 44 U. Cm. L. REv. 28 (1976).
225. The Court seems to concede this in Mathews itself, where it gave short shrift to reversal rate
statistics proffered-with conflicting interpretations-by the parties. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
226. Mashaw, supra note 224, at 48. See generally Laurence Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or
Ideology, 2 Pin. & PuB. AFF. 66 (1972).
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tion of the fisc. There seems no way to account for the possibility that govern-
ment might share with the citizen, to at least some extent, an interest in
decisional processes that seem fair, rational, and careful-and hence legitimate
and acceptable-even if (or perhaps, precisely because) they cannot be infalli-
ble.
The present approach, it seems, yields nothing but harm. Perhaps because
a utilitarian calculus is so vulnerable to theoretical and practical attack, the
Court rarely concludes that the Mathews balance tips in favor of substantial
pre-deprivation process. Thus, it often inadequately protects those interests that
do make it past the entitlement gatekeeper.227 At the same time, to the extent
that process is imposed, the importation of strands of the formal, adversarial,
judicial hearing into the administrative setting can be useless, and even destruc-
tive. Goldberg's mandate of evidentiary hearings prior to termination of
welfare benefits has become the classic example. Mashaw points out that most
recipients lack the resources to utilize hearings and that, in any event, many
of the errors made in the program are not addressable through this sort of
process.228 Moreover, the emphasis on more formal, adversarial procedures
has changed the nature of the interaction between officials and benefit recipi-
ents in ways that many observers find disturbing and counterproductive.22 9
The pre-Goldberg regime may have been an intrusively paternalistic one, but
the new regime of assembly-line hearings stamped out by at-best-indifferent
bureaucratic adversaries hardly seems a brave new world worth discovering.
Hence, this last component of contemporary due process analysis exhibits
the unsoundness that afflicts the doctrine as a whole. It is simultaneously
underprotective and overintrusive, useless and harmful, incoherent and inevita-
ble, in need of remedy and irremediable. Mashaw, one of the most dedicated
contributors to the effort to craft the procedural due process jurisprudence of
the administrative state, best describes where we now find ourselves:
If positive law does not provide the identification and relative value of
interests, what does? If process promotes something other than accura-
cy, what is it? And, if the Court is to balance interests without becom-
ing utilitarian, or perhaps to eschew interest balancing in favor of rights
enforcing, exactly how is it to go about these things in a coherent and
acceptable fashion?
227. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 50, at 673-74, 710.
228. J. MASHAW, supra note 43, at 33-36. The way to improved agency performance, Mashaw argues,
is not adversary hearings but better administrative management. Id.
229. See, e.g., William Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD. L. REV.
36, 36 (1985) (hereafter Simon, Invention and Reinvention); William Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and
Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198 (1983) (hereafter Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and
Class). See also Lucie White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the
Hearing of Mrs. G, 38 BuFF. L. REV. 1, 32-34 (1990) (describing recipient's reluctance to invite
administrative retaliation by invoking hearing rights).
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"[We are what we have made ourselves . 231
I have retold the story of contemporary procedural due process jurispru-
dence in order to reveal something that has been hard for us to see.
Due process is the constitutional mouthpiece through which we voice a
multitude of anxious questions about the sort of society we are, and are
becoming. When an individual complains that a government official harmed
him through a process that seemed callous or unfair, he calls for an illumina-
tion of the relationship between citizens and the state in a world in which this
relationship is increasingly critical to each citizen's ability to survive and
prosper.32 When procedural due process doctrine reveals itself so incapable
of generating satisfying answers to this call, we are tempted to blame the Court
for stupidity, stubbornness, or shortsightedness. If only the justices would pay
attention to what the critics are saying; if only they would just "fix" procedural
due process. What the story of the last twenty years shows is that the conceptu-
al and practical problems we perceive throughout the doctrine cannot be traced
to some bungling that, with greater judicial attention, effort or humility, could
be fixed. At every turn, the Court did choose badly-but only to avoid choices
that appeared as bad or worse. Where we find ourselves is not a matter of
carelessness or happenstance. Where we find ourselves, unfortunately, makes
complete sense.
If we are to find our way out of this dilemma we must, paradoxically, go
still more deeply into it. We must look past the apparent welter of disagree-
ment to see that the doctrine and its various critiques are all born of a common
vision. It is this shared conceptual framework that has, until now, generated
the goals we have set for ourselves, the range of solutions we have deemed
possible, and the criteria by which we have judged doctrinal choices to be
"good," "bad," or "worse."
230. J. MASHAW, supra note 43, at 154.
231. DOROTHY DINNERSTEIN, THE MERMAID AND THE MINOTAUR 22 (1977).
232. In speaking, here and henceforth, of "citizens," I do not intend any implied exclusion of resident
aliens. The status of aliens has historically been a complicated and unhappy corner of due process law,
and it is beyond my purpose to confront it in this article.
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A. Images
"At any point in time,
we are one whose identity is constituted
by a tale. "
The legal magi of legend have always known the secret strength of meta-
phor. 4 For the rest of us, that knowledge comes harder. We have to strug-
gle to recognize the power of the images we invoke, their two-faced tendency
to constrain as well as facilitate, to construct as well as be constructed by, our
thinking. We have to work at understanding the pictures through which we
have become accustomed to understanding the world.
Behind the frustrated tangle of doctrine and criticism that is procedural due
process stand two powerful images: entitlement and largess. "Entitlement" is
the more familiar of the two, for it is image become doctrine itself. We know
it as the trigger, the test, the brass ring the plaintiff must be able to grab if he
wants to stay on for the next round. Its role as doctrine disguises and, simulta-
neously, enhances its potency as image; like the critical clue in a mystery
story, it is the commonplace object hiding in plain view. "Largess" also
exercises conceptual power from hiding, although it is concealment of a
different sort. The word plays no part as doctrine; except for a single mention
in one dissent, 5 it does not appear in the Court's procedural due process
opinions. It is, however, the normal discourse of the commentary. Benefits,
jobs, licenses, statuses, all the activities and services that are the potential
objects of due process claims are known collectively as "government largess."
The usage is ubiquitous and unself-conscious, a subliminal message conveyed
in the accounts of commentators of all political and jurisprudential persua-
sions.36
Strong words, "entitlement" and "largess" paint vivid pictures of the
relationship between the people and their government. The image of "entitle-
ment" is the image of the individual peremptorily asserting his claim to have
233. SEYLA BENHABIB, CRITIQUE, NORM, AND UTOPIA: A STUDY OF THE FOUNDATION OF CRITICAL
THEORY 349 (1986).
234. See, e.g., Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926) (Cardozo,
J.) ("Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end
often by enslaving it.").
235. Goss, 419 U.S. at 599 (Powell, J.).
236. See, e.g., J. MASHAW, supra note 43, passim; Rabin, supra note 108, passim; Saphire, supra
note 128, passim; Smolla, supra note 50, passim; Van Alstyne, supra note 124, passim; Alexander, supra
note 173, at 1560; Terrell, supra note 4, passim.
You might consider whether you remarked the usage of the word, several times, in the first half of
this article. Curiously, members of the Court use "largess" frequently, outside the area of procedural due
process, to describe government benefits and services. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 334
(1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Medicaid); Califano v. HEW, 443 U.S. 76, 84 (1979) (employment-related
benefits); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 361 (1974) (White, J., dissenting) (widows' tax exemption);
Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 462 (1973) (aid to schools); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 327
(1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (welfare).
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rendered to him what is rightfully due and owing. He stands at the focal point,
his posture one of demand, his tone one of righteous indignation. He is radiant
with moral force. He seeks the restoration of the proper order of things, an
order that has been disrupted by the stupidity or venality of figures (bureau-
crats, one gathers) lurking in the shadows. The image of "largess" is the image
of a potent magnate dispensing favors, a public Lord of the Manor moved by
noble and generous condescension to do good works. Moral weight, as well
as power, lies with this central figure; the people in the shadows are merely
the objects of its charitable impulses. Their only appropriate response is eager
gratitude; for them to thrust forward and make a claim would be a shocking
display of spiritual degeneracy or social deviance. 7
That these should be the images that have dominated our thinking about
procedural due process is remarkable in two respects. First, neither image
seems to be a good representation of how we citizens actually experience the
role of contemporary government. The entitlement picture is too grossly
peremptory. It does not hold true across the range of activities in which
government engages. We are likely, for example, to think about the category
of government jobs differently than we think about the category of government
benefits. Adding even greater complexity, our reactions vary within category.
Access to public kindergarten feels different than access to public graduate
school, just as we think differently about driver's licenses than about liquor
or broadcast licenses, about administration of a public library than about a
prison or mental health facility, about veterans benefits than about disaster
relief or farm subsidies. We could doubtless identify certain characteristics of
government-citizen relationships that affect our response across categor-
ies-importance, scarcity, voluntariness, and blameworthiness come immediate-
ly to mind-but their interaction is complicated. Rarely do we see a simple
picture in which it is the rightful prerogative of the citizen to demand the good
or service, and the correspondingly absolute duty of the public official to
provide it.
At the same time, the largess picture is, if anything, even less true to our
felt experience. We may not think of health benefits, liquor licenses, teaching
jobs or parole as things that "belong" to the citizens who seek them. But
neither do we think of them as things that "belong," absolutely and without
qualification, to the government from which they are sought. Certainly we do
not understand them as charity dispensable at the whim of public officials.
Indeed, only the common currency of the largess image could desensitize us
to its startling inappropriateness. To describe as "largess"-the "liberal giving
to or as if to an inferior"-the array of opportunities and services our govern-
237. If this picture of "government largess" seems too fanciful, consider the definition of "largess"
offered by Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary: "(1) liberal giving to or as if to an inferior; (2) excessive
or ostentatious gratuities; (3) an innate generosity of mind or spirit." Charles Reich is apparently the source
through which the term entered our due process consciousness. He appears to have used it deliberately,
with full awareness of its unpleasant connotations. See, e.g., Reich, supra note 78, at 733, 770.
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ment provides its people out of public funds betrays an almost feudal mindset,
a worldview that antedated the ascendence of democracy.
The second remarkable thing about the two images is their disparateness.
"Entitlement" and "largess" could not be more wildly contradictory representa-
tions of the dynamic of power and moral standing in the welfare state. Yet they
coexist in due process jurisprudence. But, you might object, this is easily
explained-indeed, the answer also helps resolve how our legal imagination
could be dominated by two images that so poorly fit our experiences as
citizens. Law often sees the world as divided into winners and losers, those
who have the right to control and those who lack it, things that are property
(and therefore cannot be withheld without due process) and things that are not,
rights and privileges, entitlement and largess. Even though neither image by
itself is an "accurate" picture of our understanding of the relationship between
citizen and modern government, they work in tandem; their exaggerated
oppositional features convey, like a pair of good caricatures, important legal
truth. I will come back to this point,"3 but for the moment let me offer sim-
ply a factual response: We have not used the two images as the either/or of
a central constitutional dichotomy, the heads-or-tails of the coin of due process.
Whether describing what the Court has done or prescribing what it ought to
do, we repeatedly talk-seemingly deaf to the dissonance-about creating
entitlement in (or to) government largess ."
If the images of "entitlement" and "largess" jar with how we would
instinctively describe the relationship between citizens and modern administra-
tive government, why did they emerge as the dominant pictures? And why do
we hold on to them, conjoining them in a way-"entitlement in largess"-that
seems to condemn our thinking, from the very outset, to incoherence as well
as inaccuracy? The explanation, I believe, is that behind the images stand a
set of assumptions about people, power, government, and law; assumptions
that are familiar objects hiding in plain view; assumptions that are the sublimi-
nal message in the accounts of courts and commentators.
I emphasize that my claim, with respect to these assumptions, is essentially
an inductive one: Given the procedural due process jurisprudence we have
developed in the last two decades, they appear to be the underlying assump-
tions about human nature, society, the state, and law that would generate such
a doctrine and set of critiques. This is not a claim that the judges and commen-
tators who have shaped the jurisprudence consciously hold or would enthusias-
tically endorse these assumptions. 2" And it certainly is not a claim that these
238. See infra text at pp. 244-46.
239. E.g., Smolla, supra note 50, at 79, 98 ("From what source of law are entitlements to largess
to be derived . . . ?"; "Roth accepted the premise that 'rights' or 'entitlements' in largess had no a priori
existence."). Cf Rabin, supra note 108, at 74 (Recent cases "do not go far enough in recognizing a
property interest in government largess.").
240. I have, however, included (in this and in the preceding section) statements that seem consistent
with holding or endorsing these assumptions-or at least that appear to accept them as the descriptive and
normative premises of the jurisprudence.
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assumptions correspond to what we know from our lives with family, friends,
and fellow citizens. Indeed, to the extent that we (those who have shaped the
discourse to date, and those who can shape it in the future) feel impelled to
distance ourselves from these assumptions-perceiving a dissonance between
the world as we experience it in our daily lives and the world as they posit it
to be-we create the space in which to begin to imagine a very different
procedural due process jurisprudence.
B. Assumptions
"[T]he definition of the problem
sets the answer. "241
Begin with an assumption about human nature: Man's most significant
characteristics are his autonomous individuality and his rationality. Essentially
separate from others, he comprises a unique constellation of needs, interests,
and desires not shared (perhaps, not even knowable) by others. He experiences
the fullness of his humanity when he brings to bear, upon questions of ends
and of means, his capacity for reasoned decisionmaking. Hence, what he
requires to flourish is the freedom to define and pursue his own vision of the
good life, unsubjugated by other, competing visions. For him, independence
is the desire and the requirement of full human personhood; the rational
exercise of choice is the substance and the sign of full moral agency.
Which leads to an assumption about society: For this autonomous, rational
individual, others are at least potentially dangerous. Each of them will be
pursuing a particular conception of the good life. Even among men of good
will, those conceptions will often be indifferent, if not actively hostile, to the
realization of his vision-and he would be foolhardy to trust to an abundance
of good will. Because each of the others' constellations of interests and desires
is idiosyncratic and practically (if not fundamentally) unknowable to him, he
can never be certain if, when, or from where the danger will materialize.242
To mitigate this insecurity he reaches for a tenuous solution. The one
common ground upon which he and others can meet is the human capacity for
rationality. This quality will not be sufficient to enable them to attain a shared
vision of the good life, at least beyond some fairly basic and limited point. The
constellations of interests and desires are simply too mysterious, varied, and
subjective. However, the others, as rational actors, should consent to a set of
rules that guarantees the freedom of each to pursue his own vision of the good
so long as that pursuit does not interfere with the reasonable freedom of others.
241. Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law-A Conversation, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 11, 47
(1985) (remarks of Carol Gilligan) Ihereinafter Buffalo Symposium].
242. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 3 (1980).
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One of these rules is that every individual is acknowledged as the equal of
every other. This primary rule of equality generates a subsidiary rule: No
individual's conception of the good may be privileged over any other's.2 43
Another and related rule is that obligations toward others which entail action
contrary to the individual's own desires should be imposed only if he has
consented, in some manner, to undertake those obligations. 2"
Which leads to an assumption about the state: For the aggregate of autono-
mous, rational individuals, the state is both necessary and dangerous. The state
must exist in order to secure the conditions within which the individual may
pursue his vision of the good life.24 At the most basic level, government
guarantees material security, policing the boundary between the individual's
sphere of autonomy and others who might attempt to invade that sphere.
Additionally, government guards the integrity of the framework of consensual
interchange, maintaining conditions within which individuals can engage in
mutually satisfying, voluntary relationships and exchanges. By thus safeguard-
ing the freedom of each individual to pursue his own interests as he perceives
them, government promotes the autonomy and self-fulfillment of each citizen
and hence the good of society as a whole.
The state is dangerous because the power required to safeguard individual
freedom may just as readily become an instrument of individual domination.
Ceding power to another is always perilous.2" Power in the hands of govern-
ment is a two-fold danger: It may be seized to serve the ends of individual
government officials or private individuals acting in collaboration. This danger
has intensified as industrial and technological advances render human existence
more physically and economically interrelated. Protecting the individual against
specific predatory incursions of others and maintaining the framework of
voluntary interchange may no longer be sufficient to secure the conditions
within which his freedom can be realized. Some individuals will lack, through
no circumstances that could be attributed to their voluntary choice, the minimal
resources necessary to experience autonomous personhood. Thus, the state
must increasingly be prepared to supply, as well as to safeguard, the material
conditions of human freedom. This will require taking resources from some
individuals for redistribution to others. Official power, and hence opportunities
for its misuse, proliferates. With every act of redistribution undertaken to
enhance the autonomous personhood of some individuals, the state teeters
precariously on the edge of thwarting other individuals' autonomous pursuit
243. See, e.g., J. MASHAW, supra note 43, at 224 (quoted infra note 259).
244. See, e.g., id., at 224-25 ("There are essentially two techniques through which the state may
exercise power, while avoiding the legitimation of personal domination. The first is consent; the second,
the use of impersonal rules or principles.").
245. Some voices within the procedural due process commentary would say this is far too positive
a description of the state's role. E.g., Terrell, supra note 4, at 354-56 & n. 10. See also infra note 254.
246. "From the individual's point of view, it is not any particular kind of power, but all kinds of
power, that are to be feared." Reich, supra note 78, at 774.
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of their own conceptions of the good life.247
And an assumption about law: Law is the instrument which accommodates
the multifarious, potentially exploitive actions of autonomous, preference-
pursuing individuals by providing forms and processes to control conflict.
Through the institution of rights, law marks out zones within which the
individual is free to pursue his own conception of the good, and across the
boundaries of which further satisfaction of his desires is a matter of consensual
arrangement with other rights-holders.248 The precise location of these boun-
daries will rarely be objectively demonstrable or self-evident. Hence the legiti-
macy of law's content generally depends upon the consent of affected individu-
als, obtained either directly through their participation in law-making or
constructively through their assent to institutions of law-formation.249
To fulfill its function most completely, law should possess certain formal
characteristics. It should be general, impersonal, and objective to ensure equal
treatment of autonomous individuals, none of whose conceptions of the good
must be subordinated to any other's.2 ° It should be determinate, stable, and
calculable to permit the fullest experience of liberty by allowing the individual
confidence of its boundaries. 2" It should be comprehensible and predictable
to enable the individual to engage in the rational decisionmaking which is his
quintessentially human characteristic.252 Even when law fails to forestall
conflict, these formal attributes contribute to its success as a conflict-dampen-
ing device. When preference-pursuing individuals collide, their dispute (struc-
tured as competing claims of right) is most likely to be resolved acceptably
if, after full opportunity for adversarial joining, winner and loser are declared
by a third party not on the basis of his own values, but rather through the
rational, objective application of recognizably impersonal, determinate, stable
rules.253
These assumptions are not unfamiliar. They closely correspond to what
others have characterized as the classic premises of liberal legalism. 4 To
247. See Michelman, supra note 55, at 1334-37; Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal,
101 HARv. L. REv. 421, 437-46 (1987) (both tracing ideological evolution from night-watchman to welfare
state).
248. "The rules thus have a double aspect. By their very effect of staking out the limits of each
person's guaranteed freedom, they also stake out zones of autonomy wherein each is protected from
exposure to unpredictable, arbitrary or discretionary interference by others." Michelman, supra note 138,
at 129.
249. See, e.g., J. MAS.SAW, supra note 43, at 224-25; Michelman, supra note 138, at 129.
250. See, e.g., J. MASHAW, supra note 43, at 267 (urging "the impersonality of rules as a safeguard
against domination, as a means for maintaining the social preconditions of individual moral agency").
251. See Michelman, supra note 177, at 1472 ("a formally rational law designed to liberate as it
organizes and orders").
252. "Absent transparency and comprehensibility ... the possibilities for rational planning and
independent moral agency vanish." Mashaw, supra note 85, at 439-40.
253. "Thus the role of rendering decisions in formal procedures-which we can call the judicial
role-must consist of deciding in accordance with criteria external to, and capable of contradicting, the
judge's own Olympian or managerial view of what is best." Michelman, supra note 138, at 130.
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discover that they dominate procedural due process jurisprudence would not
be at all surprising. Many would say they are the reigning assumptions of our
entire legal system. Of course our thinking about due process originates in
liberal-legalist assumptions. Why wouldn't we begin here? Where else would
we begin?
The case against beginning here is, I hope, becoming clear. The jurispru-
dence we created has failed, conceptually and practically. Twenty years of
trying to fix it has proven it to be incorrigible. We were quick to see the
failure. We are slower to recognize the incorrigibility. We will be free to move
forward only when we see the connection between this incorrigible failure and
the set of assumptions from which we started and within which we have
attempted reform. Seeing that connection begins by considering again the two
images, entitlement and largess.
What is to be expected when a human subject whose nature is essentially
solitary and self-contained, and whose primary motivation is the determined
pursuit of his own needs and desires, interacts with another such subject?
Perhaps, his interests will parallel those of the other, and cooperative action
will be born of coincidental self-interest. If, however, interests do not so
fortuitously coincide, then only a limited range of outcomes can be anticipated.
The individual might attain a position of power, from which he is able to
compel the other to yield to his wishes. Or, the individual might find himself
in a position of subordination, in which he is at the mercy of the other's whim.
The premise that actors are autonomous and egotistic allows us to imagine few
patterns in between. In an encounter with another over a mutually-desired
resource, one emerges either in control or under control, with the advantage
or at a disadvantage. Now, imagine the possible patterns of interaction between
citizen and government over the resources of the welfare state. Two pictures
emerge: entitlement and largess.
254. See generally Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities,
1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7 (1989); Christine Littleton, Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method
Makes, 41 STAN. L. REV. 751 (1989) (reviewing CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED
(1987)); Deborah Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617 (1990); Ann Scales, The
Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986); Simon, Invention and
Reinvention, supra note 229; Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988);
ALISON JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE (1983).
By using the label "liberal legalism," I do not mean to deny liberalism's status as a broad political-
philosophical tradition that cannot be reduced to a single, uniformly-endorsed set of assumptions. See
generally J. MASHAW, supra note 43, at 183-99; Steven Shiffrin, Liberalism, Radicalism, and Legal
Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1103 (1983). Many legal scholars who place themselves (or who are
placed) within that tradition obviously depart in significant ways from the assumptions that have been
dubbed "liberal-legalist." See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 50; KENNETH KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA:
EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION (1989); Kenneth Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE
L.J. 447; STEVEN SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (1990). Cf. Cass
Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1566-71 (1988) (advocating "liberal
republicanism"). The scholarship devoted to procedural due process, however, has stayed remarkably close
to what might be called a liberal-legalist mainstream. Indeed, it has been moved by strong currents of
libertarianism which (in their Hobbesian origins) would demand an even bleaker account of human nature
and a far harsher picture of human society and the state than I have incorporated into my relatively benign
statement of the assumptions.
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These two pictures, entitlement (the image of control) and largess (the
image of subordination), represent the possible dynamics in an encounter
between the citizen-individual and the government-other. Which of the two is
the appropriate dynamic-which, to put it somewhat differently, is the image
towards which procedural due process doctrine ought to strive-cannot be
known without consulting some normative reference point outside the pictures
themselves. Within the set of liberal-legalist assumptions, the truest, best such
reference point is consent, the distribution of obligation through the voluntary
choice of rational actors. And two theories of consent appear, initially at least,
to favor the individual-empowering dynamic of entitlement.
The first theory invokes the metabargain through which individuals came
together and formed society. The state created in this agreement received
power only so that the freedom of the citizen-individual might be maximized.
To understand the origin and purpose of government in this way compels us
to reject the image of largess, in which citizens occupy a condition of depen-
dence, a condition that is the antithesis of individual freedom and, indeed, of
full human personhood. To lack the power of self-determination, the control
over one's environment, and the ability to make and implement choices is to
be less than human. 55 Indeed, it is precisely the goal of curing dependence,
of providing the material base from which citizens can realize the independent
self-direction of fully human actors, that (within liberal-legalist assumptions)
most securely justifies governmental redistribution of individual wealth. Under
the terms of the metabargain, then, the citizen-individual might legitimately
demand from government that which government may justly possess only in
order to secure his freedom. He might be regarded as "entitled to" the resourc-
es amassed by the welfare state. But the triumph of entitlement, through this
reasoning, is a pyrrhic one. The posture of demand can be achieved only from
the condition of helplessness. The citizen-individual attains the focal position
of power in the picture of entitlement only by first demonstrating that he is one
of the powerless dependent who crouch in the shadows of the picture of
largess. In a world that cherishes autonomy and self-command, it is hard to
hear the demand of one whose peremptory voice originates in helplessness,
defectiveness, and failure.
An alternative way in which consent could be said to support the dynamic
of entitlement over largess involves the more transient societal bargains that
are ordinary legislation. The benefits, jobs, licenses, and statuses created
255. The issue of dependency in particular is a perennial and poignant problem for liberal poli-
tics. For many forms of dependency seem to demand a paternalistic control that liberal autonomy
rejects. To rationalize paternalism within a liberal polity, paternalism must be presented in
therapeutic, rehabilitative, or educational forms that promise only temporary limitation of
individual autonomy, a reversion at the earliest possible moment to self-command, and necessary
assistance in making the transition.
J. MASHAW, supra note 43, at 249-50. The most powerful expression of foreboding remains The New
Property, in which Charles Reich worried, "What will dependence do to the American character?" Reich,
supra note 78, at 771.
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through those laws could be seen as obligations undertaken by the state. The
individual would-be beneficiary could not have demanded that such promises
be made in the first instance. They are explained and justified by nothing
more, or less, than that they are the present confluence of citizens' interests
and desires (expressed through representatives). Nevertheless, once these
promises have been made, the individual might be said to be "entitled" to
demand that they be honored. But once again, the case for choosing the
entitlement picture is unstable. Once again, the first step is largess-here, the
beneficent whim of the majority. This is demand springing forth from gratuity,
an order predicated on a promise that could not have been commanded. In a
world that prizes voluntary choice as the fountainhead of obligation, it is hard
to hear such a demand without fearing that those who promised have been
pushed beyond their undertaking, and that those who benefit will eventually
try to claim that the promise itself was required.
In this way, having first generated the dichotomous images of entitlement
and largess, liberal-legalist assumptions then spawned the freakish hybrid of
"entitlement in largess." This is the picture of the opportunistic beggar extort-
ing payment by flaunting his wretchedness, or of the spoiled donee imperiously
demanding delivery of his gift. It is the most unsavory picture of all. Is it any
wonder that the jurisprudence built around this unhappy image is deeply
conflicted? Consider again the story of procedural due process, this time
hearing the relentless compulsion of its generative assumptions.
C. Jurisprudence
"The kings had made a monster
that devoured them. "256
If law is conceived as the instrument through which autonomous selves
protect themselves against the acquisitive behavior of others, then the Due
Process Clauses become the promise of Ultimate Law. The pledge of "due
process "-process that is owed or owing as a debt, as a natural or moral
right257-reassures the citizen-individual that he will not be relegated to the
caprice of others for the treatment he receives. Here is process proclaimed as
right, and a right is a powerful possession, a zone of noninterference, "a
loaded gun that the rightholder may shoot at will in his corner of town."'
In addition, this process is attached to "liberty" (the condition of freedom,
from domination of other wills, that is the natural and desired state of the
256. CHARLEs REMBAR, THE LAW OF THE LAND: THE EVOLUTION OF OUR LEGAL SYSTEM 212
(1980).
257. The primary definitions of "due" in WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 387
(1988).
258. Roberto Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L. REV. 561, 597 (1983).
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individual)2 9 and to "property" (the material circumstance that realizes this
freedom, the safe base that enables you to deal, from strength, with the threat
posed by individual and collective others). 260 In one constitutional cluster, the
central icons of liberal-legalist ideology come powerfully together, and the
constitutional meaning seems clear and vivid.
However, when we invoke due process, thus conceived, to help us define
the relationship between citizen and the modern regulatory state, all that
ideological power works against us, confusing and obscuring what had ap-
peared so clear. The need seems to be compelling-Charles Reich vividly
portrays the citizen losing himself in the maw of collective power and individu-
al dependency that is the welfare state-but none of the implementing concepts
now make sense. If "property" is the bulwark of individual autonomy against
the other, the desideratum of private limitation on collective power, how can
it help us think about an individual's claim to a benefit, license or other share
of public resources? It is like demanding from me the space that gives you
room to defy me. If "liberty" is liberation from the oppression of the other,
how can it help us understand an individual's claim for employment, status,
or other relationship with government? It is like demanding that I assist you
in being left alone. If "due process," process as right, is a loaded gun that the
holder may shoot at will in his corner of town, aren't you demanding that I
hand you the gun with which you will then shoot me down? Or, better, hold
me up-for the propinquity of the takings clause underscores that resources
demanded by individuals from government today are resources taken from
individuals by government tomorrow.
For a Court trying to create a doctrine that simultaneously promotes each
citizen's quest for autonomous self-fulfillment and protects each citizen from
the natural tendency of all others to maximize their share of available resourc-
es, there could be, in the end, no choice but the positivist trap. The reality of
redistribution could not be denied. The benefits and statuses clamoring for
protection as the new property and liberty were inescapably someone else's
traditional property and liberty transmuted. The Court could not find consent
to the creation of these new rights/demands in the Due Process Clauses
themselves-at least not through any interpretive process that met the liberal-le-
galist ideal of adjudication as a process of rationally noncontroversial reasoning
from neutral principles. There was no place left but simple-majoritarian
positive law, and the enforcement of whatever obligations have been undertak-
en there.
259. Cf. J. MASHAW, supra note 43, at 224 ("Let us begin by restating the basic value of liberal
governance in terms of a general prohibition: State power shall not be used to subject any person to the
will of another. ").
260. Outside, [the individual] must justify or explain his actions, and show authority. Within,
he is master, and the state must explain and justify any interference.. . .Thus, property performs
the function of maintaining independence, dignity and pluralism in society by creating zones
within which the majority has to yield to the owner.
Reich, supra note 78, at 771:
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However, just as (given liberal-legalist assumptions) this solution was
inevitable, so was it inevitably unacceptable. If the protection of due process
depends on the content of ordinary law, the individual will find himself at the
mercy of a majority of egotistic, preference-maximizing others-the very
position from which the constitutional right was to secure him.26
Reaction within the commentary was, accordingly, vehement and deep. Of
all the proffered strategies for escaping the positivist trap, the boldest and most
promising was dignitary theory. Its promise lay in its determination to supplant
the "possessive, privatistic" view of process as an instrument to obtain public
resources 262-a view that labored under the conceptual dyslexia of "entitle-
ment in largess"-with a "communal, interpersonal" vision of process as
interaction between the citizen and his government.2 63 Frank Michelman
explained, "The [former] perspective is that of the isolated individual interested
in getting what is his, while the [latter] perspective is that of a group member
interested in his relationships with fellow members of the group."2" But
within the governing ideological framework, the transformation sought by
dignitary theorists simply was not possible.
In good liberal-legalist fashion, these theorists assumed that human dignity
resided in the distinctively human capacity for rational thought.265 From here
it was but a short step to Kant for the ideal of a dignity-affirming process: "To
treat anyone as a mere means is to deny the importance of his ends in life [viz,
No citizen's conception of the good may be privileged over any other's] and,
at the same time, to undermine his basis for self-respect" [viz, The individual
experiences himself as fully human only when he can exert control over
himself and his environment, not when he is directed by some external
will].266 This ideal would be realized through procedures that epitomized
rational discourse: revelation by the decisionmaker of the grounds for action
and participation by the individual in the form of responsive information and
argument. These procedures would embody rationality, by enabling the individ-
ual to comprehend what is happening and to work at averting the threatened
harm. Moreover, by preventing the decisionmaker from denying the indivi-
dual's status as an autonomous, equal will, they would constitute the citizen's
261. "[1]t makes no sense to employ the value judgments of the majority as the vehicle for protecting
minorities from the value judgments of the majority." J. ELY, supra note 79, at 69.
262. Michelman, supra note 138, at 128.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 130-3 1.
265. See, e.g., Saphire, supra note 128, at 119-20. Although dignity may have a nonrational
psychological dimension, any attempt to pursue affective satisfaction would be intolerably indeterminate,
plunging the constitutional inquiry into the chaos of subjectivity. See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 224, at
50. See also J. MASHAW, supra note 43, at 171 ("This analysis should not be confused with apsychological
analysis of the state of mind or well-being of individuals .... We are not exploring what processes make
people feel dignified or have self-respect.") (emphasis in original). Rational cognition was the only
acceptably universal and objective starting point.




proof against being disposed of by his government as a less-than-human thing.
In this way, having set out to envision an alternative to process as privat-
istic, possessive and peremptory, dignitary theory came round full circle. All
that had changed was the name of that to which the self-contained, self-cen-
tered citizen-individual lays claim. Listen to this description of how the
dignitary conception of process (here called "nonformality") is thought to
differ from the conception of process as an instrumentality to obtain desired
things ("formality"): "It might be said that formality is the standpoint of an
individual momentarily regarding others solely as means to his ends, while
nonformality is the standpoint of an individual steadfastly demanding to be
treated as an end and not solely as means. "267 For the self of liberal legalism,
there can be no escape from privatism, no interchange with another that is not
peremptory and possessive. Dignity means preserving self inviolate from
others. Relationship means mutually acceding to the demand to be treated as
an end-a fragile truce made possible not by growing trust, but by new-found
modes of verifiability. The process which results is "interpersonal" only in that
each confirms the other's right to egotistic separateness. It is "communal" in
a world where "[c]ommunity consists in this: that no one can rightly complain
of being used by another."
261
And even if dignitary theorists imagined a more generous, responsive and
compassionate relationship among persons and between the citizen and his
government, they were forced to concede that it could never be attained
through the mechanism of due process.269 In this world, law vindicates sepa-
ration. A claim of right to dignity-affirming procedure concedes the absence
of connection: "To stand on one's rights is to distance oneself from those to
whom the claim is made; it is to announce, so to speak, an opening of hostili-
ties; it is to acknowledge that other warmer bonds of kinship, affection and
intimacy can no longer hold. "27 Courts preside over these hostilities, chan-
neling the adversaries through rituals which, if conducted properly, result in
victory without violence. 27 1 Law could not change the nature of the self-
sufficient, egotistic combatants that come before it. Indeed, for it even to
attempt to do so would be the grossest invasion of individual autonomy.2 72
Thus dignitary theorists reluctantly concluded that even if the citizen-individual
could imagine desiring from his fellows something other than possessive,
privatistic satisfaction, law could not assist him in achieving it.
273
267. Michelman, supra note 138, at 131 (emphasis added).
268. Pincoffs, supra note 132, at 179 (emphasis in original).
269. Supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
270. Jeremy Waldron, Wen Justice Replaces Affection: The Need for Rights, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 625, 628 (1988).
271. Or, rather, without a level of violence we find unacceptable. See Robert Cover, Violence and
the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986) [hereinafter Violence and the Word]; Robert Cover, The Supreme
Court 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
272. See, e.g., J. MASHAW, supra note 43, at 200 ("1 do not believe that fraternity can be mandated
by law without an unacceptable loss of individualist liberal values.").
273. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
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Still, so disturbing was the danger from the collective other represented
by the positivist trap that the accomplishment of freestanding, uncontingent
rights of revelation and participation-limited as they concededly are-would
have been no small victory for dignitary theory. But because even this theory
rested upon a peremptory, proprietary rationale for process, it ultimately
collapsed upon itself. Two hypothetical liberal-legalist selves might choose to
accede to each other's demands for process that both constituted and verified
respect for self-centered rationality. Within the mutuality of such a compact,
neither could rightly claim that he was being used as mere means.274 In fact,
however, the government official-individual whose thought processes and
attention were being requisitioned had not consented to honor such a demand.
Coercive revelation of his reasoning processes would simply reverse which
individual was reduced to means towards another's ends. 275 Thus dignitary
theory found itself stymied by that most powerful of liberal-legalist touch-
stones, consent.
The power of consent to confound the creation of an acceptable due process
jurisprudence did not end with the defeat of dignitary theory. Having thwarted
our efforts to escape the positivist trap, it then posed the painful conundrum
of "the bitter with the sweet." So long as positive law specifies the process
to be afforded, in advance and in terms that the rational citizen-individual can
apprehend, does not the act of seeking the benefit constitute acceptance of the
terms on which it is offered? That some might call those terms undesirable or
undignified does not negate the presence of choice; it simply confirms the
mysterious multiplicity of individual needs and desires. From the ideological
commitment to allowing the individual to pursue his own ends, regardless of
what others may think reasonable or best, naturally flows an ideological
complacency about where the individual then finds himself.276 And as the
citizen-individual is left in splendid isolation holding whatever portion he
apparently has chosen, procedural due process is left with no apparent function
to perform. Positive law supplies not only substance but also procedure.
Note that the entire account, thus far, has proceeded on the assumption that
interactions between individual and government are not fundamentally different
than interactions between two "private" individuals. "Bitter with the sweet"
comes straight out of the familiar contractarian model of two rational actors,
perfectly self-knowledgeable and possessing equal power, who confront one
- another and, after consulting the private calculus of self-interest, choose
whether to accept the other's terms. This conflation of public and private is
274. "Negotiation is the legitimate process for classical liberals. . . . Submission to another emerges
through consent; consent thus transforms potential domination into cooperation." J. MASHAw, supra note
43, at 227 (emphasis in original).
275. See, e.g., id. at 192.
276. See, e.g., Smolla, supra note 50 at 114 (Judgments about constitutional process in administrative
environments "must often be influenced by the feeling that recipients have in fact voluntarily given up
certain rights in exchange for a public benefit, and it is not clear why that judgment is illegitimate.").
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initially perplexing in an ideological universe that generally sets such stake on
distinguishing between the two. The explanation for the apparent contradiction
can be found by going back a moment to dignitary theory.
Dignitary theorists automatically and without discussion "pierced the veil"
of government to regard the official engaged in public administration no
differently than any individual acting in his private capacity. In this, they
adhered to the liberal-legalist view of humans as separate, fully individuated
beings with needs and desires not contingent, in either origin or satisfaction,
upon others. Any group composed of such beings, even government, is simply
an aggregation of separate selves, each retaining his essential nature unaltered
by the incidental fact of affiliation. That one of two parties to a dispute over
resources is a government official is significant only in that he possesses
additional power in the struggle of contending wills. This understanding of the
public official as simply another individual (who happens to have greater scope
for self-regarding action) both set up and rendered irresolvable the "use as
means" dilemma of dignitary theory. Since status as government agent is
essentially irrelevant to individual identity and personhood, it cannot be the
basis for any altered rights or responsibilities vis-a-vis other individuals (who
happen to be seeking government resources).
Once dignitary theory quite logically (within liberal-legalist assumptions)
pierced the veil of government to think about the government official as simply
any other individual, it was but a short step to thinking about government as
simply any other actor. Thus, commentators came to talk unself-consciously
about the "rights" and "freedom" of government. 277 And from there it was
an even shorter step to assuming that government (like any other actor) is
presumptively free to be arbitrary; absent some demonstrable and legitimate
basis for imposing an obligation to the other, it is free to pursue its own
interests as aggressively as any other sovereign will. 27 When this presump-
tion is conjoined with the commitment to holding the individual responsible
for choices he has been free to make, the resulting dynamic makes "bitter with
the sweet" virtually unstoppable within the liberal-legalist understanding.279
The commentary did, nonetheless, try to resist it. Monopoly theorists
attempted to meet consent on its own terms, but faltered as they tried to
specify what it means for a citizen to "have a choice" about dealing with his
government. Caught within the contractarian model, they had to accept the
ideological correctness of the premise that government (like any other actor
in a competitive market) has the right to be "as arbitrary as economic feasibili-
277. E.g., Simon, supra note 59, at 164, 173; Terrell, supra note 59, at 904.
278. E.g., Terrell, supra note 59, at 910 n.238. Despite the market rhetoric in which this idea is often
expressed by contemporary scholars, it is not a new development. The presumptive equation of government
with a private actor was at the heart of the right-privilege distinction. See, for example, the opinions of
Holmes in: Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 511, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (1895); and McAuliffev. New
Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892).
279. Thus, the commentary almost universally agrees that Chief Justice Rehnquist's position is logically
.correct" within the existing doctrinal framework. See supra note 203.
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ty permits "2 t°-but all the implications of that starting point felt wrong.
Caveat emptor may have a venerable pedigree in the liberal-legalist universe,
but "caveat citizen"-wherein government is free to drive "tough-minded and
self-serving contractual bargains with the citizenry" 2 8-is harder to swallow.
Successfully mediating these conflicting impulses required developing a theory
of choice that could negotiate the knife-edge line between condoning exploita-
tion and enshrining paternalism-a task that made contract law's attempt to
define unconscionability and overreaching in the private sector seem child's
play by comparison. As if the knot weren't Gordian enough, dignitary theory
briefly reemerged to query, softly, whether individuals could consent to
relationships in which they were treated as mere means.282 And monopoly
theorists were forced to admit the added complication of inalienable rights.
Round and round the theorists went, unable to catch the tail of consent, unable
(in the liberal-legalist universe) to stop trying.
Perhaps intuiting that this imbroglio could yield no answers, the Court
resorted to fiat. The doctrine would look to positive law for the interests
protected and ignore it for the process due. As theoretically and practically
satisfying as actually cutting the baby in half, this resolution at least allowed
the jurisprudence to move forward-in a course at once predictable and
doomed.
The standards requirement-process is available only when positive law
contains mandatory substantive standards that enforceably constrain agency
discretion-followed quite naturally from the premise of autonomous actors
indifferent, if not openly antagonistic, to one another's interests. There could
be no point in compelling an interaction between two such beings if there were
no basis upon which the one with power over the contested resource could be
forced to yield. At least, there could be no legitimate point. Interchange in
such circumstances could only produce objectivity-destroying personal pleas,
corrupting appeals for special treatment, a dangerous regime of law without
rules.2"3 The standards requirement was thus a logical doctrinal entailment
of core liberal-legalist assumptions. And, once again, those same assumptions
generated vehement objections to the doctrine they had created. If individuals
with power have no incentive to use it altruistically, then citizens require most
protection where official power is most expansive. The standards requirement
withholds due process precisely where the need is greatest.
280. Terrell, supra note 59, at 906.
281. Smolla, supra note 50, at 112 (characterizing the position of Justices Holmes and Rehnquist).
See also id. at 115 ("Once it is accepted that freedom of contract and open marketplace ideas may be
sufficient to sustain the rationality of conditions on largess, one must be willing to swallow many one-sided
bargains, including bargains that one may wish, as a matter of personal politics, the government had never
struck.").
282. See, e.g.. Michelman, supra note 138, at 166 n.66.
283. See, e.g., Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 114 (1977) (Plaintiff, whose driver's license was
summarily suspended, "is really asserting the right to appear in person only to argue that the Secretary
should show leniency and depart from his own regulations."). Cf. J. MASHAW, supra note 43, at 178 ("In
short the demand is for law without rules.").
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This criticism (not surprisingly) rests upon the same view of process as that
which impelled the standards requirement in the first place: Process is confron-
tation, wherein it is revealed who is entitled to prevail and who is compelled
to yield. Therefore, even as they condemned the standards requirement, liberal-
legalist assumptions insisted that some principle of reckoning-some criteria
by which winner and loser are ordained-must be present. Moreover, because
an individual (particularly one whose willfulness is enhanced by the possession
of official power) could not be trusted to capitulate merely on the strength of
reasoned argument, policing by some disinterested arbiter must be possi-
ble.284 However, the ability of courts to serve that role is (in this world)
carefully circumscribed. Combat by trial legitimately proceeds only where the
rules for declaring the victor are neutral, objective, and determinate.2"'
Courts cannot properly summon parties to the ritual of process without substan-
tive standards that are mandatory (to provide the warrant for compulsion),
specific (to set the boundaries for contest), and explicit (to reveal the canons
for judgment). And so the standards requirement became a part of the doctrine
that could not be tolerated, and could not be abandoned.
Finally and most obviously, liberal-legalist assumptions determined the
shape (and, ultimately, the contradictions) of "what process is due?" The
Mathews balance perfectly embodies the presumed radical disconnectedness
and oppositionality of the contestants. It would be inconceivable to attribute
to the individual any concern with the integrity of the program as a whole or
with the effects on other actual and potential recipients-just as it would be
inconceivable that the interest of the government could be other than avoiding
the costs of giving in to citizens' demands.2"6 Forming the pivot of the bal-
ance (and hence effectively determining how the balance tips) is the risk of er-
ror-the point at which the court assesses the capacity of procedure to flush
out truth, that correspondence of fact to principle in which rightholder and
wrongdoer stand revealed.2"7 When applied to the reality of resource distribu-
tion in the modern administrative state, however, this theoretically consistent
construct utterly fails.. The premise of adversarialness coupled with the focus
on accuracy generates the process ideal of the full, judicial-type trial. Yet, as
the Court quickly realized, this sort of procedure cannot possibly accompany
284. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 138, at 129-30.
285. See, e.g., id. at 130.
286. Thus, Goldberg's early assertion of a societal interest in the material and psychic well-being of
citizens, 397 U.S. at 264-65, quickly disappeared from the analysis, a judicial embarrassment that was (in
this world) so clearly a makeweight.
287. This concern with accuracy is ordained, two-fold, by liberal legalism's exaltation of the Rule
of Law. First, accuracy essentially constitutes the Rule of Law. The comprehensibility and predictability
that a legal order must provide rational actors entails not simply the existence of definite, coherent rules
but also their correct and consistent application. See, e.g., J. MAStAW, supra note 43, at 219. Moreover,
the concern with accuracy instrumentally furthers the Rule of Law. Official power cabined with processes
that direct and verify its exercise towards prescribed ends is less threatening to citizens' security. See, e.g.,
Rubin, supra note 5, at 1104.
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the multitude of regulatory decisions.2 8 And so the goal of accuracy was
abandoned in favor of the goal of accurate-enough-given-all-the-circumstanc-
es-a pragmatic compromise ideologically vulnerable as illegitimate utilitarian-
ism,28 9 abdication of constitutional responsibility,2 9 and judicial usurpation
of political judgments.2 91
And ultimately, there is the sobering knowledge that, at a time when
government has embarked upon resolving more, and more complicated, social
and economic problems than ever before in our history, judicial declaration
of process rights marks the end of innovation and adaptability. At the agency
level, we have watched programs rigidify around the contours of entitlement,
as constitutional floors become process ceilings.2 92 When law is understood
as demarcating the extent to which one is compelled to yield to the hostile
demands of the other, it is not surprising that a decision which specifies the
minimum a losing official must give, comes to establish the maximum he will
offer. As for the Court, we have watched it retreat under the pressure to
declare, once and for all time, the perfect due process solution that will save
citizen-individuals confronting some new facet of regulatory power. When
constitutional law is understood as the rational elucidation of neutral and
determinate principles, a court facing the ever-expanding, ever-changing
administrative state cannot experiment-it can only make mistakes.
IV. DIFFERENT ORIGINS
AND INTIMATIONS OF A DIFFERENT DOCTRINE
"This is a circle that must be broken,
not inhabited. "293
I have come a long way to offer a short proposition: We cannot use an
ideology of autonomy, privacy and self-sufficiency to create a jurisprudence
about the citizen's relationship to her community, access to public resources,
and dependence upon governmental and private others. If we want a humane
and satisfying account of procedural due process in modern society, we must
288. And, on the rare occasions when the "ideal" procedure was ordered (as in the case of welfare
in Goldberg), the result was process at once too much, not enough, and fundamentally of the wrong sort.
See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
289. It sacrifices the individual to some collective social balance. See, e.g., J. MASHAW, supra note
43, at 152.
290. It insufficiently counteracts the potential for abuse of official power. See, e.g., Mashaw, supra
note 224, at 58.
291. Once the goal is not the neutral, objective goal of accuracy but rather the compromised goal of
"enough" accuracy, that level should be set through the political processes. See. e.g., J. MASHAW, supra
note 43, at 152; Mashaw, supra note 224, at 49.
292. For example, Goldberg's refusal to hold that due process required provision of counsel in welfare
termination hearings was followed by the agency's withdrawing proposed regulations that would have made
counsel available. See J. MASHAW, supra note 43, at 260-61.
293. Robin West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives:A Phenomenological Critique ofFeminist
Legal Theory, 3 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 86 (1987).
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begin with something other than the set of liberal-legalist assumptions. The
new beginning I suggest here is a set of feminist understandings and meth-
ods. 294
Let me emphasize that it is indeed a beginning I speak of. I can tell you
what I think are the new starting points, a series of understandings about
human nature, knowledge, society, government and law. And I will suggest
that they are better starting points, for they correspond in important ways to
our experience of life in the contemporary regulatory state. At the same time,
however, I must acknowledge these understandings as emerging rather than
established, provisional rather than propositional. Feminist theory is quintes-
sentially work-in-progress, historically still in its formative stages and also,
more important, ideologically committed to remaining fluid, possibilistic and
open to reassessing goals and strategies as perspective and experience grows.
Similarly, I can tell you what I think are the methods through which a new
doctrine would develop. And I will suggest that they are better methods, for
they are ways of thinking more suited to the complex task of specifying
process in the regulatory state. At the same time, however, I will not attempt
to predict the precise doctrinal structure that would result. Feminist ways of
thinking warn against solutions that emerge, like Athena, full-blown from the
294. Sensitive to the perils of seeking the "essentially" or "universally" feminist, see Martha Minow,
Beyond Universality, 1989 U. CI. LEGAL FORUM 115, 129-34, I speak carefully of "a set of feminist
understandings." These might be characterized as an attempt to infuse into a relational (or cultural) feminist
base some of the insights about power that mark dominance (or radical) feminism. A merger such as this
is bound to evoke disagreement, or at least proposed qualifications. I do not mean to devalue such reactions,
but, in this context, I am wary of stressing the differences within feminist theory. Any attempt to reconcep-
tualize an area so thoroughly steeped as procedural due process has been in liberal-legalist thinking must
present, at least in the project's earliest stages, an alternative vision that is fairly coherent and relatively
unconflicted. I hope that many of the ideas and methods set forth in this section will be acknowledged by
many feminists-at least as a first statement of what this alternative vision would be. If the discussion
implies a greater degree of uniformity within feminist thought than many would, as a general matter, find
acceptable, I offer the incipiency of this project as both justification and excuse.
A very different sort of criticism might object that many of the understandings and methods I discuss
are not unique to feminist theory. To be sure, feminism shares with critical legal theory an insistence on
deconstructing the rule of law, see, e.g., ROBERTO UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT
(1986); with neo-republicanism, a belief in a public good that is more than the sum of expressed preferenc-
es, see, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988); Frank Michelman,
The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Forward: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); with
communitarianism, a recognition of the constitutive nature of relationships with others and the possibility
of altruism, see, e.g., MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITs OF JUSTICE (1982); with critical
race theory, a contextual assessment rather than categorical rejection of rights, see, e.g., Patricia Williams,
Alchemical Notes: Restructuring Ideals From Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401
(1987); with narrativists, a consciousness of the power of naming and the symbiotic relationship between
law and how we perceive our world, see, e.g., Gregory Alexander, Takings, Narratives, and Power, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1752 (1988); and with pragmatism/practical reason, a recognition of the importance of
contextual thinking, see, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV.
1699 (1990). Doubtless there are other commonalities, just as, in each instance, there are significant
divergences. See, e.g., Robin West, Feminism, Critical Social Theory and Law, 1989 U. CIH. LEGAL
FORUM 59 (differences between feminism and CLS). However, to debate the provenance of particular ideas
would be, at this juncture, a truly prodigal use of our energy. See Minow, supra, at 131. To the extent
that feminist understandings coincide with other alternatives to liberal legalism, all the better. We should
sooner be able to break the hold it has had on our thinking. I do not, and do not need to, make the claim
that feminist theory is utterly original to propose that feminist understandings and methods represent, in
the aggregate, a singularly promising approach in this area.
1991]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
detached contemplation of the solitary rational mind.295 I recognize that this
tentativeness may feel frustrating. Trained as good liberal-legalists, you and
I both would be most comfortable contemplating a set of alternative premises,
carefully abstracted and logically arranged, from which a comprehensive set
of "new" doctrinal conclusions are syllogistically derived. But the first step
in this venture of beginning again is to resist all the old habits of mind that will
ask for "feminist due process" to be delivered in a small black box neatly tied
with pink ribbon.296 Feminist thought is a singularly promising source for
a better due process jurisprudence precisely because of such elements as its
commitment to theory emergent from and always transmutable by living
context and its resistance to grand, olympian, acontextual solutions. If we are
brave enough to grasp such resources, we can create a jurisprudence that
allows us to imagine and realize a satisfying understanding of the relationship
between we, the people, and our government.297
And so I ask you to read this final section not as a denouement, in which
all questions are answered and truth is finally revealed, but as an introduction.
Consider it not a consummation but a prospectus, an invitation to join in the
undertaking of conceiving procedural due process anew.
295. Athena's unnatural birth is chronicled by Hesiod:
"Zeus himself produced. from his own head,
Grey-eyed Athena, fearsome queen who brings
The noise of war and, tireless, leads the host,
She who loves shouts and battling and fights."
Theogony 53 (Dorothea Wender trans. Penguin Classics ed. 1973).
296. My colleague Steve Shiffrin gave me this image.
297. Having several times spoken of "better" approaches, perhaps I should make explicit the
sense in which I use that word. Kate Bartlett best captures it:
Realities are deemed better not by comparison to some external, "discovered" moral truths or
"essential" human characteristics, but by internal truths that make the most sense of experienced,
social existence. Thus, social truths will emerge from social relationships and what, after critical
examination, they tell social beings about what they want themselves, and their social world, to
be.
Katharine Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 884 (1990) (citations omitted).
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A. New Places to Begin29
"[Wihat would this legal landscape look like
if women had constructed it for ourselves? "299
Begin with an insight into human nature. Personhood is a delicate and
protean balance of intimacy and differentiation. What the self knows, feels and
desires is shaped by interaction with others; without them, she could not be
who she is. At the same time, she is an active agent in the creation of knowl-
edge, feeling and desire; without her, others could not be who they are.
Neither she, nor they, can thrive if she loses either her sense of separateness
or her sense of connection. Her daily life confirms all this. The raising of
children-in which she simultaneously teaches and learns, provides security
and encourages independence, gives care and experiences being cared
298. This section draws in many ways on the work of many women, including A. JAGGER, supra note
254; MARY BELENKY, BLYTHE CLINCHY, NANCY GOLDBERGER & JILL TARULE, WOMEN'S WAYS OF
KNOWING (1986); CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT (1982); CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989);
Buffalo Symposium, supra note 241; Bartlett, supra note 297; Leslie Bender,A Lawyer's Primeron Feminist
Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1988); Drucilla Cornell, Dialogic Reciprocity and the Critique
of Employment at Will, 10 CARDOZo L. REV. 1575 (1989); Lucinda Finley, Breaking Women's Silence
in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886 (1989);
Sandra Harding, Is Gender a Variable in Conceptions of Rationality? A Survey of Issues, in BEYOND
DOMINATION: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON WOMEN IN PHILOSOPHY 43 (Carol Gould ed. 1984); Lynne
Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987); Christine Littleton, Women 'sExperience
and the Problem of Transition: Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM
23; Littleton, supra note 254; Mari Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human
Nature: A Feminist Critique ofRawls'Theory ofJustice, 16 NEW MEX. L. REV. 613 (1986); Minow, supra
note 294; Martha Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 47 (1988); Martha
Minow, Interpretating Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860 (1987); Nedelsky, supra
note 254; Rhode, supra note 254; Scales, supra note 254; Elizabeth Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights
and Politics: Perspectivesfrom the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986); Suzanna Sherry,
The Gender of Judges, 4 LAW & INEQUALITY 159 (1986); West, supra note 254; Caroline Whitbeck, A
Different Reality: Feminist Ontology in BEYOND DOMINATION, supra.
299. Littleton, supra note 298, at 30 (citations omitted).
In using the feminine gender in the sections that follow I am obviously making what is, at some level,
a gendered claim about how we do and should think about our world.
I do mean to suggest that these understandings of human nature, society, knowledge and law grow
out of what is characteristically the experience of women in out society. Even if this experience were
accessible only to women, liberal legalism's failure to account for it would be particularly problematic in
the area of procedural due process because of two basic demographic facts: As the gap between rich and
poor in our country grows greater and as our population becomes relatively older, women with children
and women past retirement age increasingly constitute the citizens who must encounter regulatory power,
at least in its social welfare dimension. See, e.g., MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN:
SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 1 (1988); Mary Becker, Politics,
Differences and Economic Rights, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM 169; Nancy Fraser, Women, Welfare, and
The Politics of Need Interpretation, 2 HYPATIA 103 (1987); Barbara Nelson, Women's Poverty and Women's
Citizenship: Some Political Consequences of Economic Marginality, 10 SIGNS 209, 221-23 (1984). But
ultimately I do not believe, and so do not mean to suggest, that the experience which nourishes feminist
theory is inevitably inaccessible to men. Perhaps this is wishful thinking, for I doubt that women by
ourselves could recreate the regulatory state. However, I find cause for optimism not only in the flourishing
of such alternative political and jurisprudential philosophies as CLS, communitarianism and neo-republican-
ism, but also in responses of men I live and work and dream with, that many men find feminist understand-
ings expressive of what they want themselves and their world to be.
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for -is perhaps the clearest manifestation, but it is only one of many.
Students, neighbors, co-workers, parents and older relatives, lovers, friends,
all reach out to her, asking from her and giving to her, confirming the subtle
and varied ways in which she and they are materially, emotionally and intellec-
tually interconnected.30'
Immersed in the reality of human interconnection, she has two profoundly
different experiences of human response to dependence. One experience is the
response of nurturance, the ethic of care, the acceptance of power as responsi-
bility. She sees herself responding to need with compassion, finding fulfillment
in helping others become fulfilled, making decisions by asking how others, as
well as self, will be affected. 0" The other experience is the response of
exploitation, the ethic of selfishness, the use of power to dominate. She often
experiences these as a victim. Embedded in her home, her job and her society
is the threatened or realized violence of physical abuse, economic deprivation,
psychological battering, spiritual violation. Sometimes, she experiences these
as perpetrator. Uncared for herself, she may lose the capacity to care; without
the material and psychological resources to help those who need her, she may
close herself off to their suffering; a self battered and diminished by the
indifference and predation of others, she may be able only to batter and
diminish other selves.30 3
Thus, for the feminist self, separation and connection, power and depen-
dence are not simple phenomena. Inescapably part of the fabric of human
existence and capable of representing great good and great evil, these qualities
could not be sought or condemned in the abstract. Children can be, and are,
destroyed both by abandonment and by smothering. Adults can be, and are,
devastated both by being cast off as different and by being denied recognition
300. "We expect parents to nurture children, but forget that children nurture parents. Even the fact
that children often nurse sick and temporarily bedridden parents [or siblings] is by a pathological twist of
the social memory simply forgotten." Whitbeck, supra note 298, at 78 (quoting Elise Bouldring; brackets
in original).
301. Hence, as both a descriptive and normative matter, feminists work towards a reconception of
autonomy" in which differentiation of the self occurs, but not through opposition to the other. See, e.g.,
Nedelsky, supra note 254; Whitbeck, supra note 298, at 69.
302. Carol Gilligan's work is the most influential documentation of the ethic of care. See C. GILLIGAN,
supra note 298. See also MAKING CONNECTIONS: THE RELATIONAL WORLDS OF ADOLESCENT GnLs AT
EMMA WILLARD SCHOOL (Carol Gilligan, Nona Lyons & Trudy Hanmer eds. 1990); MAPPING THE MORAL
DOMAIN (Carol Gilligan, Janie Ward & Jill Taylor eds. 1988). The controversy over this work within the
feminist community has sometimes ignored Gilligan's own emphasis that, in its mature state, the ethic of
care seeks to integrate care of others and care of self. E.g., C. GILLIGAN, supra note 298, at 73-105;
Buffalo Symposium, supra note 241, at 58-61. Cf. Whitbeck, supra note 298, at 65 ("Nurturing" is a loaded
term, often used "to evoke a sentimental picture of a woman doing a variety of mindless tasks in response
to the demands of others .... The creativity and responsibility of all parties in the conduct of the practice
[of nurturing] in its full, liberated form is inconsistent with the sentimental picture of women's self-
sacrifice.").
303. See LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 59-60 (1984) (Interviews with
battered women suggest that they are eight times more likely to abuse their children when living with
batterer than when not.). See also Henderson, supra note 298, at 1583-84 (If highly empathetic person lacks
means for helping, she "may avoid dealing with suffering altogether" or engage in nonaltruistic behavior
such as blaming victim.).
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as singular. The self with power over another can, and does, use it both to
oppress and to save. The self reaching out to another for support can be, and
is, met both with derision and with generosity. In the complex fabric of human
relationships, the value of more separation or more connection, as well as the
morality of power or dependence, can often be judged only within context.
Still, some basic dynamics can be recognized. When the sense of connec-
tion with the other is lost, dependence may come to evoke indifference and
even ruthlessness, while power may readily degenerate into psychological and
even physical violence. Similarly, when a person lacks the tangible and
intangible resources and opportunities that her society generally regards as
necessary for full participation in the life of the community, she becomes
vulnerable, as a victim and a perpetrator, to abuse of power and exploitation
of dependence.
The first of these dynamics, the relationship between the use of power and
the sense of connection with others, implicates the matter of knowledge. For
the feminist self, knowledge of others is not a simple phenomenon. The project
of knowing is at once optimistic and deeply wary. It is optimistic in affirming
that persons can achieve meaningful understanding of one another. Reflecting
the experience that individuality is spun within a web of relationships, it does
not conclude that selves are condemned to atomistic enigmaness. It is wary
because feminism has discovered the dangerous tendency, particularly in those
who possess power, to impose one's own experience as the norm and to
dismiss different experiences as irrelevant or deviant, or silence their expres-
sion all together."° Hence, the feminist search for knowledge is especially
attuned to seeking out the voices of those who lack power.
The project of knowing is at once rational and resolutely nonrational.
Because rationality is but one dimension of human awareness, rational dis-
course can be but one way of knowing. Empathic and intuitive ways of under-
standing must also be pursued, for feminism has discovered that privileging
rationality-at least so long as rationality is equated with objectivity-facilitates
domination by obscuring the connection with others who appear most different
from the self in background, experience and power.305
304. The vivid first stage of this discovery was the realization that patriarchal society has long silenced
women in this way. Increasingly, though, feminists are recognizing the subtler manifestations of this
tendency even within the population of women, as when white, educated, affluent, straight women with
their position of relative privilege are oblivious to the experiences of women of color, poor women, and
lesbians. From the painful recognition that even feminism is not immune to this tendency, feminist theory
has become even more determinedly committed to ways of knowing that counteract it. See, e.g., Bartlett,
supra note 297, at 847-49; Minow, supra note 298, at 59-60.
305. The liberal-legalistequation of rationality with objectivity is a dangerous linkage. Because "[t]here
is no Archimedean point outside the world where we may stand to gain a perspective on reality that is
neutral between the interests and values of existing social groups," the assertion of objectivity merely
provides a deceptive "cover of neutrality." A. JAGGAR, supra note 254, at 362, 378. Moreover, it
encourages detachment from the persons and situations that could reveal the partiality of the knowledge
claimed as "objectively" true. See Scales, supra note 254, at 1389. See also Henderson, supra note 298,
at 1586 (studies show persons have reduced empathic response "if they are instructed to view a victim in
a detached way").
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Finally, the project of knowing is determinedly contextual and concededly
nonfinal. As before, this account of the epistemological enterprise is both
descriptive, reflecting experienced qualities of human life, and normative,
forswearing methods that lead to pain and oppression. Persons do not exist
outside the interlacing of relations and experiences which shape identity and
awareness, needs and desires; persons are not immutable bundles of static
interests and uncontingent preferences. To ignore the importance of perspective
and its multiplicity, or to fail to recognize that changes in circumstance can
change the persons within them, is a prescription for disaster. The notion of
truth as a unitary absolute that can be single-handedly wrestled to the ground
and ever-after possessed has produced both arrogant colonizations and failed
crusades, as those with power to effect change have mistaken the partial and
provisional for the universal and timeless."°6
The second dynamic, the relationship between the use of power and the
equitable distribution of resources and opportunities, implicates the matter of
society, government and law. Because individual identity forms within personal
relationships and social networks, society must be understood as both constitut-
ed from, and constitutive of, the persons within it. Its dominant forms of
activity will both reflect and create their values, needs and desires. Just as a
person continually shapes and is shaped by her local environment, so a people
continually makes and is made by its government and its law. Given this, it
would be meaningless to charge the state to avoid privileging certain concep-
Feminists seek to sever the link between rationality and objectivity by articulating a different and richer
understanding of rational processes. "A rational person, for women, values highly her abilities to empathize
and 'connect' with particular others and wants to learn more complex and satisfying ways to take the role
of the particular other in relationship. A rational person naturally has problems when there is too little
connection with particular others." Harding, supra note 298, at 52-53. See also Bartlett, supra note 297,
at 857-58 (feminist rationality is "process of finding commonalities, differences and connections" that
openly reveals its underlying moral and political choices and strives to integrate emotion and intellect).
The insistence that affective responses are an important source of knowledge is not a call for uncritical
abandonment to passion. "Like so-called cognitive knowledge ... feelings and emotions are social
constructs, and this means that they are not self-authenticating. Like our perceptions, our feelings and
emotions may be distorted . . . by the prevailing ideology and even by the oppressive structure of daily
life. . . .All aspects of our experience, including our feelings and emotions, must be subjected to critical
scrutiny . . . ." A. JAGGAR, supra note 254, at 380 (citations omitted).
306. The commitment to the provisional nature of knowledge is not an abandonment to relativism.
See Littleton, supra note 298, at 26-27. Kate Bartlett explains this through a concept she calls "positional-
ity":
Positionality is not a strategy of process and compromise that seeks to reconcile all compet-
ing interests. Rather, it imposes a twin obligation to make commitments based on the current
truths and values that have emerged from methods of feminism, and to be open to previously
unseen perspectives that might come to alter these commitments. As a practical matter, of course,
I cannot do both simultaneously, evenly, and perpetually. Positionality, however, sets an ideal
of self-critical commitment whereby I act, but consider the truths upon which I act subject to
further refinement, amendment, and correction.
Some "truths" will emerge from the ongoing process of critical reexamination in a form
that seems increasingly fixed or final .. . .These truths, indeed, seem to confirm the view that
truth does exist (it must; these things are true) if only I could find it .... The problem is the
human inclination to make this list of "truths" too long, to be too uncritical of its contents, and
to defend it too harshly and dogmatically.
Bartlett, supra note 297, at 883-84 (citations omitted).
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tions of the good over others. All exercises of government power are value-
laden. The greater the reliance upon government and law as forms of activity
though which a society defines the physical, economic and social conditions
in which citizens live, the greater is the need to acknowledge this fact. In any
but the most minimalist state, the pursuit of neutrality is not only illusory but
dangerous, disguising the fact that certain conceptions of the good and certain
distributions of power are being favored.3 7
To understand that every exercise of public power reshapes, for good or
ill, the public and private world"' does not identify the set of values govern-
ment and law should pursue. But it is an essential first step towards creating
a society in which all citizens can flourish. By uncovering the inescapable
"moral crux" 3" of public power, we force ourselves to shoulder the respon-
sibility for deciding which values ought to be advanced and whose interests
ought to be favored. a0 In this essential process of value discovery and affir-
mation, we can be guided by our understandings of the phenomena and
dynamics of separation, connection, power, dependence and knowledge.
Hence, we can know that we must work towards an equitable distribution of
resources and opportunities in order to ameliorate the material conditions and
power imbalances in which persons become victims and perpetrators of
oppression. As important, we know that we must cultivate practices which
reveal the connection with others, in order that the disparities in power that
remain will be exercised under the ethic of care and responsibility. We recog-
nize that the process of accomplishing these things will necessarily be an
incremental and iterative one, in which answers are developed in context and
theories are modified with experience to yield results that approximate ever
more closely what we hope to become as a people. There can be no universal
blueprint for the good society, no step-by-step instructions for manufacturing
the conditions in which each citizen can flourish. In particular, there are no
easy shortcuts through consent.
For the feminist self, consent is not a simple phenomenon. On the one
hand, the power of choosing is a significant experience of personhood.
307. Moreover, the maintenance of a minimalist state would itselfbe a heavily value-laden distribution
of power. See generally CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULA-
TORY STATE 39-45 (1990).
308. My use of the "public" and "private" here, and throughout, is intended to affirm a connection
rather than a disjunction between the two spheres. The public/private "distinction" is another of the
concepts feminist theory is deconstructing and reconstructing from liberal legalism. See, e.g. Rhode, supra
note 254, at 631.
309. Scales, supra note 254, at 1387.
310. These questions certainly are not simple ... [tihey confront every political theory...
and it is far from clear that any theory has an entirely satisfactory answer to them. What is clear,
however, is that an adequate answer can never be found so long as one retains the assumptions
of abstract individualism and the view of rationality as morally and politically neutral.
A. JAGGAR, supra note 254, at 48. "[Wlhoever pretends moral choice is easy is ignoring the fact that
sometimes-many times-moral choice is a choice among evils .... To the extent I understand what it
is I face, I understand my moral options. I simply cannot pretend absolute certainty." Henderson, supra
note 298, at 1584, 1585 (citations omitted).
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Growth, moral responsibility, and self-awareness all involve the exercise of
choice; denial of the ability to choose is felt as a painful denigration of the
self. On the other hand, because personhood develops within physical, social
and historical context, what the person desires cannot be dissociated from the
demands, expectations and opportunities she has experienced. Hence the very
setting in which the person is asked or required to choose shapes, to some
extent, the choice she makes."' A failure to acknowledge the complexity of
consent will end either in ideological paralysis (how could we decide that
people should have, or do, something other than what they say they want?)
or self-righteous callousness (why should we, who have better managed our
lives, intervene to save consenting adults from themselves?).
In the feminist effort to conceive the good society, it becomes easier to
acknowledge the disturbing complexity of choice because of the understanding
that consent is not the sole benchmark of personal and public responsibility.
That a person had once consented would not necessarily justify forcing her to
bear a burden or forego a benefit. This is so even apart from the need to
scrutinize carefully the conditions within which her choice arose. Because
government and law are activities in which public values and identity are
created as well as enforced, there will be interactions that public officials
cannot orchestrate or facilitate, consistent with what we are and want to be,
regardless of a particular citizen's willingness to endure them." 2 By the same
token, the absence of some act of consent would not necessarily preclude the
presence of obligation. As the person experiences daily in her interactions with
parents, siblings, children, neighbors or coworkers who are not necessarily
people whom she would have chosen as friends, responsibility to exercise care
and offer support sometimes arises from the fact of relationship itself.313
Hence, in understanding the obligations, of persons to one another and of
government to persons, that inhere in the social and political relationship that
is citizenship, consent may not be irrelevant-but it is surely not dispositive.
Given all this, it is not surprising that law in its adjudicatory dimension is
311. This poses a two-fold problem in using consent to identify the values that foster human flourish-
ing. Most directly, preferences are not prepolitical and uncontingent. See, e.g., A. JAGGAR, supra note
254, at 43-44. More subtly, we cannot assume that, even allowing for the adaptive quality of preferences,
the choices people make accurately express what they want for themselves. Women may consent in order
to increase the satisfaction of others rather than self. See West, supra note 293, at 92. While feminist
theory rejoices in women's experience of nurturing and care for others-an experience that belies the
liberal-legalist assumption of humans as paragons of selfishness-it also sees clearly the dark side of always
putting the needs of others first. E.g., id. at 92-93, 96-97; Buffalo Symposium, supra note 241, at 27,73-75
(remarks of Catharine MacKinnon). Hence Carol Gilligan's insistence that mature moral development is
reached only when the ethic of care is extended to encompass self as well as others. See supra note 302.
312. Or, regardless of a majority of citizens' willingness to sanction them. "What seems important
is the clear articulation of the values a society considers basic (surely an ongoing process), together with
the idea that democratic outcomes are not (at least in the first instance) dispositive of the meaning of those
values or what counts as a violation of them." Nedelsky, supra note 254; at 35.
313. This same responsibility to exercise care and offer support may arise from the fact of a relation-
ship with a lover-a lover whom the person at first chose but who now batters her, or a lover whom others
chose (because in her culture the choice is others') or whom circumstance forced on her (perhaps because
of an unwanted pregnancy).
[Vol. 3: 189
Conceiving Due Process
not, for the feminist self, a simple phenomenon. In a culture in which citizens
regularly bring into courts our most compelling social issues, adjudication
represents a critical moment in which we examine the society we are and
elaborate the one we aspire to become. Rights discourse offers a promising
mechanism by which responsibility can be articulated and the distribution and
use of power can be assessed. If, however, the language of rights can be used
only to claim separation and to wrest away power, adjudication not only fails
to realize its potential as a norm-discovering enterprise. It becomes an actual
impediment, even a threat, to the creation of the good society. If one of the
most powerful oracles of our values can speak only about the desirability of
separateness and the danger of dependence, we will learn nothing about the
indispensability of connection and the generous, responsible use of power. If
one of our most significant social rituals can model human interaction only as
battles or deals and can understand its function only as refereeing conflict or
enforcing bargains, we will learn that exploitation, naked or disguised, is how
we do and should behave.
And if, having taught us that connection has no value and that predation
is the norm, law then holds itself out as our protection from abuse of power,
it promises most falsely. The feminist self, seeing the intricate and fragile web
of interdependence between self and other, sees also the enormous devastation
that the other can wreak if he repudiates those bonds. The perils of the battle-
field and the market-that greedy others will take one's life or one's posses-
sions-pale to the self who contemplates the battering and impoverishment of
women and children, the abuse of the elderly, the abandonment of the home-
less, the humiliation of the disabled, the gross and petty violence against those
who are not white or male or straight or christian, the bodily occupation that
is rape, the spiritual rapine that is prejudice. By pretending that dependence
upon others is an aberration which the prudent man can avoid, by pretending
that rights-as-sword-and-shield can save the self in an onslaught of all against
all, law perpetrates a delusion as deadly as the myth that nuclear war can be
survived.
Feminist understandings recognize that law in its adjudicatory dimension
cannot be a positive force in the quest for human flourishing so long as it
distorts and denies important aspects of human existence. To be sure, rights
as swords and shields are needed at some times and in some contexts. Some-
times, conditions of domination have so persistently and pervasively denied
people the aspiration and capacity of self-determination that they will require,
first and foremost, greater psychological and material independence.3"4 Some-
314. This has been the response of both many feminists and critical race scholars to the CLS critique
of rights. See, e.g., Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights
Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REV. 387, 393-94 (1984); Schneider, supra note 298, at 593-98; West, supra note
254, at 46; Williams, supra note 296. The shortcomings of rights in such contexts are known well. "Rights
are whatever people in power say they are." Matsuda, supra, at 338. Still, rights-as-swords-and-shields
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times, there will be no way (at least that we can presently imagine) to imbue
power with the ethic of responsibility and concern, so that it can be rendered
safe only by taking it away or by providing those subject to it with some
defensive capability." I But, at other times rights must function as bridges
and channels, through which connection is established and affirmed and those
with power are led to recognize responsibility and encouraged to act with
compassion. Many times, a cycle of suffering can be broken only by seeking
out affinity and nurturing cooperation to replace alienation and contention.
Many times, power can be rendered safe only by acknowledging its reality and
cultivating, in the very fact of its inevitability, a fiduciary ethic and a practice
of care.3 16
In other words, the role of rights cannot be understood in the abstract any
more than can the human needs and desires that rights attempt to secure. In
law, as in the rest of life, the value of more separation or more connection,
as well as the legitimacy of power or dependence, can often be judged only
in context. If we are to make those judgments wisely, adjudication must not
be disconnected from all the other processes by which we seek to understand
and improve our lives. If we set courts the task of finding universal and
timeless solutions, the result is not the vaunted generality and stability of the
Rule of Law. We merely close our eyes to the partial and contingent nature
of the answers adjudication generates, and so sacrifice the opportunity to adapt
and improve upon them. If we restrict what courts can count as knowledge to
that which appears rational and objective, the result is not the fabled impartiali-
ty and rigorous logic of legal truth. We merely condemn adjudication to a
warped view of social problems and a crabbed vision of potential remedies.
If we insist that judging be a value-free exercise in applying neutral principles,
the result is not the triumph of apolitical, rationally uncontroversial reasoning.
We merely guarantee that values are shaped by persons who hide from what
are potent emblems in our culture, and play an important role in the early stages of escaping domination.
They are capable of unsettling the dynamic of oppression, even though they rarely deliver all they promise.
Perhaps more important, they can become a rallying point round which oppressed people create a new
identity and experience the possibility (and hence the first real germ) of empowerment. See Matsuda, supra;
Schneider, supra note 298; White, supra note 229; Williams, supra note 294.
315. Sheri Johnson has recently argued that this is precisely the case with criminal defendants, so that
even a communitarian understanding of the Fifth Amendment would retain a rights-as-shield model of the
privilege against self-incrimination. See Sheri Johnson, Confessions, Criminals, and Community, 26 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. - (forthcoming 1991).
316. Thus with rights, as with rationality, autonomy, liberty and other powerful concepts in our
culture, feminist understandings both warn against the dangers of liberal-legalist conceptualizations and
embark upon a project of constructive recreation. Urging that we reconceive rights as "a language that can
express and remake patterns of all relationships," Martha Minow explains, "The formality of processes
set in motion by rights claims may . . . alter or even impede certain kinds of communication. The claim
of rights, however, need not predetermine the forms of requisite processes; people can use rights discourse
to develop new procedures and remedies, as well as new claims." Minow, supra note 298, at 1891, 1871-
72, n.40 (citations omitted). "The central problem with rights-based frameworks is not that they are
inherently limiting but that they have operated within a limited institutional and imaginative universe."
Rhode, supra note 254, at 635. Cf. Simon, Invention and Reinvention, supra note 229 (describing




they are doing and who attempt to detach themselves from the moral, social
and historical context in which they might find insight and compassion. And,
if we acquiesce in the dynamic of wasteful, destructive adversarialness on
grounds that adjudication just takes the litigants as it finds them, the result is
not to impress on courts the modest role they play in social ordering. We
merely encourage judges and lawyers to wash their hands of responsibility that
litigants are no better.
Adjudication, like every other exercise of public power, reshapes the public
and private world. It will do so for good only if its formative capacity is
acknowledged, and if it is committed to ways of proceeding-at once more
ambitious and more humble than the old ways-in which problems are seen
"not as dichotomized conflicts, but as dilemmas with multiple perspec-
tives,"317 in which judgment becomes not the revelation of the virtuous
winner and the unworthy loser but the occasion for "imaginative integrations
and reconciliations, ""' and in which wisdom is sought not only with the
mind, but also with the heart.
B. New Ways to Proceed
"[We are what we have made ourselves,
and we must continue to make ourselves
as long as we exist at all. " "9
If we began from these substantive and methodological understandings,
what sort of due process jurisprudence might we create?
First, we would read the text very differently. We would see in "due
process" the promise of process appropriate, satisfying and suitable. The
phrase would become an assurance of the treatment that is fitting whenever
government finds it must do harm to one of its citizens, treatment in which
there is acknowledgement of loss inflicted, and respect for pain incurred. That
such process attaches to "life, liberty and property" bespeaks a concern with
the whole of human existence, the material and psychological well-being of
each that depends upon a collective commitment of respect and support. We
would therefore recognize in the clauses an affirmation of the connection
between the people and their government, and a pledge that government will
use its tremendous power with care. The phrases would become for us an
exhortation to concerned contextualization, rather than a mandate of distancing
abstraction. We would understand process as "right," but understand "right"
as a claim of relationship rather than a defense of separation.
The reasons why we, the people, would want such provisions in our
317. Bartlett, supra note 297, at 851.
318. Id., quoting AMELIE RORTY, MIND IN ACTION 274 (1988).
319. D. DINNERSTEIN, supra note 231, at 22.
1991]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
formative document would not be hard to fathom. As persons and as citizens,
we are creatures spun within a social web. Government is one of the principal
institutions through which that web is shaped. Whenever the state acts as
educator, employer, healer, discipliner or dispenser of needed goods and
services, our individual and collective identities hang in the balance. If a
citizen's interaction with the state becomes an experience of frustration, self-
loathing or despair, we are individually and collectively diminished. We would
want our government to have always before it a reminder of this grave and
special responsibility. And, at the most basic level, we would recognize that
our lives depend upon the strength and vitality of this sense of connection. If
the vast reservoir of public power is to be rendered safe, those who govern
must never be permitted to regard citizens as alien, the other, the enemy.
Hence, our aspirations and our very survival coalesce in this overarching
injunction to our government (ourselves) to take care in dealing with its people
(one another), an injunction that integrates and transcends all the specific
exhortations to care in surrounding, more particular constitutional clauses.
Understanding the clauses in this way, we would not see the striking
increase in due process litigation during this century as an unfortunate and
dangerous exploitation of an accommodatingly vague phrase. Rather, we would
recognize this litigation as an ongoing enterprise in self-discovery and defini-
tion, in which we seek to comprehend, humanize and render benevolent the
increasingly complex, powerful and interdependent society in which we live.
We would see in due process the quintessential instance of rights as "a form
of communal dialogue"32 and realize that, of all adjudication, due process
adjudication in particular could never be value-free, detached, abstract, univer-
sal, or final. We would understand that, especially at this point in our history,
we need due process adjudication to be a consciously value-creating occasion
that emphasizes the relationship between government and its people and
elaborates the qualities and responsibilities of that relationship. Moreover, we
would, for several reasons, perceive this enterprise as far more challenging,
and far more hopeful, than we have regarded it till now.
Consider, for example, the issue of dependence. We have, until now,
accepted liberal legalism's word that dependence is a dreadful thing-that it
is inconsistent with full personhood (the unfettered exercise of self-determina-
tion is the essence of psychic satisfaction and moral responsibility) and fraught
with peril (the other on whom one is dependent can only be expected to exploit
the imbalance of power). Escaping dependence has thus been an irresistible
force within procedural due process jurisprudence. And it has met the immov-
able object of the contemporary regulatory state. If there were ever a time
when the individual could avoid dependence upon the collective, that time is
gone. If it were ever possible for the citizen to aspire to a balance of power
with government, it is possible no longer. The state will inevitably control
320. Minow, supra note 298, at 1875.
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access to things that we desire and require, from drivers' licenses to assistance
in time of catastrophe. The state's agents will inevitably have discretion that
could be used against us, no matter how rule-bound the regulatory regime.32'
Within the liberal-legalist worldview, we could only shut our eyes tight against
this reality, put our heads down, and go on fighting for rights as barriers and
process as weapons. Those on the political left waged the fight for everyone;
those on the right concentrated only on those who appeared most likely to be
saveable (i.e., those with traditional property and liberty). But the reality of
the administrative state was relentless and respected no political camp. Increas-
ingly we were forced to recognize the former strategy to be futile and even
counterproductive,322 while the latter strategy appeared as selfishly deluded
as survivalism.
Now, however, we would recognize that it is the goal of escaping depen-
dence that is futile, counterproductive and deluded, fundamentally at odds not
only with what is possible for us as citizens in contemporary society but also
with what is needful for us as persons.3z2 Once we are freed of the burden
of maintaining an impossible self-deception, we can raise our eyes to face the
real question: How do we make relationships in which one person must place
herself in another person's hands, relationships which do not imperil the
humanity of either participant? Following one of the central methodological
credos of feminism-learn from a thoughtful, critical examination of lived
experience-we would begin to thread our way between the twin perils of
despair and romanticism. We would remember that there are good parents
(biological and adoptive, permanent and transitional) who raise children with
321. Consider, for example, Lucie White's account of the experience of one welfare recipient in a
regulatory regime that has become increasingly rule-bound over the last decade:
In Mrs G's experience, these highly formalized rules . . . also keep people in fear. First of all,
"churning," the occasional, arbitrary termination of large numbers of people for technical
reasons, has the effect of keeping all recipients uncertain about whether their next check will
come. And the technical rules, although they appear very rigid, actually conceal countless
enclaves of discretion, hidden places for harassing clients who get out of line, and obscuring the
human agency behind that harassment. Mrs. G believed that "going to legal aid" or "asking for
a hearing" were the best ways to make sure that this discretion would be used against her.
White, supra note 229, at 35-36.
322. Lucie White's account is one of the most compelling documentations of this futility. Others
include Simon, supra note 117, at 1499-1504, and Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class, supra note 229, at
1198-99; and J. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE (1983).
323. So unnerving is the prospect of dependence-to feminists as well as liberal legalists-that I was
often tempted to substitute the safer word "interdependence" to describe the state of connection of which
our law must learn to take account. But "interdependence" is a word steeped in the ethic of bargains,
mutuality and pacts. Doesn't it feel safer precisely because it is a shorthand for "I will admit I am
dependent upon you if you will admit you are dependent upon me"? We can agree to be careful with each
other because we have confirmed that each can destroy the other. While I believe that the mutuality of
dependence is ultimately true and that we must recognize the damage to officials individually and to us
collectively when public power is abused, see infra text accompanying note 333, we cannot forget the first
lesson of power: The potential victim always has more to lose than the potential abuser. And so I have
foregone the comfort of "interdependence." I fear that our thinking-particularly about due process-has
been so thoroughly addicted to contractarianism that we cannot afford even the smallest opportunity to
preserve the illusion that government power can be disarmed through bilateral negotiation if rights just give
the citizen enough bargaining chips.
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love and discipline without making them feel smothered or abused, good
teachers who share knowledge with students without making them feel ashamed
of what they do not know, and good caretakers who lend strength to those who
are in need of support without making them feel less than human for their
need. From these experiences, we would know that humans can respond to
even great disparities in power with compassion, responsibility and respect.
And so we would have hope that human organizations could be structured to
enshrine and nurture such response. At the same time, however, we would
remember that families, schools and institutions have also been the sites of the
most terrible violence to personhood. From this hard-won consciousness of
oppression, we would know that a sentimental view of relationship can mask
the cruel exploitation of imbalances in material, intellectual or psychological
resources. And so we would be wary to ferret out the domination that may
hide in situations of dependence. We would, in short, recognize (in yet another
way) that the personal is political, as we discover that we are trying to achieve
in our public life what we try to achieve in our private lives: individuation
without severing connection, dependence without victimization, relationship
in which selfhood is found rather than lost.
Once we reconceive what we are trying to do, we would have a very
different understanding of how we should go about doing it. Due process
jurisprudence has long claimed a special fluidity and sensitivity to context. 24
Until now, however, we have been caught within the liberal-legalist drive
towards determinacy, predictability and universality. Each case bore the
normative responsibility of producing and conforming to abstract decisional
principles capable not only of being applied, consistently and unequivocally,
across the vast range of administrative contexts but also of being translated,
without underprotectiveness or overintrusion, to substantive due process,
takings and criminal, quasi-criminal and traditional civil adjudication." This
ideological pressure to create a monolithic, self-subsistent doctrinal system left
us precious little room for adaptability and innovation-and even less chance
324. The classic statement is Justice Frankfurter's:
"[Dlue process," unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content
unrelated to time, place and circumstances. . . . "[D]ue process" cannot be imprisoned within
the treacherous limits of any formula. Representing a profound attitude of fairness between man
and man, and more particularly between the individual and government, "due process" is
compounded of history, reason, the past course of decisions, and stout confidence in the strength
of the democratic faith we profess. Due process is not a mechanical instrument. It is not a
yardstick. It is a process. It is a delicate process of adjustment inescapably involving the exercise
of judgment ....
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
325. Judge Posner provided one of the most memorable expressions of this view. A school employee,
who had been induced to leave another position by school board assurances of at least two-years' job
security, was terminated after one year without explanation or hearing. A majority of the panel held the
employee had a property interest sufficient to implicate due process. Judge Posner launched his dissent
by warning, "If this logic is applied unflinchingly, any time a school board or any other local government
body breaks a contract without first holding a hearing, the contractor-who need not be an employee, who
could be a supplier of paper clips-can get damages in federal court." Vail v. Board of Education, 706
F.2d 1435, 1449 (7th Cir. 1983).
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for success. Seeking some essential test by which to assay the divers acts of
disciplining prisoners and school children, suspending drivers' licenses and
welfare benefits, terminating employment and parental rights, curtailing public
programs, prosecuting public offenders, and compelling public access to
beachfront property, we set up "liberty" and "property" as gatekeepers-and
continually found them too niggardly or too lax. Seeking a unitary model of
process that could handle the worst case scenario of criminal prosecution, we
could only imagine variations on the adversarial judicial trial-and constantly
found them costly and ineffective.
Now, however, we would accept from the outset that there are no univer-
sal, multi-purpose answers. Just as the nature and needs of relationships be-
tween persons vary over time and within setting, so it must be with relation-
ships between citizen and government. As we work to understand and perfect
those relationships through invocations of due process, we will discover no
philosopher's stone by which to transmute the multitude of interests implicated
by government actions, no single formula for a procedural panacea. Here, in
particular, rights must be "the language of a continuing process rather than
the fixed rules."326 We would, in short, make a true commitment to develop-
ing a flexible, contextually-sensitive due process jurisprudence. We would go
about elaborating the meaning of due process not by trying to define the
abstract essence of the duty to take care, but by trying to understand what
taking care means in particular settings. 3 27 When we contemplate the multiplici-
ty of government-citizen interactions, we would not see chaos threatening to
overwhelm legal order and stability unless reduced to a finite and predictable
set of categories. Instead, we would see in each situation an opportunity to
observe, and to integrate our observations, and to develop practices of respon-
sible care-taking, and improve our practices. We would recognize the challenge
of the undertaking, but we would not fear that we could not tell a person from
a paper clip.3 2 And if the solutions we devise turn out to be underprotective
or overintrusive, we would not condemn the enterprise on grounds that the
welfare state is fundamentally irredeemable, or the activity of constitutional
adjudication necessarily limited, or human nature essentially unchangeable.
Skeptical of the existence of absolute truths (or at least of our ability to
326. Minow, supra note 298, at 1876.
327. A standard practice is to begin with concrete experiences, integrate these experiences into
theory, and rely on theory for a deeper understanding of the experiences .. . .Rather than
working deductively from abstract principles and overarching conceptual schemes, such analysis
builds from the ground up.
Rhode, supra note 254, at 621 (citations omitted).
328. See supra note 325. One could perhaps hypothesize a situation in which a contract to sell
government some commodity might be so critical, not simply in economic but in psychological terms, to
a person's sense of self that we would think of its termination as if it were his job directly on the line. But
even in the enterprise of imagining this unusual and fact-specific case, we demonstrate our ability to
distinguish it from the garden variety contract to supply paper clips. Only the strength of the liberal-legalist
mindset makes us feel defensive about insisting that we know the difference.
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recognize them),29 we would recognize the difference between what cannot
be accomplished, and what we have not managed to accomplish-yet.
The transformations, radical and subtle, within the doctrine that would
follow such a reconception of the goals and nature of due process jurisprudence
are hard to imagine. But some things seem apparent.
Our thinking about what interests "trigger" due process would not be
caught in the positivist trap, for we would neither fear the perils nor yearn for
the solutions that made the trap so fatally seductive for liberal legalism. For
one thing, positive law would no longer appear the safe haven of judicial
legitimacy. Once we abandon, as undesirable as well as impossible, the picture
of adjudication as a value-neutral exercise in detached ratiocination, we will
measure the legitimacy of judicial action not by whether it furthers some
particular set of values, but rather by which values it furthers. In searching for
the values that will foster human flourishing, we would understand that a
positive law pedigree can provide no imprimatur. Consent is too surely contin-
gent and too often compromised and is, in any event, not the sole touchstone
of civic responsibility. In locating the meaning of government's duty of care,
we would recognize that the outcome of the political processes can be but one
source to consult. 3 °
In addition, the shadow of Lochner would recede as we accept the possibili-
ty that procedural due process implicates different interests than those which
trigger substantive due process and takings analysis. Thus far, we have been
confounded by the riddle of how the Constitution could intervene to mandate
procedural protection for deprivation of an interest it did not require govern-
ment to provide in the first place. Now, however, we would see the animating
concern of procedural due process to be how government treats its people;
what it is taking from them is significant only indirectly. To be sure, the
importance of the benefit or burden at stake would be relevant in specifying
responsible official behavior. Some interactions between government and
citizen would doubtless involve sufficiently inconsequential harm as to fall
below some minimal standing threshold. 33' And in thinking about what prac-
tices constitute the taking of care, we could not ignore the interplay of sub-
stance and procedure.332 We would, however, understand that the protection
329. Bartlett, supra note 297, at 885.
330. Hence we would reach a doctrinal point that has long seemed to us essential-that due process
protection does not depend upon the terms of simple-majoritarian law-but by a very different route than
any that liberal legalism could imagine.
331. Another sort of harm that might not be met with process (or, at least, with individualized process)
is harm that is shared in kind by a large, indefinite group of persons. We might well maintain the presump-
tion, established at the turn of the century by the Londoner and Bimetallic cases, see supra note 53, that
individualized process is needed when government singles out a citizen for harm based on her particular
circumstances, but that only "legislative" process is due when the harm falls comparably upon many
citizens-especially if our notion of due process of law/rule-making were enriched (to attempt to address
failures in the legislative process) by something like Laurence Tribe's concept of "structural justice." L.
TRIBE, supra note 50, at 1673-1687. See also Tribe, supra note 86.
332. We could not, for example, simply ignore the impact of procedural costs. Care-taking practices
are ones which attempt to accommodate responsibilities to all who are dependent, including other present
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of relationship is different than the protection of things. We would recognize
that we do not have to think about a claim that government must take care in
distributing benefits or imposing burdens as if it were a claim that government
must distribute benefits or may not impose burdens.
In this sense, we would pursue the important insight of dignitary theorists
that the primary focus of procedural due process should be on the quality of
the interaction between government and citizen. However, because we would
understand the nature and implications of that interaction very differently, we
could avoid the pitfalls that condemned those theorists, within their liberal-
legalist framework, to failure.
For one thing, if we concluded that, in a particular regulatory context,
practices of care required the opportunity for revelation and participation, we
would not be stymied by the "use as means" dilemma. Understanding person-
hood as a continually and necessarily interactive process rather than as a static
and self-sufficient state, and viewing interchange with others as the way in
which knowledge, desires and values are created rather than as a mutually
exploitative confrontation, we would not regard the responsibility to communi-
cate with another as a reduction to mere means. Indeed, affirming such a
responsibility would be one of the clearest commitments to nurturing the
personhood of both citizen and government official. Each participant in the
dialogue is understood as helpful, and indeed necessary, to the fulfillment of
the other. We have always assumed that the official has information which
could help the citizen better order her life, presently and in the future; we
would now affirm, as equally important, that the citizen has information which
could help the official better do her job, presently and in the future. If knowl-
edge is situated in context and contingent upon perspective, then a decision-
maker cannot learn to use her power wisely unless she listens to those who are
affected by her decisions. Perhaps more important, in the act of interchange
itself we create at least the potential for citizen and official to discover their
commonality. If the responsible and careful use of power is rooted in the
and future beneficiaries. Cf Whitbeck, supra note 298, at 56 (moral theory must take as important problem
"how to elaborate ways of resolving conflicting responsibilities to dependent particular others"); Henderson,
supra note 298, at 1584 ("[lI]t is not impossible both to empathize with the suffering that often produces
the sociopath and to accept the necessity of removing him or her from society.").
At the same time, "substantive" programmatic rules could not be categorically off-limits. For instance,
AFDC regulations that impose federal penalties on states for wrongly providing benefits but not for wrongly
denying them, see White, supra note 229, at 25 n.85, would be a prime suspect in any real assessment
of care-taking administration. See also Nedelsky, supra note 254, at 32-34 (suggesting that AFDC practice
of unannounced home searches is inherently incompatible with autonomy of recipient). Moreover, it may
be impossible to create an environment in which government officials are able to respond with compassion-
ate professionalism if they do not have minimally adequate programmatic and support resources to do their
job. See supra note 303 (perceived inability to help can lead to defense of indifference or blaming person
in need). Of course this means that, at some point, funding may be directly implicated, and with that the
"substantive" due process questions of constitutionally-mandated redistribution. I am not suggesting that
our reconception of the relationship between citizen and government in the regulatory state can ultimately
avoid those questions. They are a crucial part of the task of value-definition that feminist theory realizes
the need to undertake. See supra text accompanying notes 307-10. 1 am suggesting that there is much we
can do in procedural due process short of having fully resolved them.
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recognition of connection, then both participants have a stake in practices that
facilitate this recognition. We have long believed that the citizen's personhood
is diminished when an official of her government treats her with careless
indifference or contempt; we would now affirm, as equally important, that the
personhood of the official is also imperilled when she is encouraged to think
of others as unimportant or contemptible.
333
In addition, we would no longer be mesmerized by the shining coils of
consent. That a citizen "chose" to enter a regulatory program or other relation-
ship with government in the face of meager statutory procedures would
become, for several reasons, a far less significant factor in the inquiry. Appre-
ciating the complex dynamics of choice, we would beware the false equality
that would treat an individual "choosing" to apply for social welfare benefits
like a corporation entering into a defense contract, or a file clerk "choosing"
to take a public sector job at minimum wage like a highly-compensated scien-
tific consultant. Moreover, no longer conceiving individual existence as the
single-minded pursuit of preexisting preferences, we would no longer equate
individual moral responsibility with the tight-lipped endurance of the choices
one has made. Perhaps most importantly, believing that our identity as persons
and as a people depends in significant ways upon the quality of our public
activities, we would find incomprehensible the notion that forms of interaction
which encourage officials to experience public power as an occasion for hard
bargains or easy conquests could be deemed acceptable so long as citizens
"have a choice" about enduring them.
This consciousness that the manner in which our government wields its
power shapes, for good or ill, our public and private character would similarly
minimize concern about what procedures government, or its officials, had
"consented" to provide. As I have just suggested, we would not conceptualize
a duty to engage in dialogue about the reasons for official action as a "use"
of the government decisionmaker which could be legitimate only if consensual.
But even apart from this, we would be prepared to recognize obligations of
care that are rooted in a person's status as a public official and in the fact of
her possession of public power upon which citizens are dependent.334 So long
as we were caught in the liberal-legalist obsession with consent-whether of
the citizen-individual, the official-individual, or the majority-we invited
decisions (like Meachum) that public officials could inflict harm for reasons
333. Cf Henderson, supra note 298, at 1586 (citing studies showing that people's empathic response
will be reduced if they are instructed to view victim in detached way); Mashaw, supra note 224, at 43 &
n.55 (citing three Social Security Administration studies confirming that face-to-face encounters with
claimant have substantial positive correlation with acceptance of claim). See generally KATHY FERGUSON,
THE FEMINIST CASE AGAINST BUREAUCRACY 83-153 (1984) (discussing dynamics of bureaucratic
organizations that dehumanize both employees and clients).
334. In conceiving public office-holding as a relationship with citizens, we would reject the liberal-
legalist view of the administrator as an individual who happens to possess public power. "The concept of
a relationship. . . contrasts with the notion of a role as something that a person can take on and later reject




they took no care in establishing because no one ever said they would act for
reasons, and arguments (like that of monopoly theorists) that government is
presumptively entitled to be as arbitrary in dealing with persons as any other
actor in the market, and wistful statements (sprinkled in the commentary) that
it would be nice if government wouldn't strike hard bargains with citizens but
it isn't "law." Now, however, we would respond, "Why shouldn't it be law?"
The conviction that the exercise of public power entails duties of care and
responsibleness is central to our collective understanding that our government
aspires to be limited, democratic and public-regarding. This conviction has
impelled us to struggle against the image of largess and the right/privilege
distinction even as we were helpless (within liberal legalism) to avoid them.
That we can not spell out, in advance and as a series of self-executing princi-
ples, the particular care-taking practices required in the range of government
activities does not make the conviction less real, or less important to our image
of ourselves. Once we cease to regard consent as the alpha and omega of
responsibility, and neutral determinacy as the desideratum of constitutional
principle, we can begin to insist, directly and straightforwardly, that govern-
ment and each of its officials always have a duty to treat citizens responsibly
and with concern and respect.
The doctrine through which we implement this insistence would never
contain the standards requirement.335 As official discretion increases, so does
the need for inquiry into the carefulness with which power is exercised.
Although we have always realized this, until now there was little we could do
about it. Limited (at least for purposes of crafting legal rules) to modeling
human interaction as egocentric, self-serving and opportunistic, we could
imagine only process that was designed to compel those with power to yield.
Limited to regarding process as compulsion, we had to provide for the possibil-
ity of outside (i.e., judicial) policing. And limited to accepting judicial activity
as legitimate only when it neutrally enforces values generated by the political
process, we could authorize courts to intervene only where there were "judi-
cially manageable" (i.e., mandatory, explicit, substantive) standards. Now,
however, no longer limited to these assumptions about human response to
power, the purpose of process, or the criteria of legitimate adjudication, we
could openly acknowledge here-as we do everywhere else in administrative
law 336-that official discretion is inescapable. And our due process jurispru-
dence could then begin to try to discover practices that induce officials to use
this inevitable power with wisdom and compassion, for we would recognize
that discretion (like dependence) represents far greater capacity for good, and
for evil, than liberal legalism ever acknowledged.
335. That is, the present doctrinal insistence on explicit, mandatory, substantive standards meaningfully
constraining official discretion.
336. See, e.g., Rakoff, supra note 49, at 174-75 (administrative law "consideris] the control of
discretionary power as its raison d'etre").
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In this search for practices that foster the benign use of discretion, we
would be both inspired and compelled to push our thinking beyond the narrow
limits of adversary trial procedures. We would be inspired by our more
hopeful view of human nature. Knowing that people are capable of using
power responsibly and regardfully, we would realize that such capacity is not
nurtured by encouraging official and citizen to regard each other as combat-
ants, or by framing their interactions on the assumption that each will take
advantage of the other whenever possible. For our litigation-bound legal
consciousness, imagining alternative ways of proceeding that facilitate empa-
thetic and nonadversarial decisionmaking is not easy, but there are signs that
it is possible. With our rising interest in alternative dispute resolution tech-
niques, we are slowly reaching out to other disciplines-psychology, sociology,
anthropology-to broaden our conception of problem-solving methods.337
Specifically within regulatory programs, the work of William Simon, Joel
Handler and others reveals the possibilities and incidents of more humane
practices of public administration.33
And if, discouraged by the difficulty of unfamiliar terrain and the intransi-
gence of bureaucracy, our inspiration to search for these alternative practices
wanes, we would nonetheless be compelled to continue by our recognition that
adversary process in the administrative state rarely secures even the limited
goals liberal legalism had set it. A feminist due process jurisprudence might
not abandon the concepts of rights-as-swords-and-shields and process as battle,
but it would not ignore how frail these concepts become when invoked in the
real world of regulatory power. Through the work of Lucie White, William
Simon, Austin Sarat and others, we have discovered how little security,
autonomy and protection from arbitrariness citizens obtain from even the
plenary "fair hearing" Goldberg provided in the welfare context.339 In part,
this is because process crafted for the strong, articulate and self-sufficient does
not meet the needs of the downtrodden, silenced, and subordinate. But the
disjunction between the ideal liberal-legalist protagonist and the real citizen-
337. To be sure, we have discovered that such processes do not always succeed, and indeed have
sometimes reinforced existing patterns of exploitation. See, e.g., Lisa Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse
Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (1984);
Janet Rifkin, Mediation from a Feminist Perspective: Promise and Problems, 2 J. LAW & INEQ. 21 (1984);
Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, supra note 298, at 1907 n. 193; Rhode, supra note
254, at 632 & n.54 (collecting sources). Perhaps this discovery is simply a reminder that alternative forms
of process (no more than traditional forms) cannot be imposed without reference to context, or expected
to "work" immediately and without adjustment.
338. See, e.g., Simon, Invention and Reinvention, supra note 229 (describing Social Work Jurispru-
dence); JOEL HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF DISCRETION: AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY, BUREAUCRACY
79-120 (1986) (describing one school system's cooperative approach to special education rights); J.
MASHAW, supra note 43, at 264-67 (describing Veterans Administration).
339. See, e.g., White, supra note 228; Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class, supra note 229;
Austin Sarat, ". . . The Law Is All Over": Power, Resistance and the Legal Consciousness of the Welfare
Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343 (1990); Robert Scott, The Reality of Procedural Due Process-A Study




seeking-government-services is not the only reason why adversary process
fails. As even the most resourceful lawyer working for the most sophisticated
and affluent client well knows, formal procedural weapons-no matter how
skillfully wielded-provide only a limited defense against hostile or irresponsi-
ble officials. If the administrative state is a state of war, then victory will
always go, in the end, to the one who is at home in the regulatory jungle.
The only sane solution, in the long run, is to recast the activity as peace,
and to fashion administrative environments that concentrate on inducing
officials to be their best, rather than on trying to block them from being their
worst. Hence, if we do resort to patterns of adversarial process, we would be
mindful of their decidedly second-best quality and their limited utility. We
would -recognize that, to be even minimally useful to the citizens they are
supposed to protect, they often require far more supporting services than we
have been accustomed to provide.3" In the end we would, perhaps, be most
comfortable regarding them as transitional devices, imperfect stopgaps awaiting
our discovery of a way to heal a particularly unhealthy regulatory interac-
tion. 4'
We frequently have been told that the goal of making public administration
careful, compassionate, and courteous is utterly beyond the power of constitu-
tional law. Until now, this was surely so. So long as human nature is modelled
as fixed and the proper role of judges is prescribed as merely ending particular
disputes through disinterested application of preexisting neutral rules, it is
nonsensical (even threatening) to speak of the symbolic and transformative
potential of constitutional adjudication. So long as courts preside over a
ritualized form of combat in which truth emerges victorious from confronta-
tion, it is ludicrous to think that the loser can be ordered to love one who has
been cast, from the outset, as his enemy. If, however, we understood our
individual and collective identity as a constantly evolving, interactive process
as much shaped by, as shaping, such culturally important activities as constitu-
tional adjudication, then we would realize the self-fulfilling quality of predic-
tions about what those activities can accomplish. We are a society in which
judgments about the constitutionality of specific practices are frequently taken
as judgments about the morality and appropriateness of those practices.34 2
340. This means, at a minimum, the provision of skilled advocates for many claimants in social welfare
programs. See Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy and Class, supra note 229; White, supra note 228, at 53-54.
Lucie White hypothesizes a variety of more extensive supports, including the provision of linguistic and
anthropological experts who could interpret and explain to decisionmakers the speech and behavior patterns
of powerless people. White, Id. at 55-56.
341. From our very different set of starting points, we would have a very different expectation of what
.normal," "healthy" interactions look like. "Instead of community and cooperation being taken as
phenomena whose existence and even possibility is puzzling, and sometimes even regarded as impossible,
the existence of egoism, competitiveness and conflict, phenomena which liberalism regards as endemic to
the human condition, would themselves become puzzling and problematic." A. JAGGAR, supra note 254,
at 41.
342. See generally Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV.
641 (1990).
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For almost twenty years, due process adjudication has told administrators
either that their "clients" have no right to complain about how they have been
treated ("no standards, no obligations") or that they themselves can't be trusted
to do their job right ("courts decide what process yields accurate decisions").
When these are the messages it has been sending, is it any wonder that contem-
porary procedural due process jurisprudence has not contributed to-and may
indeed have undermined-the emergence of a responsible, committed and
humane public administration?343
How do we know what might be possible if procedural due process adjudi-
cation became a self-consciously value-generating activity in which all partici-
pants come together to discover what is right, rather than a battle in which
wrongdoers are unmasked and forced to yield? Hard as it is for us to think
about litigation in this way,3" there are even in our present world faint glim-
mers of hope that such an alteration is possible. Sometimes, in institutional and
other complex litigation, trial judges (or their masters) find ways to refocus
the adversarial, blame-inflicting tendencies of litigants and emphasize forward-
looking, collaborative approaches to finding solutions. Working from a set of
feminist understandings and methods, we might actually achieve the transfor-
mation of adjudication that could, in turn, transform what procedural due
343. It seems possible that the tendency to conflate judgments about constitutionality with ones about
wisdom, morality or appropriateness is especially great in an area like procedural due process.
When private parties leave the courtroom with a declaration of their legal duties to one another, they
reenter a world of family, business, religious, and social networks which contain their own norms of
acceptable behavior. The literature on relational contracts, for example, emphasizes the existence of
incentives to fulfillment of contractual expectations that operate independent of legal enforceability. See,
e.g., IAN MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
(1980); Symposium: Law, Private Governance and Continuing Relationships, 1985 Wisc. L. REV. 461.
See also Melvin Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979) ("Withholding legal
enforcement from a promise does not license its breach. A promise-breaker may lose business, friends,
or self-respect and the prospect of such losses may be more of an impetus to performance than the prospect
of money damages.").
It is not so clear that social, economic, moral or religious forces operate in the same ways to constrain
the "business" conduct of government officials-particularly if the official is part of a large bureaucracy
insulated from the local community by its "federal" character. Drawing on social science as well as on
history, Robert Cover reminded us, "Persons who act within social organizations that exercise authority
act violently without experiencing the normal inhibitions or normal degree of inhibition which regulates
the behavior of those who act autonomously." Cover, Violence and the Word, supra note 271, at 1615.
Indeed, bureaucracies may deliberately condition their component members to leave personal values at the
door when they enter:
Administrative man accepts the organization goals as the value premises of his decisions ....
What is perhaps most remarkable and unique about administrative man is that the organizational
influences do not merely cause him to do certain specific things (e.g., putting out a forest fire,
if that is his job), but induce in him a habit pattern of doing whatever things are appropriate to
carry out in cooperation with others the organization goals.
Robert Denhardt & Jan Perkins, The Coming Death of Administrative Man, PUBLIC ADMIN. REV. 379
(July/Aug. 1976) (quoting organization theorist Herbert Simon) (emphasis in original). See also K.
FERGUSON, supra note 333.
Hence, it may be that decisions about legal, and particularly constitutional, obligations readily become
the sum and substance of administrative morality-particularly in underfunded programs in which workers,
overwhelmed by unmeetable need for services, may cling to any justification for neglectful behavior.
344. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Feminist Litigatioh: An Oxymoron? - A Study of the Briefs Filed in
William L. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 137 (1990).
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process jurisprudence can accomplish. From our understanding of the nature
and sources of knowledge, we would recognize the importance of a judicial
approach that actively seeks out the perspectives of those who live and shape
the particular regulatory situation. We would not minimize the challenge of
comprehending and appropriately integrating the experience of the welfare
recipient or the front-line agency worker. But we would recognize that listen-
ing to these voices in addition to the voices of agency administrators and
lawyers is not a matter of pluralism or equal time or simple courtesy. It is an
epistemological and remedial imperative. We would realize that sound solutions
can not be developed, let alone successfully implemented, through a process
in which isolated judges formulate and deliver answers from on high. 45
What we would learn from this commitment to broadened participation in
the discovery of due process answers might at times be difficult for us to
accept. Perhaps, for example, we would be forced to acknowledge that the
process patterns of revelation and participation, which have had a remarkable
currency across political and philosophical camps, are the process ideals of an
elite-we lawyers, scholars, and judges for whom words are powerful instru-
ments and comfortable extensions of self. We would constantly be required
to reassess our expectations not simply of what sort of process is good (is the
interjection of lawyers anything other than the interjection of adversarialness?),
but even of what sort of process is possible (what if a panel of welfare recipi-
ents from the community helped make continued eligibility determinations?).
And this continual reminder of the limits of our understanding of a complex
world would further transform procedural due process jurisprudence, as we
openly admit to the provisional, modifiable, even experimental character of
the answers that emerge. The concept of solutions that depend upon context,
and are modifiable with new information and circumstance, has never been
completely alien to adjudication. Equity practice, particularly the injunction,
has long included a self-conscious commitment to flexibility and adaptabili-
ty.3" However, so long as liberal legalism modelled law as the marking of
345. Because I have been focusing on procedural due process as legal doctrine, the discussion has
largely proceeded from the perspective of the judiciary. But the rejection of "top down" solutions
necessarily implies that ways of thinking about process and about the "ethic" of government power must
change within agencies themselves. On this point, such work as William Simon's retrieval of the profession-
al belief system of Progressive Social Work becomes enormously valuable. As Simon's work also shows
us, however, the evolution of an agency's character can be affected by the course of procedural due process
adjudication. Suppose, for example, that courts explicitly said (and really meant) that they would show
deference to agency-crafted procedures if, but only if, the agency had arrived at those procedures after
deliberate study of how the needs and abilities of its client population could be accommodated, responsibly
and respectfully, in light of its programmatic goals and resources. Suppose also that, if the agency had not
previously engaged in this sort of professional self-evaluation, courts responded, at least in the first
instance, by encouraging the parties to undertake it cooperatively under the auspices of some court-
appointed facilitator.
346. The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to
mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has
distinguished it. The qualities of mercy and practicality have made equity the instrument for nice
adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and private needs ....
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944).
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boundaries between opposing camps and adjudication as the public declaration
of right-holder and wrongdoer, it was almost impossible for courts to avoid
pronouncing absolute, timeless truth that could be altered only by a system-
wrenching confession of error. Now, however, we would recognize that being
"correct" in due process adjudication-as in any of the other practices by
which we seek to understand and enrich our lives-is a matter of being situated
in particular perspectives upon which we are obligated, always, to try to
improve .3" And we would come to see in the continual, contextual reexami-
nation of the practices we devise not the sign of failure, but rather the promise
of success.
If it seems to you that I am conjuring up a world thoroughly familiar at
one moment and utterly unrecognizable at the next, I think you are right. That
is why, at the outset, I invoked the metaphor of the damask, the cloth which,
when reversed, reveals an image at once remembered and never seen before.
Conceiving a new procedural due process requires not that we abandon every-
thing we have known and been-an effort which (even if possible) could only
be profoundly disorienting-but rather that we allow ourselves to believe in
everything we might be. From understanding what we are, as persons and as
citizens poised at the end of a century of enormous public and private transfor-
mation, we learn both why we must change this law, and how we can. In one
of the earliest efforts to describe a feminist jurisprudence, Ann Scales-no
naive utopian-wrote:
It is insane at the end of the twentieth century to adhere to the belief
that people are innately horrid and can not do better. Rather, we must
recognize that our fears-of contingency, of dependency, of unimpor-
tance-have put us on a suicidal path. We need now to embrace the
lesson of Darwin-that we are a self-creating species.348
In its short but intense lifetime, procedural due process jurisprudence has often
flirted with the lure of constitutional Darwinism. It is time to surrender-not
to a seductive lie that we can save a few of us, if only we would be "realis-
tic," but rather to a quickening truth that we can save all of us, if only we
would dare to have faith.
Even science-that most radically conservative of disciplines349-knows
347. See Bartlett, supra note 297, at 832.
348. Scales, supra note 254, at 1393 (citations omitted).
349. See FRANK WILCZEK & BETSY DEVINE, LONGING FOR THE HARMONIES: THEMES AND
VARIATIONS FROM MODERN PHYsics 25-28 (1987).
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that when, despite the best and most determined efforts, existing assumptions
cannot accommodate new phenomena, it is time to find a fundamentally
different way of thinking about the world.35
Even science-that discipline most dedicated to discovering how things
"really" are-knows that truth often is created by how you choose to seek it.
"[Iff we ask a particle question,
we will get a particle answer,
if we ask a wave question,
we will get a wave answer ... "351
No answer is what the wrong question begets ....
350. See generally THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
351. A. JAGGAR, supra note 254, at 368 (quoting Fritjof Capra).
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